TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA/AMIA BOMBING
IN ARGENTINA
Y 4. IN 8/16: L 34 = _=
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ARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22-101 CC WASHINGTON : 1996
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-052233-1
TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA/AMIA BOMBING
IN ARGENTINA
Y 4. IN 8/16: L 34
Terrorisn in Latin ftnerica/ftlllft Bon...
.\RING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
^^^28ios
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22-101 CC WASHINGTON : 1996
I'
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-052233-1
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, NAraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN. Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING. New York
JAY KIM, California
SAM BROWNBACK. Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT. Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SAJiFORD, South
Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON. Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New JerBey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL. New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE. New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS. New Jereey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN. Ohio
CYNTHL^ A. McKINNEY, Geoi^a
ALCEE L- HASTINGS, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JAMES P. MORAN, Vii^nia
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Vir^n Islands (Ind.)
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Michael H. Van Dusen, Democratic Chief of Staff
John P. MacKEY, Investigative Counsel
Parker H. Brent, Staff Associate
(II)
CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Page
Ambassador Philip Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Depart-
ment of State 5
Mr. Robert Biyant, assistant director of National Security Division, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation 8
Dr. Luis Czyzewski, father of AMIA bombing victim 18
Dr. Ruben Beraja, president. Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associa-
tions 20
Rabbi Avi Weiss, national president. Coalition for Jewish Concerns 22
Mr. Tommy Baer, president, BTSTAI BHITH 24
Mr. Jacob KovadlofT, consultant for Latin Americem Affairs, American
Jewish Committee 27
Mr. Israel Singer, secretary general. World Jewish Congress 28
Mr. Barry Mehler, national commissioner, Anti-Defamation League 30
Mr. Ralph Goldman, father of victim of 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing
in Buenos Aires, Argentina 32
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Ambasssador Wilcox 39
Mr. Robert Bryant 46
Dr. Luis Czyzewski 53
Dr. Ruben Beraja 57
Rabbi Avi Weiss 64
Mr. Tommy Baer 68
Mr. Jacob Kovadloff 75
Mr. Israel Singer 80
Mr. Barry Mehler 84
Mr. Ralph Goldman 89
Additional material submitted:
Statement submitted for the record by James Brown, deputy associate
director (Criminal Division), Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco and Firearms 94
Additional information supplied by Chairman Benjamin Gilman Ill
Letters submitted by:
Senator Barbara Mikulski 129
Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean, Simon Wiesenthal Center 132
GuiUermo Patricio Kelly 165
Additional information submitted by Rabbi Avi Weiss 133
(III)
TERRORISM JN LATIN AMERICA/AMIA
BOMBING IN ARGENTINA
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m. in room 2170,
Raybum House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilmain (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Oilman. The committee will come to order. I am
pleased to call to order today's full committee hearing on inter-
national terrorism in Latin America, in particular Argentina and
the bombing of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos
Aires last year to be our focus for today.
In 1993, we in our Nation had the World Trade Center bombing
in New York, as we all know, along with the terrorist plots to kill
government officials, destroy commuter tunnels, attack United
States Oovernment and U.N. facilities in the city of New York. Ter-
rorism has come to our shores and, as we will hear today, to that
of our neighbors to the south as well.
It is an imsafe world out there, particularly in the Americas
where we have become the newest targets of these cowardly terror-
ists. We have a vested and common interest in this vital subject
because it does threaten all of us, threatens our way of life and our
fundamental freedoms. We must all battle this scourge together
here in the Americas.
The Summit of the Americas in Miami last year had this to say
on terrorism in the region and I quote, "We condemn terrorism in
all its forms and we will, using all legal means, combat terrorist
acts anywhere in the Americas with unity and vigor."
Surely, the deadly 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, which we
will be examining today, requires that same unity and vigor in the
struggle against international terrorism. The Jewish Community
Center bombing in Buenos Aires has been linked to Hizballah, the
terrorist organization based in Lebanon, which has close links to
Iran. An earlier deadly bombing at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos
Aires in 1992 also has been linked to Hizballah.
The AMIA blast killed some 86 innocent civilians, wounded 300
more, and has again greatly shaken the feeling of security of the
largest Jewish community in Argentina and in the Americas. We
look forward to hearing from the coordinator for counterterrorism
in the Office of the Secretary of State, and from the head of FBI's
National Security Division.
(1)
Representatives of both organizations recently attended a re-
gional conference in Argentina on international terrorism. We will
also be hearing today from concerned members of the Jewish com-
munity, both in Buenos Aires, and here in our own Nation. We will
also have a written submission from the ATF which was at the
bomb site, and has been very helpful to us in preparing for this
hearing.
During the August recess, committee staff traveled to Buenos
Aires and met with many of the interested parties, including family
members, the prosecuting judge and senior government officials on
the AMIA attack. I am pleased to report tnat the committee re-
ceived the full cooperation, and support of the Argentine govern-
ment in learning details about the bombing, and the status of the
inquiry to date.
We must continue to keep our regional effort strong and steadv
in this struggle against terrorism, especially when the subject isn t
on the nightly news or in the morning headlines. Vigilance and
perseverance is especially needed when the clues and leads die
down, and the public and media attention shifts away from the
horror of the smoke-filled ruins of the latest terrorist atrocity.
Hopefully, today's hearings will help to strengthen the resolve of
all of those who are dedicated to seeing that justice is done in the
AMIA bombing, the earlier Israeli Embassy attack and other such
terrorist attacks, wherever and whenever they occur. Not to do so
serves merely to reward these cowardly terrorists and encourages
more of the same, whether abroad or here at home.
Before beginning testimony, I would like to ask if any of our col-
leagues have any opening statements. I must hold all our wit-
nesses, incidentally, to 5 minutes and we will include all of their
written testimony in the record if they wish to submit full testi-
mony since we must be out of the room by 1 p.m. for a European
parliamentary session, which has to be set up here for an afternoon
session.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chair-
man, before I make some substantive comments about this issue,
I want to pay personal tribute to you for your leadership over the
years in the fight against terrorism. You have been the strong voice
of the United States in our semiannual meetings with the Euro-
pean Parliament advocating a coordinated effort to fight inter-
national terrorism and I want publicly to express my admiration
for that effort.
It is ironic, Mr. Chairman, that you have called this meeting for
today and, of course, I salute you for holding this hearing, because
in a few minutes, some of us will be going down to the White
House for the signing ceremony in this next stage of the Middle
East peace process. We were there a year ago and while some
progress has been made, there have been enormous setbacks, and
almost every single one of them is related to acts of terrorism. So
if we needed any reminder, we have the reminder of the event at
the White House today that major international developments like
the attempt to craft a more stable Middle East are at the mercy
of ruthless, reckless international terrorists, and that is our subject
at this hearing.
I think it is important to begin by suggesting that the problem
is universal, whether it is Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center
in New York, institutions in Paris or Lyons, or Argentina, we are
dealing with an international conspiracy. We are dealing with an
international conspiracy at the heart of which, of course, are some
rogue countries, reckless dictatorial police states, like Iran and
Libya, and much of the action, of course, is carried out by fun-
damental Islamic terrorists. I think it is important to differentiate
between the highly respected religion of Islam and virtually all of
its adherents who are peace-loving citizens everywhere and the ter-
rorist element in that community.
Mr, Chairman, when last year I served as Chairman of the Inter-
national Security Subcommittee and I convened a hearing on this
subject in the wake of this outrage, I had high hopes that the gov-
ernment of Argentina would leave no stone imturned to deal effec-
tively with this situation.
I particularly hoped so because an earlier bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Argentina was pursued by a very lackadaisical, incom-
petent and confused attempt to imcover the source, the culprits and
the criminals. But I must admit I am filled with disappointment
and amazement that for the second time we have been treated to
an incompetent, uncoordinated, confused attempt by Argentine au-
thorities to get to the bottom of this.
The failure to pursue more effectively this matter creates a seri-
ous blot on the international reputation of these great Latin Amer-
ican nations. I earnestly hope that our own law enforcement agen-
cies will provide far greater assistance to Argentine authorities
than what has happened thus far. It is an outrage that afler 90
people were killed, innocent civilians killed in a bombing, there is
really no effective result that this investigation can point to, de-
spite hearings in the Congress of the United States, despite the
global publicity.
I understand it is not an easy issue. The tri-border area covering
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay provides an extremely attractive
hiding place for fundamental Islamic terrorists. The extreme Is-
lamic segments of the populations in these countries provide haven
and cover. But it is simply inexcusable that so little progress has
been made by the authorities in Argentina in dealing with this
international outrage.
I hope that this hearing will provide yet an additional stimulus
for the government of Argentina at the highest level to put this
issue high on its agenda where it clearly has not been. The Con-
gress of the United States will not walk away from this issue. I
nope to God we won't have to have a hearing a year from now re-
porting equally dismal, pathetic, impotent results, and I am calling
on the government of Argentina not to redouble its efforts because
that would not be sufficient, but to at long last deal with this issue
with the seriousness the problem merits. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Chairman Oilman. I thank Mr, Lantos for his very poignant
statement. I am going to ask Mrs. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her
opening statement and I am going to ask her to take over the
chair. I have just been called to another hearing. I will try to re-
turn as quickly as possible. Mrs. Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your
decision to hold a full committee hearing on terrorism in Latin
America with a special focus on the bombing of the Argentine Isra-
elite Mutual Association is greatly appreciated. The bombing of the
Jewish Center in Buenos Aires was carried out by a truck bomb
using fertilizer and diesel fuel. The similarity between the bombing
in Buenos Aires and the bombing in Oklahoma City serves as a
useful, if tragic, reminder of the international threat posed by ter-
rorist activities. Our own experience with our fellow Americans in
Oklahoma City creates a human bond between us and the people
of Argentina, especially with the families of the 86 people who were
killed and the 300 who were injured in the Buenos Aires bombing.
That the bombing took place at this location and that the Argen-
tinean people of the Jewish faith were specifically targeted is espe-
cially troubling. The spread of violence targeted at the Jewish com-
munity in Argentina also demonstrates the international dimension
of this issue and demonstrates the need to take effective action to
end the terrorism.
The Jewish people in every country have become a target of ter-
rorists from radical groups in the Middle East and we need to join
forces to protect them from these terrorists. Every citizen of every
society has a right to live in peace and freedom free from the threat
of these terrorists.
As our esteemed chairman, Mr. Oilman, cited in his opening
statement at the most recent Summit of the Americas, there were
national leaders gathered there committing themselves to using all
legal means to combat terrorism anywhere in the Americas and to
pursue the struggle against terrorism with unity and vigor. This
summit was held in my own city of Miami and we were especially
interested in this aspect of the summit.
We cannot allow this terrorism to spread into our communities
and we must count on international cooperation to safeguard all of
our citizens. We must reach out across national borders thousands
of miles from our shores to join hands with others around the
world to ensure the survival of democracy and the safety of all of
our citizens. The last 15 years has seen a dramatic period of politi-
cal renewal in Latin America with the growth of democratically
elected governments.
In 1979, onlv two out of the 10 South American and one out of
the six Central American countries had democratically elected gov-
ernments. But by 1990, democratic rule had been established near-
ly everywhere in Latin America outside of the cruel Castro dicta-
torship. And while the long-term prognosis for democracy in Latin
America is bright, terrorism remains a threatening cloud on our
horizon.
The cruel and senseless attack which took place in Argentina on
July 18th of last year, as well as the World Trade Center bombing
that the Chairman referred to, shows us how the entire hemisphere
is at risk from state-sponsored terrorism.
To protect the people of this country and to preserve the hard-
won democracy of our neighbors, we must learn to cooperate in our
mutual defense. We must learn to share information on potential
terrorist threats so as to prevent the bombers from reaching their
targets. When these madmen succeed in shedding innocent blood,
we must be united in our determination to punish them and those
who provide the means for murderers to indulge their blood lust.
The United States must not only cooperate, but we must lead in
the pursuit of justice.
Last May I co-signed a letter to the President of Argentina ex-
pressing deep concern about the lack of progress in investigating,
not only this bombing, but the bomb attack of the Israeli Embassy
in 1992, which resulted in 29 deaths. As that letter stated, "Failure
to pursue these terrorists and their international sponsor ener-
getically will only encourage future acts of terrorism."
As our esteemed colleague, Mr. Lantos, pointed out, the progress
of those investigations has been lackluster. These hearings will
shed light on the international nature of the terrorist threat that
plagues all nations, as well as the cost in human lives. This dimin-
ishes all of us. It is our hope that it will serve to spur all the gov-
ernments involved to redouble their efforts to bring these killers to
justice and put an end to terrorism in the Americas.
I would like to recognize Mr. Wynn for any opening statement
that he might have.
Mr. Wynn. Thank you. Madam Chairman, but in the interest of
time, I will waive my opening statement at this point.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
We are pleased to introduce the first panel, the Honorable Phillip
Wilcox, coordinator of counterterrorism with the Department of
State and Mr. Robert Bryant, director of National Security Division
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thank you gentlemen.
Mr. Wilcox. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. PHILH* WH^COX, COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Wilcox. Madam Chairman, thank you and thanks to the
members of the committee for holding this hearing to educate the
Americans on a vital subject and for your continuing interest in the
resolution of the savage crime of the bombing of AMIA head-
quarters in Argentina and of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 in Bue-
nos Aires. These two heinous acts have imderscored to us that we
in this hemisphere are also vulnerable to acts of international ter-
rorism.
I would like to outline this threat in Latin America and how the
United States and the other nations of the hemisphere are respond-
ing. The Lebanese-based Iran-backed Hizballah, which has waged
a campaign of terror in the Middle East and is still implacably op-
posed to Israel, the peace process and the West, is now the major
international terrorist threat in Latin America. The suicide car
bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 was Hizballah's first ter-
rorist act in South America. Hizballah denied responsibility, but Is-
lamic Jihad, a clandestine terrorist wing of Hizballah, claimed to
have carried out the bombing and authenticated its claim with a
videotape of the embassy before the bombing, a Hizballah trade-
mark.
The Argentine Government has not brought charges for the 1994
bombing, but the evidence points to Hizballah. The attack was a
virtual duplicate of the 1992 bombing against the Israeli Embassy.
6
The terrorist bombing of a commuter aircraft in Panama in July
1994, just 1 day after the AMIA disaster, is still unsolved, but cir-
cumstantial evidence there also points to culpability of the
Hizballah.
Hizballah operations in Latin America, which include narcotics
smuggling as well as terrorism, are supported in the triborder area
of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Hizballah is known to have
cells in Colombia and Venezuela as well. Hizballah's chief patron
is Iran, and it is likely that Iran was aware of and provided sup-
port to the two Buenos Aires bombings.
We believe that Hizballah has not committed terrorist acts
abroad without Iranian consent, and that Hizballah cells in Latin
America are aided and supported and guided by intelligence offi-
cers in Iranian embassies in the region. Other terrorist threats in
Latin America also threaten our interest. Through August 1995,
there were 53 acts of international terrorism in that region of
which 35 were directed against United States interests.
A great many of these were kidnappings. There has been an epi-
demic of kidnappings in Colombia. One thousand four hundred
such acts were reported in 1994, a 35 percent increase over 1993.
At least four United States citizens are currently being held for
ransom in Colombia, and two American hostages were killed on
July 19th during a shoot-out between terrorists and government
forces.
In Peru, the notorious Shining Path Group, which has killed
thousands over the years, has been in decline since the arrest of
its leader, Guzman, in 1992. But Sendero still remains a deadly
force.
Let me turn now to the AMIA investigation. Argentine leaders
have emphasized to us their strong determination to solve this
crime and the attack on the Israeli Embassy, and to prevent any
recurrence. The Argentine leadership has also promoted greater
counterterrorism cooperation in the aftermath of these two crimes
in the Western Hemisphere and this has been a precedent.
Large suicide bombings of this kind are very difficult to inves-
tigate and solve. Regrettably, there has been no breakthrough in
the AMIA case and I believe there are various reasons for this. Ar-
gentina's laws and investigative and judicial systems do not pro-
vide all the tools and resources that are needed to deal aggressively
with such major crimes. Improved machinery is needed.
In the past, Argentina's borders have been porous and the gov-
erninent has lacked an adequate mechanism for monitoring immi-
gration. Recently, President Menem's government has adopted a
new program to tighten border controls. In the past, Argentina's in-
vestigative security and intelligence arms have suffered from inad-
equate interagency coordination.
Recently, steps have been taken to provide greater cohesion and
we believe this holds promise. Argentina also needs to improve the
effectiveness of officials working m the lower levels of all of their
law enforcement and security agencies.
Let me say a word about United States assistance to the AMIA
inquiry. We have assisted the government's investigation in various
ways because of our profound sympathy for the victims of the
AMIA bombing and because of the close relations between the
United States and Argentina. Within 48 hours of the AMIA bomb-
ing, an international response team managed by the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, with three explosive experts
from Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, flew to
Buenos Aires. Three FBI agents also participated and provided
technical assistance.
The members of the IRT team and the FBI were instrumental in
this — ^in assisting in the early phase of the investigation. They
helped in recovering parts of the engine of the van which was be-
lieved to be carrying the suicide bomber and the explosives. They
helped monitor the cleanup efforts and they provided technical ad-
vice to the Argentine authorities on evidence collection and preser-
vation.
The United States has also provided extensive antiterrorism
training assistance to the Argentine government through the De-
partment's Antiterrorism Assistance Program, which this commit-
tee has given generous support. The ATA program has trained over
280 Argentine officials in 17 different courses.
We are proposing to provide 10 more such courses in the next 2
years that will train 222 additional officials. We have invested so
far about $4.8 million in this training and we think it is very im-
portant. The Buenos Aires bombings have created a new sense of
urgency in the Southern Hemisphere and they have galvanized the
states of that region into greater counterterrorism cooperation.
As in other parts of the world, you cannot fight terrorism suc-
cessfully without cooperation among the law enforcement, intel-
ligence and diplomatic elements of friendly governments. Spreading
this approach of cooperation to our own Hemisphere has been one
of this administration's most important goals and I am pleased to
report that this is working.
The United States, Argentina and other like-minded States led
an initiative at the December summit in Miami for an OAS-backed
hemispheric conference on terrorism. This will be held in Lima in
the spring, and we will be playing an active role in that process.
In another move to strengthen cooperation, Argentina held a con-
ference of the five states of the southern cone in Buenos Aires in
August and they produced agreement to cooperate in very practical
ways against terrorism. The United States and Canada also took
part.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador, if you could
summarize.
Mr. Wilcox. This was a heinous act of terrorism, as was the
1992 bombing. It was aimed at the very heart of the Jewish com-
munity in Argentina and it destroyed a priceless historical archive.
Out of this tragedy has come greater awareness of the inter-
national threat to Argentina in the Southern Hemisphere, and we
are doing everything we can to work with the government of Ar-
gentina and the other nations of the re^on to stop this threat. We
pledge to continue this, so that there will be no recurrence of such
acts in our hemisphere. Thank you. Madam Chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilcox appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador, I
apologize. We are trying to stick to the 5-minute rule because of
all the witnesses that we have following this esteemed panel.
Thank you, Mr. Bryant.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT BRYANT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID It WILLIAMS, FBI
SPECIAL AGENT, FBI LABORATORY, EXPLOSIVES UNIT, FED-
ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Bryant. Thank you. On behalf of the FBI, it is a pleasure
to appear before you this morning to discuss international terror-
ism in Latin America. Since the tragic bombing of the World Trade
Center in February 1993, the FBI, the intelligence community and
the law enforcement community have learned that we are con-
fronted with a new and growing form of international terrorism.
This brand of terrorism is loosely structured and comprised of
many groups and persons who use violence to promote their per-
sonal, political, social or economic beliefs.
Currently, there are terrorist infrastructures in Latin America,
the United States and Canada which actively support terrorist op-
erations worldwide. In July of last year, two suspected
transnational terrorist assaults occurred, namely the bombing of
the Israeli Argentine Mutual Association, AMIA building in Buenos
Aires, and the downing of a Panamanian commuter airline. As the
attack on the commuter airline took the lives of three U.S. citizens,
our citizens and our country became victims of potentially a broad-
er terrorist campaign.
Today I would like to update you on the assistance the FBI pro-
vided during these investigations in one other major attack per-
petrated by suspected transnational terrorists in Latin America.
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 coupled with the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 au-
thorized the FBI investigative jurisdiction overseas when a U.S.
national is taken hostage, murdered or assaulted by terrorists.
Naturally, FBI investigators abroad require coordination with
the Department of State and permission of the host country. Since
these acts have become law, we have responded to 207 incidents,
105 which are in South America. In Colombia, the National Libera-
tion Army, ELN and the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia,
FARC, regularly target U.S. interests.
Many Latin American Marxist terrorist groups, including Peru's
Shining Path, have greatly diminished. However, new terrorist
challenges are emerging in the region in the form of international
radical terrorism. On March 17th, 1992, a car bomb destroyed the
three-story Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and although 29 peo-
ple were killed, more than 240 others sustained injuries.
The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this cowardly attack.
The Islamic Jihad is a cover name used by Hizballah for the Party
of God. The Hizballah is a radical extremist group based in Leb-
anon and backed by Iran that is dedicated to installing a theocracy
in Lebanon modeled on the government of Iran. Moreover, the
Hizballah is pursuing the removal of all nonlslamic influences from
the Middle East.
In April 1983, 16 deaths occurred in the Hizballah bombing of
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Likewise, 241 fatalities were caused
by a Hizballah suicide truck bomb attack on the U.S. Marine bar-
9
racks in Beirut in October 1983. Support for the 1992 terrorist
bombing in Buenos Aires may have emanated from the triborder
area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which has a large Middle
Eastern population and a Hizballah presence.
The borders in this area are porous and are ideal for conducting
some illegal fundraising enterprise, including narcotics smuggling
and gun running. In Buenos Aires, the terrorist car bombing on
July 18, 1994 destroyed the AMIA building in which over 90 people
perished and more than 200 were injured.
A previously unknown group called the Islamic Command
claimed responsibility for this brutal attack. The U.S. Government
responded to this bombing less than 48 hours after the blast by of-
fering and thereafter deploying 13 experts in explosive investiga-
tions from the international response team, the Department of
State.
The international response team represented various government
agencies including security experts from the FBI, the State Depart-
ment diplomatic security and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms. I have with me today FBI Special Agent, David Wil-
liams, from our Explosives Unit, who was in Argentina and con-
ducted part of the investigation.
For the record, no arrests have been reported regarding the 1992
terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy, and with respect to the
1994 AMIA bombing, there have been two arrests of people in-
volved in the sale of the vehicle. Outside of Colon City, Panama,
an ALAS commuter plane destined for Panama City exploded in
flight and crashed on July 19, 1994.
Among the 21 victims were three United States citizens and 12
Jewish persons. In Lebanon, a group using the name Ansar Allah,
or Partisans of God, expressed support for the AMIA bombing and
suggested participation in the bombing of the ALAS commuter
plane.
The FBI is conducting a parallel investigation with the Panama-
nian Government due to the homicides of three United States citi-
zens. No arrests have been made in this ongoing investigation. Due
to the high visibility of the trials of Sheik Rahman and Ramzi
Ahmad Yousef, both allegedly involved in terrorist acts in New
York City, the counterterrorism community must remain on guard
against potential sympathetic acts of reprisal by elements of the
international radical terrorists.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Bryant, if you could summarize and we
will be putting your full statement in the record.
Mr. Bryant. I think the main point I want to make is that inter-
national terrorism requires an international response and it takes
training, it takes skilled law enforcement and it takes a lot of co-
operation to attack these elements that would destroy our society.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryant appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. I thank the gentle-
men for their excellent testimony.
Ambassador, in your statement, you had said, "the government
of Argentina has not yet charged any suspect for the 1994 AMIA
bombing, but the evidence points to Hizballah as the bomber." The
operation was a virtual duplicate of the 1992 suicide bombing in
10
which a vehicle carrying massive explosive charges detonated in
front of the Israeli Embassy, Ansar ^lah, a clandestine subgroup
of Hizballah, issued a statement expressing support for the bomb-
ing of the AMIA center after it happened. You later state
Hizballah's chief patron is Iran and it is likely that Iran was aware
of and provided support to the two Buenos Aires bombings. We be-
lieve that Hizballah has not committed terrorist acts abroad with-
out Iranian consent.
So you would say that in your expert opinion that that very same
terrorist group was responsible for both bombings in Argentina just
a few years apart?
Mr. Wilcox. That is correct, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And the chief patron of this group, as we
pointed out, is Iran.
In your expert testimony, you believe that that would not happen
without the expressed consent of Iran, and certainly the State De-
partment's annual Patterns Report on international terrorism in
part describes Hizballah as, "closely allied with and often directed
by Iran."
Therefore, if Hizballah is behind both of these terrorist attacks
in Argentina, certainly Iran seems to be behind as to who is ulti-
mately responsible for the AMIA bombings and Secretary Chris-
topher at one point blamed Iran for this bombing. You would say
that that is true.
Mr. Wilcox. Yes. Iran is the chief state sponsor of international
terrorism and, as you know, the President has tightened U.S. sanc-
tions against Iran recently with a full embargo against any U.S.
trade with Iran. We hope other nations will respond similarly to
tighten sanctions and bring home to Iran that this kind of behavior
is beyond the pale of civilized conduct.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Would you say that Iran has been using its
embassies and its diplomats to promote and support international
terrorism around the globe, including possibly this attack, the lat-
est attack in Argentina? What is the use of their embassies, their
operation with the diplomats? How is that tied into the bombings?
Mr. Wilcox. There is significant evidence, Madam Chairman, of
a classified nature, that the Iranian government does use its em-
bassies around the world in support of terrorist activities.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Bryant, could I ask the FBI's opinion
about Iran using the diplomatic channels or embassies around the
globe to support their terrorist attacks?
Mr. Bryant. I would concur with Ambassador Wilcox that the
Nation of Iran has on occasion used their diplomatic services for
these purposes, but we are getting into a classified area.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. When you say on occasion, sir, what occa-
sions have those been?
Mr. Bryant. I think I would rather answer that in a closed ses-
sion.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ambassador, did you want to add something?
Mr. Wilcox. May I add, Madam Chairman, that one of the ele-
ments of the declaration issued in Buenos Aires 3 weeks ago at the
subregional conference on counterterrorism was for nations in the
hemisphere to take action against nations which abuse diplomatic
11
privilege by using accredited diplomats for terrorism and other ille-
gal activities.
Ms. Ros-Lehtlnen. Following up on that, what are we urging
our allies and our friends around the globe to do about this gross
abuse of the diplomatic immunity by Iran? Are we urging them to
use the persona non grata tool and expel these diplomats in order
to attempt to break the links these diplomats have in the local
community, as well as in order to expose Iran's outrageous role in
promoting international terrorism around the world? What are we
doing to help our allies help us in this?
Mr. Wilcox. We are sharing information in our possession with
other States about Iranian diplomats, Iranian terrorist leaders who
are posing as diplomats, so that nations will refuse to give them
accreditation, or if they are already accredited, to expel them. We
have had some success in that respect, but we have not always suc-
ceeded.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I would like to ask the gentleman a question
submitted by Congresswoman Meyers to you, if you could respond
and we would include that in the record. She asks two questions:
What, if any, progress has been made in the investigation of the
March 17th, 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires?
And what connections, if any, are there between that attack on this
most recent atrocity? Realizing that you might have covered that
already, but if you could summarize it for the Congp-esswoman.
Mr. Wilcox. I regret that little progress has been made toward
solving the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy. We do believe
that the Hizballah was responsible for both acts because of the car-
bon copy similarity of the two acts: the same modus operandi, the
same suicide technique, the same kind of vehicular attack, which
are Hizballah signatures. Yet unfortunately, there has not been
progress in identifying the individuals who are responsible and
bringing charges against them.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Bryant.
Mr, Bryant. I would just add that the bombing had the ear-
marks of a Hizballah-type bombing. It has not been solved. But
from what we see in similarities to other bombings, we would clas-
sify it as a Hizballah bombing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Before I recognize Mr. Lantos for
questions, I would like to recognize Mrs. McKinney and Mr.
Menendez for any opening statements that they might like to put
in the record.
Mrs. McKinney.
Mrs. McKinney. Thank you, Madam Chair. I don't have an open-
ing statement.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Madam Chair, I reserve my comments for my
question period.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Lantos, you are recognized for questions.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman. I want to
commend you for your steadfast leadership on this very important
issue. I also want to extend in advance my apologies to other wit-
nesses because I am due at the White House in a few minutes. I
will study your testimony carefully. I also would like to submit a
12
formal request through you to the Chairman that we have a closed
session on this issue because Mr. Bryant properly indicated that on
issues that we cannot discuss in open session and I think a closed
session would be useful.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I will be passing that on to the Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. I just have a couple of questions at this point. Presi-
dent Clinton, in February, issued an Executive Order under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act freezing the assets
of various individuals and organizations involved in terrorist activi-
ties. Ambassador Wilcox.
The Executive Order also prohibited "charitable contributions to
those organizations and individuals." I want to ask you about the
implementation of that Executive Order. One, how much money or
other assets have been frozen, Ambassador Wilcox?
Mr. Wilcox. Congressman Lantos, the Department of Treasury
is the agency which is implementing that.
Mr. Lantos. I am fUlW aware of mat.
Mr. Wilcox. I am informed by the Department of Treasury that
approximately $350,000 has been seized in illegal transfers or fro-
zen in bank accounts, which were destined for the designated ter-
rorist organizations. Perhaps my colleague, Mr. Bryant, might have
some further information on that.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. The lEEPA provisions which were promoted in Feb-
ruary are being looked at and are being reviewed. The actual sei-
zures have been low, but some of those issues would be a matter
of ongoing discussions.
Mr. Lantos. Well, I find the answer very disappointing. There
was an excellent public relations release about freezing the assets
of terrorist organizations or individuals who promote terrorism,
and yet in reality only a pittance has been seized. I will call.
Madam Chairman, for a hearing on this whole issue.
We cannot deal with international terrorism merely via press re-
leases. Action is called for. And $350,000, in the domain of an ac-
tivity involving billions and huge amounts within the United
States, is very disappointing. Has anyone been caught violating the
charitable contribution ban, Ambassador Wilcox?
Mr. Wilcox. Yes. The money that was seized. Congressman Lan-
tos, was seized after the Executive Order was issued and those
transfers, I believe, were made in violation of the executive order.
Mr. Lantos. Well, that doesn't answer my question. Has anyone
been caught violating the charitable contribution ban and what has
happened to the individuals who have been so charged?
Mr. Wilcox. There have been no criminal prosecutions, sir, but
there are a series of extensive investigations going on.
Mr. Lantos. Since February.
Mr. Bryant. Yes.
Mr. Lantos. And not a single individual has been charged.
Mr. Bryant. No.
Mr. Lantos. I have difficulty visualizing this is a very effective
pursuit of an order. But under these circumstances, my judgment
would be that the practical impact of the executive order has been
minimal, to be generous, and I am wondering if either of you would
13
care to comment on how you evaluate the practical impact of a
Presidential Executive Order dealing with assets of terrorists and
dealing with the issue of camouflaging contributions to terrorist or-
ganizations as charitable contributions.
Mr. Wilcox. Mr. Congressman, while I cannot quantify it and
the number would never be known, I believe that a good many po-
tential contributions to these 12 designated organizations nave
been deterred by the Executive Order and that it has had a sub-
stantial effect. I have no way of confirming that, but I believe it
is the case, given the major publicity we have given to this and the
penalties that attach to violating the Executive Order.
Mr. Lantos. But you would agree, would you not, that since in
every other criminal instance, in every other criminal activity, we
are looking at the records to see whether, in fact, deterrence is op-
erative, I would find it surprising that that would not be the case
here.
Had we caught 10 people or 210 people and had we charged
them with violating this Executive Order, I could see that acting
as a deterrent. But what you are reporting is zero arrests, zero
prosecutions, $350,000 frozen, which to me could indicate that this
is not a very serious issue or it is so viewed because, obviously —
I have difficulty visualizing that in the entire United States not a
single individual would have been charged with violating this Exec-
utive Order, that everybody suddenly decided to behave impec-
cably, which is what you are saying,
Mr. Wilcox. Sir, some weeks ago U.S. authorities detained Mr.
Musa Abu Marzook, who is believed to be a senior official in
HAMAS, one of the proscribed terrorist organizations. Subse-
quently the government of Israel has informed us that it proposes
to request extradition of Mr. Marzook. There is reason to believe
that Mr. Marzook has been extensively involved in HAMAS activi-
ties in this country and perhaps in fundraising activities also, so
that a positive act, I believe, in fulfillment of the intention of the
Executive Order, although it happened in a different context.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you. Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-LEHTnsfEN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. And we will pass on
your concerns and your requests to the Chairman.
Mr. Wynn.
Mr. Wynn. Thank you. Madam Chairman. Actually this question
is for — well, I will ask both witnesses. I reviewed some of the testi-
mony, one by the father of one of the victims and another by the
national president of B'nai B'rith and there seems to be a strong,
very strong suggestion that there is a problem in the security
forces and in the courts that are impeding the investigation.
Reference was made to perhaps past links to the military dicta-
torship. But at any rate, I would like to get your evaluation of
whether there is an internal problem that is impeding the inves-
tigation.
Mr. Wilcox. Congressman Wynn, I mentioned in my oral testi-
mony and I have recorded in my statement that there are struc-
tural deficiencies in the Argentine law enforcement and judicial ap-
paratus which have impeded this investigation. I have no informa-
tion of any kind that there are senior government officials in Ar-
14
gentina who are impeding this investigation for any reason whatso-
ever.
Mr. Wynn. If I could just interject. Then you are saying by struc-
tural deficiencies, a lack of resources, training, problems such as
this, rather than any deliberate obstacles being placed. Is that a
fair assessment of your position?
Mr. Wilcox. To the extent of my knowledge, sir, that is the posi-
tion of the U.S. Government. We have no reason to believe that
there is any official hindrance and effort to stall or not to aggres-
sively pursue this investigation.
The leadership of the government of Argentina is determined to
do this. There are problems of efficiency, training and competence
at some of the lower levels in the judicial and law enforcement ap-
paratus, and I believe that this has probably been an impediment
to the investigation.
Mr, Wynn. OK, and I appreciate you saying that. In that context,
do you believe the current level of U.S. assistance to Argentina is
adequate to assist them in dealing with these structural defi-
ciencies should there be a sig^^ificant increase in U.S. assistance or
should there be an increase in multilateral assistance?
Mr. Wilcox. We view Argentina as an important country. The
terrorist threat there continues. We have committed a dispropor-
tionate share of antiterrorism assistance program funds to training
Argentine officials, and will continue to look for other ways to do
that, as the opportunities arise and as the Argentine authorities re-
quest such assistance. We also have done considerable training in
the area of aviation security to prevent Argentina's airports from
being used by terrorists.
Mr. Wynn. Could you put a dollar figure on the additional funds
that might be needed?
Mr. Wilcox. Sir, I can't do that, but I would pledge to you that
if a need is identified, if the government of Argentina requests as-
sistance and to the extent that our budget allows us, we will give
this high priority.
Mr. WWN. One final question and it may be more appropriate
for a closed session. My thinking along these lines is that increased
intelligence would be appropriate. Do you feel that the intelligence-
gathering apparatus we have in place is appropriate or what
changes ought to be made to give us a better ability to respond to
this great threat in the region?
Mr. Wilcox. I can only say in this open session that the collec-
tion analysis of intelligence on the terrorist threats around the
world and in Latin America is a very high priority for this adminis-
tration and the U.S. intelligence commimity, and we are devoting
far more resources to that area than we were some years ago. It
is a critical area. It deserves that priority, and it is getting it.
Mr. Wynn. Thank you. Madam Chairman, I don t have any fur-
ther questions, but I hear an underlying suggestion that perhaps
we should have some sort of closed session. We can go into this in
more detail.
I am particularly concerned in light of discovery of a billion dol-
lars in apparently imused funds in one of the intelligence agencies
that might be appropriately used for purposes of Eintiterrorism.
U5
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I share your concern and we will be glad to
pass that along to the Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wynn.
Mr. Wynn. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. For the record, I would like to ask Mr. Bry-
ant about the triggering device that set off the van in front of the
AMIA building. Could you give us a little information as to what
was the triggering device that set the bomb off?
Mr. Bryant. Madam Chairman, I have David Williams from our
laboratory who was in Argentina and I would like to have him re-
spond to your questions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. If you could state your name and
your title.
Mr. Williams. Yes. It is David R. Williams and I am a super-
visory special agent in the Explosives Unit Laboratory.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Would you say that this is an accurate artis-
tic rendition of the path of the van and where it might have gone
oflF?
Mr. Williams. Yes. That is consistent with what I saw.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you could tell us about the triggering de-
vice.
Mr. Williams. In this particular case, there was very little recov-
ered. Due to the size of the device that had exploded, basically all
that was recovered and identified was the vehicle itself As far as
the explosives residues, minimal was found in that particular case.
By the damage and damage consistent with the surrounding area,
it was consistent with a fertilizer-based explosive device. No trig-
gering mechanism was found.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You say no triggering mechanism was found?
Mr. Williams. No triggering mechanism was found. There were
some unusual characteristics found with the device. One suggests
that on the site of the truck bomb opposite the explosive there was
a tamping effect perhaps with sand or dirt which may
directionalize the explosive force toward its target. Additionally, in
doing a crime scene analysis, I had found portions of an individual
which highly suggests that he was or she was the bomber.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. What was the type of explosive and trigger-
ing device at the bombing of the Israeli Embassy? There was some
testimony about the similarities.
Mr. Williams. Again, as far as I am aware, the FBI had no par-'
ticipation in the Israeli Embassy crime scene, and as far as I can
recall, there was no explosive residue found in that case.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you. Madam Chairlady. Let me first say
to the families of the victims of this both despicable and cowardly
act, who will be testifying here and others, to Dr. Czyzewski and
Mr. Goldman, I would like to express my condolences, as I am sure
all of the members of the committee do. As someone who sits on
the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of this committee, I have
dedicated a lot of my time to the Western Hemisphere.
As my focus within the purview of this committee, I am particu-
larly concerned about what I hear todav and what I have been
viewing for some time in the context or terrorism in this hemi-
sphere. We have as a hemisphere, short of civil strife in various
16
countries in Central and Latin America, been relatively untouched
per se by terrorism as known to other parts of the world, but obvi-
ously that has changed both for the United States, as it has for the
hemisphere. I want to respectfully echo the comments of Mr. Lan-
tos and with all due respect to the Ambassador, who is doing a fine
job with what he has, that I am concerned that we are not dedicat-
ing sufficient resources and bringing this issue to the level of atten-
tion that we should.
I understand the present focus we have on dwindling resources,
but I don't know how often we have to wait sometimes before we
get a wake-up call and we have had some pretty significant ones
already. I am from New Jersey and right across the river from us
we had some pretty significant wake-up calls. I don't think we need
to wait much longer. Sometimes when we deal with these issues,
we deal with them in abstractness. That is why I think it is so
moving to see this album of remembrance that has been handed
out to the members. Even if they don't read Spanish, I would urge
them to look through the album that is named Sus Nombres Y Sus
Rostros because it brings to life for us the people who were lost in
this despicable act.
Mr. Bryant, I would like to ask you, based on your testimony, a
couple of questions. On page 5 you say that Hizballah has a pres-
ence in what you describe as a triborder area between Argentina,
Brazil and Paraguay. What type of presence?
Mr. Bryant. This area is an area which has a population of nu-
merous Arab and Muslim people and part of that presence are cells
of Hizballah members.
Mr. Menendez. While understanding sensitivity to some of this
discussion and I am sure you will veer away from that which can-
not be publicly stated, do we have a sense, I mean, what I am con-
cerned about as I read the testimony is that it is couched in terms
on page 9. You say that transnational Middle Eastern extremists
may, which is somewhat speculative to me, be using Latin America
as a support base and platform for operations. Have we had the
ability or opportunity to quantify this?
Are we ongoing in our efforts — maybe this is a combination ques-
tion for both you and the Ambassador. Are we in the process of
quantifying this threat? Are we in the process of dedicating re-
sources, not just in Argentina, but in the greater context of the
threat to the hemisphere?
Mr. Wilcox. I can say on behalf of the Department of State and
the counterterrorism community that this is a very high priority.
Our diplomatic reporting and our intelligence-gathering apparatus
have this right at the top of their agendas in Latin America. We
are amassing a body of information. It is difficult to quantify.
In any case this information by its nature is not always com-
pletely verifiable. It is usually not in the public domain. But we
think there is a growing body of information that the threat exists,
is widespread, and it needs to be addressed, and that is what we
are doing.
It is not just a question of putting more resources into the activ-
ity. I think we probably have an adequate level of resources going
into gathering information now, sir. If we find a gap, that we need
more, we will certainly invest in those resources.
17
Mr. Menendez. What efforts concretely? You say you are gather-
ing information. What efforts are we taking in cooperation with the
countries which find themselves as the base for these platform op-
erations?
Mr. Wilcox. Well, I think your question is very perceptive be-
cause ultimately the main burden lies on those countries to gather
information, to perfect their intelligence security, law enforcement
activities, and share information among themselves. We share in-
formation with them. They are increasingly sharing information
among themselves, and that is critical so the terrorists cannot come
from other continents into Latin America and travel freely across
borders.
I believe there is a heightened understanding of the need for this
now, whereas there has not been in the past. I have realized that
Latin American governments understand this need, based on mv
two visits to Argentina during the last year and in contacts with
many other Latin American governments.
Mr. Menendez. What, in reference to their action has been done,
while I recognize they have a significant role to play, I would not
want to simply wait. We have seen that our borders are extremely
porous and I would not simply want to wait for just merely their
efforts. What has been their response and what is our response, in
cooperation with them in trying to make both for the United States
and for the hemisphere a more secure place from terrorism?
Mr. Wilcox. A year ago I visited Brazil with an FBI, Depart-
ment of Justice, and Department of Defense team to discuss this
problem, and the opportunity for more cooperation between the
United States and Brazil. A member of my staff and other mem-
bers of the counterterrorism community made a similar visit a
month ago. They found a greatly increased awareness in Brazil of
the need for cooperation in this area.
Similarly, we found this in Argentina, in Uruguay, in Paraguay,
and in Venezuela as well. The activities that they are undertaking
are of the sensitive nature, but basically they include improved in-
telligence gathering, tightened border control, better training of
personnel, sharing of information with their neighbors, the use of
extradition treaties, and the drafting of better antiterrorism crimi-
nal laws in the domestic realm. All tnose things are going on.
Mr. Menendez. Let me close. Madam Chairlady, by joining my
colleagues. I would have much more pointed questions, but rec-
ognizing that the response to those questions would be that they
are of a privileged nature, a confidential nature, I would urge the
Chairman through you. Madam Chairlady, to hold a private session
for this committee because I have many pointed questions and with
all due respect, I won't pursue them today, but I do want answers
to them.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Menendez. We will pass on
those concerns to the Chairman. We have been joined by Congress-
man Chris Smith, the Chairman of the International Operations
and Human Rights Subcommittee, who has been looking at this
problem of international terrorism as well. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
And also by Marty Martinez, our colleague from California. Mr.
Martinez, do you have an opening statement? Mr. Smith did not,
so I will yield to you.
18
Mr. Martinez. No, I do not, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Do you have any questions for
the witness?
Mr. Martinez. Not at this time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We thank Mr. Bryant. We thank
the Ambassador for being here with us. I would Hke to call our sec-
ond group of panelists starting with Dr. Louis Czyzewski, the fa-
ther of one of the AMIA victims in Buenos Aires. If we could start
from my right, your left.
Dr. Kubin Beraja, President of the Delegation of Argentine Jew-
ish Associations; Rabbi Avi Weiss, National President of the Coali-
tion for Jewish Concerns; Mr. Tommy P. Baer, President of B'nai
B'rith; Mr. Jacob Kovadloflf, consultant for Latin American affairs,
the American Jewish Committee; Mr. Israel Singer, Secretary Gen-
eral, World Jewish Council; Mr. Barry I. Mehler, National Commis-
sioner, Anti-Defamation League; Mr. Goldman, father of a victim of
the 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will begin with the first panelist, Mr.
Czyzewski, and we are going to confine the statements to 5 min-
utes. We will be timing you. The interpreter for Mr. Czyzewski will
be Alfredo Neuburger. Mr. Czyzewski is the Argentinean account-
ant whose firm is tne external auditor of AMIA. His daughter was
killed when she had gone to AMIA to assist his staff at work. Both
he and his wife were present at the attack but fortunately neither
were injured. Our sympathies and our condolences to your entire
family. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LUIS CZYZEWSKI, FATHER OF AMIA BOMBING
VICTIM, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA THROUGH INTER-
PRETER, ALFREDO NEUBURGER
Mr. Czyzewski. I am the father of a victim who died in the at-
tack against the AMIA headquarters. On behalf of myself and my
wife who is with me, I am representing the relatives and friends
of this brutal massacre of victims. I would like to share with you
our views about the issues included in this meeting's agenda.
As we all know, Argentina suffered two attacks against Jewish
targets in less than 3 years. After the second terrorist attack, one
should carefully analyze whether the things that were not done or
done in the wrong manner afler the attack to the embassy could
have caused the murders' action to be repeated.
We firmly assert that the mistakes and omissions that followed
the first terrorist attack, which was practically not investigated,
acted as an immense and attractive invitation to persuade terror-
ists to repeat their action.
Based on the theory that it was an attack by international ter-
rorism against a foreign target located in Argentina, as is the case
of an embassy, the responsibility was moved beyond our borders
without seriously investigating the local connection which is not
doubted by anyone today.
On the other hand, we do not see that the first attack alerted the
Argentine Government about the security and control measures
that should have been implemented in borders and airports and we
believe that they were not applied as seriously and strongly as re-
quired.
19
This and the analysis of the events following the AMIA building
make us believe that Argentina in particular and Latin America in
general is a region in which international terrorism can operate
with extreme ease. It is a generally accepted principle that a thief
decides to steal where it is easier and that is applicable in this
case, with the aggravating circumstance that in the two attacks
perpetrated in Argentina, terrorists necessarily had support from
internal partners who have not been discovered to date.
In our opinion, the following is therefore imperative: A, the coun-
tries of the region should coordinate efforts and elaborate joint
strategies to prevent terrorist acts not only in Latin America, but
in the continent as a whole.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Doctor, if I could iust impose myself for a
second because of the translation taking longer, obviously then we
will afford you a few extra minutes. Thank you. I apologize.
Mr. CzYZEWSKi. [Through the interpreter.] With regard to the
present status of judicial investigations aimed at clarifying the at-
tack, we perceive that in 14 months, a lot was investigated with
notoriously poor results. From our standpoint, where rational and
emotional aspects are necessarily intermingled, we firmly hold that
we will only be appeased when we get to know who perpetrated the
attack, who the local accomplices were and when tneir full names
are known and jail is the place where the rest of their lives would
be spent.
It does not suffice to hear that investigators are working hard
and doing everything possible. That is not their merit. It is their
duty. We do not perceive the coordination of objectives that should
exist between the judicial power and the agencies in charge of ana-
lyzing each of the pieces of evidence that appear every day and
tnen nothing becomes of it. This makes the feeling of impunity
grow day after day. As to this very day, the facts do not show the
opposite.
We are certain that the Argentine Government positively knows
that clarifying the attack to the AMIA will notoriously strengthen
its international standing and it is therefore necessary for inves-
tigators to do so without fear, doubt or conditioning. However, it
is something we have not perceived to date.
Madam Uhairlady, allow me to spend one more minute analyzing
the topic that gathers us here from a different perspective, the
human aspect. For people and countries, attacks mean the analysis
of facts and actions originating in them.
For the relatives, the tragedy in itself is the most important fact
and I would like to convey a testimony on this aspect. Since July
18, 1994, myself, my wife, my other children cannot enjoy the
smile, a kiss, and the model of life that our daughter, Paola, set
for us every day and which were beautiful.
Since then we cannot see her grow up, become an adult, a good
person as every parent wishes of her children. For the other 85
families, some Jewish, some Catholic, Argentine, Bolivians and
other nationalities, the situation is the same with respect to their
dead relative.
I hope that you who are also sons and daughters, parents, broth-
ers, and sisters understand that the pain of this uselessly shed
blood should force all persons and countries to reflect and do what-
20
ever is possible so that soon we can say with all our might never
again.
Finally, I would like to thank the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives of the United States for
this invitation I received through Mr. Benjamin Oilman to offer my
testimony, which I hope is useful. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Doctor, for a very mov-
ing testimony and all of the committee members have received this
very touching and poignant book of memories of all of the victims
of that tragic bombing and, indeed, on page 17 is a lovely biog-
raphy and photo of your beautiful daughter. She lives today still
in our memory and in our hearts.
Mr. CZYZEWSKI. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Next is Dr. Ruben Beraja, the President of
DAIA, the Delegation of Jewish Organizations of Argentina since
1991. An attorney by profession. Dr. Beraja is the head of Mio
Bank and is also the founding president of Bar Lan University in
Buenos Aires. Thank you, doctor.
STATEMENT OF RUBEN BERAJA, PRESmENT, DELEGATION OF
ARGENTINE JEWISH ASSOCIATIONS, BUENOS AIRES, ARGEN-
TINA
Mr. Beraja. Thank you. Miss Chairman. I will provide and will
make the presentation on behalf of the DAIA, the Delegation of
Jewish Organizations in Argentina. We have been working to ob-
tain so that the wound opened by the international terrorism does
not remain unpunished and that they also receive the adequate po-
litical sanction.
Regarding the first aspect, as plaintiffs together with AMIA, we
have had an active participation in the activities covered by the Ar-
gentina justice, witnessing the difficulties that prevented more con-
crete results in the ongoing investigation.
We criticize the fact that these difficulties were increased in the
past by the lack of coordination between the security and intel-
ligence agencies in charge of the investigation and because of the
delay in obtaining the active participation of the police of the Bue-
nos Aires Province, which only took place a few months ago.
In spite of the above-mentioned, we believe that the court has
gathered elements that have allowed us to come to the following
conclusions:
A. To commit the terrorist actions, the perpetrators acquired
qualified support from diplomatic personnel or individuals linked to
the Embassy of Iran in Buenos Aires.
B. Under diplomatic immunity or in close relationship to those
who have it, as indicated previously, cells of activists identified
with Islamic fundamentalism have been established in Argentina,
one of which can be reasonably presumed has played an important
role in the logistical support previous to the attack.
C. Groups involved in the illegal dealing of cars, where some
members of the police of the province of Buenos Aires are involved,
have been included as accessories, providing support to the terror-
ists.
21
D. The elements obtained in the investigation allow us to con-
clude that Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, constitutes a center of sup-
port of fundamental terrorism in Latin America.
I wish to emphasize that as we assert responsibilities to
Hizballah and Islamic fundamentalism we would continue for a cit-
izen investigation of the local connection and the anti-Semitic ex-
treme right m Argentina.
The logical analysis of the information already gathered allows
us to indicate that those mentioned in points A, B, C and D con-
stitute an interconnected web, interacting between them and recip-
rocally necessary to consummate a massacre as the one we have
suffered.
This logical conclusion which has been conducted with great ef-
fort in the court file is enriched by the investigations carried out
within the sphere of the Secretary of State Intelligence, which is
under the authority of the President, and they have arrived to the
following conclusions:
The attack of July 18, 1994, and also the attack against the Em-
bassy of Israel in 1992 was the responsibility of individuals belong-
ing to the Hizballah organization. This was admitted recently by
the head of intelligence, by the Argentinean Foreign Minister, and
also by the Ambassador of Argentina to the United States.
There are serious indications of suspicious activity of individuals
linked to the Iranian embassy as well as growing activism within
elements of Islamic fundamentalism in Buenos Aires and other
parts of Argentina. The accumulation of conclusions reached by the
court and those obtained by the law enforcement and intelligence
agencies allow us to state that from a political point of view there
exist enough elements and background so that the government of
Argentina can adopt policy decisions that imply stronger sanctions
against Hizballah and all those states that through complacency,
direct or indirect involvement, allow that organization to plan and
execute acts of aggression in other countries killing innocent civil-
igms, instilling fear in the society, creating havoc and enormous
material damage, all of which affects and endangers the basic pil-
lars of democratic life.
We, therefore, wish to propose, first, that democratic nations and
particularly the United States intensify specific actions to neutral-
ize terrorists groups in their own bases.
Two, governments denounce without fear or ambiguous specula-
tion those regimes that support, protect and promote terrorism and
narcoterrorism.
Three, that the resolution against terrorism passed unanimously
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the last year be
implemented with complete measures. Words are not enough.
Our organization, an NGO, recognized for 60 years of the strug-
gle against Nazism, discrimination and for the preservation of
human rights, will continue its efforts within the rule of law so
that Argentina becomes one of the leading countries willing to face
terrorism and its allies and neutralize sinister threats that endan-
ger democracy. Between them we see also the allies with the
narcoterrorism.
We trust that this presentation contributes to strengthen the de-
cision of the U.S. Congress to maintain as a priority item of its
22
agenda the terrorist threat, and that the rule of law will assure
protecting the basic right of a human being, the right to live with-
out fear.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beraja appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Rabbi Avi Weiss, the president of the Coalition for Jewish Con-
cerns, ACJC, a grass roots Jewish activist group with more than
5,000 members nationwide. He is also a senior Rabbi of the Hebrew
Institute of Riverdale, New York, a congregation serving 500 mem-
ber families. He is assistant associate professor of Jewish studies
at Stem College, Yeshiva University in New York where he has
been a member of the Judaic faculty for 25 years. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF RABBI AVI WEISS, NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
COALITION FOR JEWISH CONCERNS
Rabbi Weiss. Thank you very much. I am grateful to Congress-
man Ben Oilman for convening these hearings and to my own rep-
resentative, Eliot Engel, for his great concern and to your presence.
I dedicate this testimony to the victims and their families in the
prayer that justice will be done. Their images will forever be etched
in my memory.
It is my contention that the government of Argentina is
stonewalling the investigation and that a cover-up is taking place.
This conclusion is not speculation.
One, it is part of the public record that President Carlos Menem
has reincorporated many people with ultra right-wing or neo-Nazi
views or criminals with murderous pasts into the State intelligence
service, people with notorious pasts like Ouerreri appointed by
Menem as an advisor to SIDE. One cannot expect individuals witn
these kinds of views to carry out a serious investigation into either
of the two bombings, yet these were the individuals tasked to carry
out the investigation.
Two, the Argentine immigration services are compromised. For
example, in Januaiy 1990, a Syrian terrorist Monzar Al Kassar,
linked to the Pan Am 103 bombing and Achille Lauro hijacking,
was permitted to enter into Argentina by Martinez, appointed by
Menem as director of immigration. Kassar's name surfaced in con-
nection with the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy.
Three, specific questions concerning the AMIA and the Israeli
embassy bombing point to a government cover-up.
A. Carlos Telleldin, the only person det£iined, swore before three
Federal judges that Vergez, rumored to be an ex-member of SIDE,
offered him $1 million and his freedom in exchange for falsely im-
plicating one of the Lebanese citizens held in Paraguay as the per-
son to whom Telleldin sold the van. In La Nacion a few days ago
it was reported that Telleldin met secretly with one of the judges
and told her that he had in fact sold the cars whose parts were
found in the AMIA rubble to two Buenos Aires police officers.
B. The policemen on duty at AMIA and the Israeli Embassy
when the attack occurred were not present. Despite this fact. Cap-
tain Fernandez, chief of the seventh precinct which controls special
guard duty in front of AMIA, was promoted.
C. Several Buenos Aires residents told me that members of the
Painted Faces, a notorious neo-Nazi group, were given life sen-
23
tences and were seen on the streets of Buenos Aires just a few
weeks before AMIA was bombed. Who was responsible for their
early release?
D. Subsequent to the Israeli Embassy attack, the United States
warned Argentina of possible further terrorism. Despite this fact,
security remained lax, the borders remained unguarded. Jewish
buildings were not protected by cement barriers. Why has no one
been held accountable?
E. Respected Argentina La Nacion reporter, Adrian Ventura, told
me he saw two men wearing blue uniforms digging craters in front
of the Israeli Embassy on the Saturday night after it was bombed
to give the appearance that a car bomb exploded. It was clear from
the very beginning of the AMIA investigation that the police had
a preferred lead, specifically Iran, and uiey weren't going to give
serious consideration to other leads which would embarrass the
Menem government. This kind of attack could not have taken place
without being abetted from the inside.
For the investigation to be thorough, nothing can be left un-
checked. If neo-Nazis were involved, if they worked together with
Arab extremists, as the Mufti allied himself with Hitler 50 years
ago, it must be revealed. If it was Syria, which the United States
and even Israel seeks to protect from these charges to bring it into
the peace process, that, too, must be reported. Political expediency
has no place in the terrorist investigation. The chips must fall
where they may.
The argument that AMIA bombing was Hizballah because it
looked like the Israeli Embassy bombing does not wash. That is
what they said after Oklahoma City, it was Middle Eastern be-
cause it looked like the Twin Towers and in the end it proved to
be right-wing.
Four, serious questions have been raised about Federal Judge
Galeano's independence, who is charged with the investigation.
A. Until April 1995, this judge was handling hundreds of other
cases. While ne has received no new cases since April, those cases
are still pending before him.
B. There are many in Argentina who believe that the judiciary
does not act without approval from high government officials, in-
cluding Menem.
There is one other matter that deserves the committee's atten-
tion. Buenos Aires is a city that awaits the next terrorist attack.
This is because security in Argentina is abysmal. The Buenos Aires
International Airport is among the least secure in the world. They
don't check your passports by computer. It is common knowledge
the borders are open.
To test security, I traveled together with my colleagues by boat
from Buenos Aires to Uruguay and back this past July. My worst
fears were borne out. Both in Buenos Aires and Uruguay, our bag-
gage, which included a tape recorder, commonly used by terrorists
to nide sophisticated bombs, was not checked. Upon our return to
Argentina, I walked directly from the ship to the streets of Buenos
Aires not even passing through passport control.
To prevent further terrorist attack in Argentina, it is critical that
this committee recommend that the U.S. Government conduct a
full onsite investigation into Argentine security. If Argentine air-
24
ports are found jto be unsafe, the U.S. Government should prohibit
American carriers from landing there. And if the Argentine borders
are foimd to be porous, U.S. citizens should be warned not to travel
to Argentina.
There is great fear in Buenos Aires, fear that terrorism will
strike again, fear that Argentina may once again slip back into a
dictatorship, fear on the part of many Argentine Jewish leaders to
speak out.
There is a fire burning in Argentina. Buenos Aires is ripe for an-
other terrorist attack unless America pressures the Argentine gov-
ernment to take serious measures and demands that security be
dramatically tightened.
Just days after the horrific World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City bombings terrorists were apprehended. It is almost 4 years
since the Israeli Embassy was blown up and more than 1 year
since the AMIA attack, but there are no serious suspects and tnere
will be no serious suspects without the U.S. Government stepping
in to demand a real and full investigation.
I am only sorry that there isn't an official Argentine person here
from its government to respond to what is this great concern about
a government cover-up.
[The prepared statement of Rabbi Weiss appears in the appen-
dix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Rabbi. We will be looking for-
ward to the question-and-answer period.
Next, we will hear from Mr. Tommy Baer. Mr. Baer is the highly
talented President of B'nai B'rith, receiving this distinction from
delegates hailing from six continents. He is currently a partner in
the Kichmond-based law firm of Canfield, Moore, Shapiro, Cease
and Baer. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF TOMMY P. BAER, PRESIDENT, B'NAI B'RITH
Mr. Baer. Madam Chairman, members of the committee, on be-
half of B'nai B'rith members in this country and Argentina and in
54 other countries around the world, I welcome this opportunity to
testify on a subject that has troubled and preoccupied us for more
than a year, particularly since our members in Argentina have be-
come deeply frustrated in the failure to find the culprits in the das-
tardly 1994 AMIA bombing that was so costly in the lives of both
Jews and nonJews.
I am of two minds on the subject of the bombings and the inabil-
ity to bring those responsible to justice. At the one level, while we
can commend the efforts of those judges and investigators who are
making a sincere effort to search out the truth and ensure that jus-
tice prevails, at another level, I have a knowing sense that obsta-
cles are being thrown up by an old guard in the security forces and
in the courts, an old guard whose instincts were finely honed under
a military dictatorship and which has often been associated with
and protective of Nazis and neo-Nazis.
Because of the suicidal nature of the bombings, suspicion pointed
to Iranian sponsorship of Islamic extremists whose aim worldwide
is to defeat the Middle East peace process and to create hostility
between Jews and their neighbors. However, no clear evidence suf-
ficient for a trial has yet appeared.
25
Wheels of justice turn slowly in Latin America. Argentina, better
developed than most countries in the region, is still impeded by a
lack of skills to deal with the ferocity of terrorism that has struck
it. From the standpoint of courts, laws and their security forces and
their apparatus, the country is ill-prepared to solve its terrorism
problem. As a result, Argentina has begun to receive technical aid
from the United States and other countries. What is more, judges
from Argentina have also come to the United States to learn how
our courts deal with terrorism cases.
At the onset of the two bombings, enormous technical assistance
came from the United States, Israel and other countries. Indeed, of-
fers of cooperation from the U.S. Government agents to Argentina
are to be commended. More pressing is the reality that Argentina
is facing a threat from its open borders, particularly with Paraguay
and Brazil. The triborder region is thriving and unchecked, legal
and illegal elicit business, particularly in Ciudad del Este invites
strong suspicion of heavy drug traffic and drug running, contra-
band, arms and terrorists.
Aside from the fact that customs officials can be bought off for
a closed trunk passage from Paraguay to Argentina, the documents
collected from travelers are discarded after 3 months. There is no
computerization of who crosses borders. In other words, no record
of wanted or suspicious individuals is possible.
The investigation of the AMIA bombing has been the focus of one
judge. Upon learning that the judge was not free from his other
court duties and worked on the AMIA case only part-time, B'nai
B'rith questioned government officials and other judges on this
point. To its credit, the government released Judge Galeano from
all duties but the AMIA case.
However, at the outset, there were numerous runs down blind
alleys. By August, 1995, the judge had four people under detention.
The lead suspect is Carlos Telleldin, the son of a sadistic torturer
close to the junta who had been a high-ranking security official
from Cordoba. Telleldin espouses neo-Nazi views and is being held
for involvement in the falsifying of documents of the vehicle used
in the bombing, ^
We learned only yesterday that the two policemen to whom he
sold the vehicle were dismissed. However, knowledgeable people
see Telleldin as only a small cog in the wheel while other
operatives, especially those who planned this terrorist act, are still
at large.
Many terrorism analysts believe that Iranian Embassies are the
spark for activating dormant Hizballah and other Muslim extrem-
ist cells. They point to the enormous presence of the Iranian Em-
bassy officials in countries like Argentina where there is a small
Iranian community and limited trade with Iran.
Insofar as diplomatic representation is concern, senior govern-
ment officials in both Chile and Uruguay told me several months
ago that they are aware of the potential problems posed by over-
representation at the Iranian embassies in their countries. Al-
though there is a general belief among many that the government
will not prove a case against anyone who directed the attack, some
experts expect substantial breaks in the case.
26
It was thought that one occurred most recently. In early August,
seven suspects from Paraguay, six Lebanese and one Brazilian,
were extradited to Buenos Aires for their connection with a Ger-
man-bom Nazi arms seller. They were released in less than 48
hours for a lack of evidence.
It seemed odd to us. After all, it was Argentina which pressed
for the extradition of the seven from Paraguay in the first place.
Why were the suspects released so quickly? Would not there have
existed probable cause precedent to a request for extradition?
Indeed, some countries in the region are aiming to comply with
higher standards. There is now a democratically elected govern-
ment in Paragfuay and clearly the old way of doing business is
changing. It is significant that the extradition which involved ap-
peals by two of the terrorist suspects went through a process of ad-
judication. Despite insider claims of money changing hands at one
court level, the judges abided by judicial rules.
In memory of those who died and as tribute to those who worked
in rescue and research, B'nai B'rith and other Jewish organizations
have pressed for a concerted effort to find those responsible. B'nEii
B'rith Argentina sponsored a 2-day conference on July 3 and 4,
1995, to analyze the wide-reaching effects of terrorism.
With the participation of government officials, rabbis and priests,
educators and psychologfists, the conference attracted more than
1,000 attendees. This historic conference, the first of its kind ever
held in Argentina, raised the profile of the terrorist threat and pro-
posed concrete steps to confront it.
B'nai B'rith has also maintained contact with a broad range of
United States and Argentine officials to, among other things, gath-
er information in order to properly assess the terrorist threat, to
commend the positive steps that are taken to improve the situa-
tion, including greater cooperation among appropriate agencies and
countries of the hemisphere and to continue pressing the Argentine
government.
From the viewpoint of worldwide jury, it is important not to for-
get the innocent victims who lost their lives in the two Argentine
bombings and in the Panamanian air bombing as well where mem-
bers of B'nai B'rith, including an officer of that district, lost their
lives. B'nai B'rith pledges to continue its global role in working to
expose the threat posed by international terrorism and not just to
Jewish communities and to Israel, but to democracy everywhere,
including our own.
Madam Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to ap-
pear before the committee today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baer appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. We have been joined by
Mr. Chabot. I don't know if you have any opening statement.
Mr. Chabot. No. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
We will next hear from Mr. Jacob Kovadloff, who is the consult-
ant for Latin American Affairs and Spanish mass media at the
American Jewish Committee. He is the former Director of the
American Jewish Committee's South American Office in Buenos
Aires and is responsible for public relations with Spanish-speaking
27
communities and media throughout the United States. Thank you.
Mr. Kovadloff.
STATEMENT OF JACOB KOVADLOFF, CONSULTANT FOR LATIN
AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Mr. Kovadloff. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. On behalf of
the American Jewish Committee, I want to thank you for this op-
portunity to testify today on a matter of grave importance to our
country and to the security and well-being of democratic societies
to the Western Hemisphere and across the globe.
By way of introduction, I must tell you that my connection to the
issue before the committee today is profoundly personal. I am Ar-
gentine and Jewish. For the last eight of its more than 30 years
of existence, I was the Director of the American Jewish Committee
South American Office headquartered in Buenos Aires. In June
1977, I left my country due to escalating threats to my family, my
staff and, of course, myself
Allow me to say that many of us have not forgotten and still har-
bor deep gratitude to the chairman of this committee. Congressman
Gilman, for the help to the victims of the barbaric struggle in my
home country. We have not forgotten either his formal condemna-
tion of the anti-Semitic acts which were a common occurrence in
Argentina during that terrible time.
Indeed the history of extremist political movements in and out of
power in my native country and across South America for several
days has been interwoven with anti-Semitism. In a sense, today's
hearing revisits a chapter of that history that might well be called
"From Domestic Terrorism to International Terrorism."
While in Argentina today there are not surviving structures of
militant movements of the extreme left, it is easy to see that the
individuals and small groups of the extreme right remnants of the
repressive former regime and support network are still active,
anonymously, in important areas of Argentina's political life, par-
ticularly in its armed forces and in the security and intelligence
services.
The link between this group and individuals on the militant right
and the terrorist attacks against the Israeli Embassy and the Jew-
ish community in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively, has
never been firmly established, but there continues to be a specula-
tion in Argentina that such groups may have played a supportive,
logistical role in the bombings and through law enforcement con-
nections, may have complicated the government's investigative ef-
forts.
The 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires brought a sincere
expression of public sympathy with the victims and their families
and with the Jewish community generally. But those expressions
were, of course, made nearly incidental by the horror of the attacks
themselves, attacks that together killed more than 120 individuals
and that as yet have led to no conclusive persecutorial action.
President Menem and his entire cabinet, Catholic church leaders,
lawmakers and representatives from all walks of Argentine life,
join the Argentine Jewish community in expressions of solidarity
and in condemnation of the attacks.
28
While the pubHc reaction and the public statements by the na-
tional leaders were sincere and appropriate, the action that has fol-
lowed those expressions has been frustratingly inadequate — inad-
equate for a State, I know, to Foreign Minister Di Telia, with
whom several of my colleagues in AJC met yesterday in New York,
and frustrating to the Argentine Jewish community and to all who
are committed to justice in the AMIA case.
Answers to the questions posed by both of the Buenos Aires
bombings have eluded the Argentine criminal justice system, al-
though a consensus was formed among Western intelligence offi-
cials that the attacks were carried out primarily by operatives of
or connected to Hizballah, very likely at the direction of or with the
knowledge of Iranian officials. After both bombings, there was a
speculation in Argentina that the attacks were intended as signs
to the government that its warming relations with Israel and per-
ceptions of a cooling in political and commercial relations with
some in the Arab world would carry a heavy price. While such
speculation cannot be discounted, it must be said that other coun-
tries even in Latin America, have enjoyed a longer history of close
relations with Israel without experiencing similar tragedies.
The choice of Buenos Aires as the site for these two terrorist as-
saults has been the subject of considerable anxiety and speculation.
In fact, we may never know why the bomber selected Buenos Aires.
With each passing month, the prospect of resolving these crime
grows more imcertain. But there are facts we do know. That with
its long and, in many areas, minimally patrolled international bor-
ders, and its sorely inefficient immigration control procedures, Ar-
gentina likely offered the relatively easy access to and from their
targets that terrorists require.
•niat within the ranks of right-wing extremist elements and
within radicalized segments of tne immigrant Arab population in
Argentina and its border regions, outside agents would be likely to
find operational support for an attack on Jewish institutions.
Mr. Chabot [presiding]. Mr. Kovadloff, if you could summarize.
We have several other witnesses. I want to make sure we get all
the testimony in.
Mr. Kovadloff. I will, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. We can put that in the record.
Mr. Kovadloff. There are two publications that the American
Jewish commimity published in the recent 2 years about the bomb-
ing of the AMIA and the Israeli embassy. I will respectfully ask,
Mr. Chairman, to include it in my testimony in the congressional
record. And I would like to thank the committee and you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kovadloff appears in the appen-
dix.]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We will include that in the
record. We appreciate your testimony here this morning.
Our next witness would be, I believe, Mr. Israel Singer, the Sec-
retary General of the World Jewish Congress.
STATEMENT OF ISRAEL SINGER, SECRETARY GENERAL,
WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
Mr. Singer. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my thanks to you
for holding the hearings on this critical and urgent subject. I would
29
like to take notice of a personal friend, Mr. Ralph Groldman. I went
to Argentina right after the murder of his son along with the other
victims in the Israel Embassy bombing and I would like to take no-
tice of Dr. Louis Czyzewski, whose daughter was killed. We flew to
Buenos Aires with the president of the World Jewish Congress
after that ugly event and we met with victims, parents and fami-
lies.
We met with victims themselves in hospitals. And without at-
tempting to deal with the formal testimony which I am ^oing to in-
clude in the record and because of the interest of 5 minutes that
we have here, I am, as well, going to include the research that we
have done into the worldwide Jihad movement, militant Islam tar-
gets in the West, as well as the United States, which our institu-
tion of the World Jewish Congress has put out, particularly in light
of the fact that the initial speakers that spoke today on behalf of
the U.S. Government pointed out that Islamic Jihad is a wing of
Hizballah.
I think that we have here today heard that the United States
sometimes speaks very, very clearly with regard to statements that
it makes on behalf of our administration and yet continues to
speak very diplomatically with regard to some of our enemies. And
yet we are the best of the lot because we are holding hearings
today.
We represent 75 communities throughout the world. Argentina is
the one that has been hit hardest. We visited those communities.
We saw those victims. We cannot stand for the fact that none of
these efforts on the part of our government have had any effect
upon the government of Argentina. Yes, we, too, met with Foreign
Minister Gatella this morning and, yes, he told us that there have
been no results with regard to the questions we put to him when
we were there last year after the AMIA bombing and in 1992 after
the Israel embassy bombing. But he is not alone.
We met last week with President Chirac, with Prime Minister
Juppe, after the bombing which saved, because of some miracle,
hundreds of kids in Lyon. And we were to visit the people in Lon-
don to our affiliate of the World Jewish Congress. There where two
bombings took place within 24 hours. The people were satisfied
with the efforts that were taking place. Many of those govern-
ments, as opposed to ours, still have relations with the Iranians to
this very day. And no one raises their voices about these things.
They have full relations.
There is a lot that hasn't been said here today and I have in-
cluded in my remarks, but I would like to summarize quickly by
telling you that there is no need to repeat what we already said
last year after the bombing and 2 years ago, Ralph. What I want
to say is that we have made little progress.
I want to commend Oilman and Lantos and yourself, the chair-
man and the members of this committee for asking us again, but
I want to tell you that we are not going to sit by and watch this.
We are going to continue to tell you that this is a problem in Ar-
gentina, that this is a problem in Europe, that many European
countries aren't even cooperating with each other as many Latin
Americans didn't until this bombing took place and until we, as the
free world leader, act as the impetus to change the lethargy which
22-101 0-96-2
30
exists on this subject, we shall have to, as an organization of Jew-
ish communities throughout the world, attempt to guarantee for
our people and for citizens of the world personal security, which is
the basis of a democracy.
On these days before the high holy days conclude with Yom
Kippur, I would like to ask that those who sit in judgment of us
all try to do a more effective job than we ourselves down here have
done. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Singer appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for your moving testi-
mony, Mr. Singer. We will, of course, include all of your statements
in the full record.
Next, we will hear from Mr. Barry Mehler, who has been a lead-
er of the Anti-Defamation League, of which he has been a trustee
for over 20 years. Mr. Mehler is a Washington -based CPA and part-
ner in charge of the 10-man Mehler, Bloom & Gruen accounting
firm. Thank you, Mr. Mehler.
STATEMENT OF BARRY I. MEHLER, NATIONAL
COMMISSIONER, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
Mr. Mehler. Thank you. Madam Chairlady. Thank you for al-
lowing the Anti-Defamation League to testify at this very impor-
tant hearing. As you know, on July 18, 1994, the world was
shocked by the horrific bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos
Aires. The terrorists who committed this heinous crime did not just
destroy a building. They struck at the very heart of the Argentine
Jewish community.
Among the 87 killed and scores wounded in the blast were Jews
visiting the building to pick up their pensions, to look for work, to
seek assistance. The records of 100 years of Argentine Jewish his-
tory was lost.
In the bomb's wake, the community, which had suffered the
bombing of the Israeli Embassy just 2 years earlier, was left fear-
ful, helpless and demoralized. They wonder when and where the
third bombing will occur. Yet, 14 months after the assault against
the AMIA building and over 3 years after the destruction of the
embassy, little if any progress has been made.
In April 1995, a delegation of 17 leaders of the Anti-Defamation
League visited Argentina. Our objective was to demonstrate the
solidarity of American Jews with tne Argentine Jewish community
and to assess the Argentine government's investigation into the
bombings of the AMIA building and the Israeli Embassy. Prior to
the trip to Argentina, several members of the delegation met with
the terrorism divisions of the FBI and the State Department and
were briefed on the current status of the Argentine Government's
investigation into both bombings and also given observations at
both divisions on various facts and assumptions.
In the 4 days that the delegation was in Argentina, we met with
government officials, includmg among others President Carlos
Menem, the Ministers of Justice and Interior, the Director of State
Intelligence Service in addition to several members of the staff.
Additionally, we met with the members of the DAIA which is the
umbrella organization of Jewish organizations in Argentina. These
meetings clearly showed that the Argentine Grovernment, led by
31
President Menem has shown a gn*eater seriousness and responsive-
ness investigating the AMIA bombing than that was shown follow-
ing the embassy bombing. We also came to the following conclu-
sions.
One, the expertise of the various Argentine security and police
departments is much less than what would be desirable. A general
consensus of the people we spoke to felt that the experience and
training of the investigators was not up to solving the problems
presented. In this regard, we would suggest that the American
Government and the FBI, in particular, expand the availability of
counterterrorism schools to Argentine personnel. We understand
some of this training has already taken place by the FBI and we
feel that much more is necessary.
Two, from what we have, we were able to gather, there is very
little coordination in Argentina between the various entities that
are investigating these two bombings. We heard that they don't
share information, but rather that each one wants to be the one to
hit the home run and this has greatly hindered the investigation.
Three, in IGUACU area in the north of Argentina where the bor-
ders of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina meet, there is an Islamic
extremist group that I understand resides on the Brazilian side of
the river. The border between these countries is very porous and
having spent some time in the area, I can agn*ee that it is almost
impossible, if not impossible, to police crossings.
We suggest that a trilateral commission be set up between Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Paraguay to maintain control of the groups
that live in this area. There certainly should be infiltrators as well
as monitors at work. We urge the U.S. Government to work with
the respective governments to have such a commission formed that
would be active in the prevention of terrorism that emanates from
this area. But just as the United States must encourage Argentina
to take firm steps to combat terrorism, we must continue to be at
the vanguards of this international effort. Enactment of tough,
comprehensive antiterrorism legislation has been a top legislative
priority for the Anti-Defamation League and the broader Jewish
community.
We support the broad policy objectives of the bill and are dis-
turbed by recent reports that the momentum behind this measure
has been stalled. The Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act is an im-
portant complement to existing legislation and strengthens the rule
of law against terrorists worldwide. Most important, the bill strives
for an appropriate balance between constitutional safeguards and
the need for a more aggressive response to this escalating threat.
Madam Chairlady, thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mehler appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for your testimony.
We will now like to hear from Mr. Ralph Goldman, who lost his
son, David Ben Rafael in the terrorist attack on the Israeli Em-
bassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992. Today, he joins us from
New York and we send our deepest condolences to the entire Gold-
man family.
32
STATEMENT OF RALPH I. GOLDMAN, FATHER OF VICTIM OF
1992 BOMBING IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA
Mr, GrOLDMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, on March 17, 1992, I lost
my son, David Ben Rafael, to the most deadly terrorist act of that
year, the attack on the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires. American
born and educated, raised under the values of freedom and justice,
he was there as a minister of the Israel Delegation.
In the years that passed since that day, I lost my confidence in
the will of the government of Argentina to pursue the investigation
into this criminal incident and its perpetrators with any energy
and determination. For more than 3 years, I have pressed the Ar-
gentine authorities with respect to two simple questions: What has
the Argentine Grovemment done about the investigation of the
March 17, 1992, bombing of the Israel embassy?
And two, specifically, has the Argentine Government investigated
why their two policemen, who were charged with guarding the Is-
rael Embassy, were not on duty when the attack took place? I take
the opportunity to draw to the attention of this distinguished body
that to this date, no response, publicly or privately, even from
Members of Congress, to either question has been offered by the
Argentine Government and that the investigation of 1992 is appar-
ently at a halt.
We know that the poisonous weed of terrorism grows mainly
where ripe conditions exist. In retrospect, it is clear that Argentina
continues to provide such fertile grounds. A second deadly attack
took place as we heard, as we know, in Buenos Aires on July 18,
1994, this time striking at the heart of the Jewish community.
Following the investigations of the two terrorist attacks, one can-
not avoid the frustrating conclusion that the authorities of Argen-
tina failed twice in their duty as a sovereign state. Once they failed
to create the right climate to deterrence that would have prevented
terrorism from operating on its territory. It saddens me to suggest
that perhaps the opposite climate existed there, one that attracts
terror by astonishing leniency of its law enforcement apparatus.
And the second failure is the inability of the authorities to cap-
ture and bring to trial those citizens of Argentina who with their
deeds or omission were axillary to the two attacks.
Ladies and gentlemen, the political tradition of Argentina in the
last quarter century is characterized by short memory. The natural
tendency there, as demonstrated through various regimes, is the
tendency to forget. I am cognizant of the fact that America has
used its utmost resolve and considered resources to fight this ter-
rorist scourge.
However, not enough has been done as it was intimated here by
some Members of Congress. Americans must not let these events
in Argentina be forgotten until justice is served. I urge the Con-
gress of the United States to use its prestige and economic power
to assure meaningful investigations of 1992 and 1994 terrorist at-
tacks and to keep the international communities and, I repeat,
keep the international community and the families of the victims
informed what the government has not done.
Moreover, I hope that these hearings will continue and contrib-
ute to a thorough resolution of the investigations at hand.
33
Ladies and gentlemen, I open my statement by sharing with you
the fact that I personally have suffered from terrorism in Argen-
tina. No action you will take will return my son and others to life.
However, your voice can be heard and your statement can resonate
in the free democratic world encouraging the government of Argen-
tina to exhaust all measures to pursue justice in these cases. By
doing that, you may be adding a significant weapon to the global
war against terrorism. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldman appears in the appen-
dix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Goldman, and certainly that
is the very message that we are trying to send today in our hear-
ings and our continued hearings Because this will not rest here
today, and we know that the memory of your son and your daugh-
ter and so many other victims will be ever present in our minds
and in our hearts as we continue that task of the deliberation.
Thank you so much, all of you, for being here with us. We want-
ed to ask just a few questions, some specific and some generally to
all the panelists. But, Dr. Beraja, I wanted to start with you.
I noticed on page two of the testimony that you had given us you
said, "groups involved in the illegal dealing of stolen vehicles where
some of the members of the police of the province of Buenos Aires
are involved have been included as accessories providing support to
the terrorists." If you could tell us what was the role of these offi-
cers.
Was it knowingly in support of a planned attack on the Jewish
community or certainly ongoing criminal activity involving stolen
or altered vehicles? If you could expand on that part of your testi-
mony.
Mr. Beraja. I answer in Spanish and he will translate.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes, of course.
Mr. Beraja. [Through the interpreter.] In our opinion, those
members of security forces who were involved in illegal car deal-
ings were not necessarily, we do not — cannot determine yet, but
were not necessarily aware of what the use of that vehicle would
be. One aspect that supports this belief is the fact that the num-
bers of the motor of that vehicle were not deliberately erased and
they appeared when they were found in the ruins of the attack.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Rabbi Weiss, do you think that Hizballah was responsible for the
AMIA attack?
Rabbi Weiss. I stand by my testimony that it is my position that
the investigation has been unifocused on Iran and specifically on
Hizballah. It is quite possible that Hizballah was involved, but
there are many other leads that would take us in other directions
and there are specific leads which would indicate that what hap-
pened at the Israeli Embassy and at AMIA could not have been
done without help from the inside.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I think that — ^let me see if I can find the
doctor's testimony. He had said also, more or less, in a similar vein
he says based on the theory that it was an attack by international
terrorism against a target located in Argentina, as is the case of
an embassy, the responsibility was moved beyond our borders with-
out seriously investigating the local connection, which is not doubt-
34
ed by anyone today. If you could elaborate, doctor, just a bit about
this local connection.
Mr. CzYZEWSKi. [Through the Interpreter.] We are convinced that
this kind of terrorist attack cannot be perpetrated without the local
support people. What we cannot determine yet is this local support
was directly linked to the attack itself or was another kind of sup-
port. But both of the embassies and in the AMIA, this must have
been the case.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We have had some documents shared with
us and we will be looking at some of those, some of those problems
that have been raised. We thank you for your testimony.
If I could ask all of you a general question, most of you had men-
tioned Iran and its diplomats' role in the AMIA attack. Do you sup-
port the greater use of the persona non grata tool against these
Iranian diplomats? There have been many reports that these em-
bassies are stacked with individuals who may have other agendas
on their minds and there have been some indications that perhaps
in the specific countries those host countries are not being aggres-
sive enough in getting rid of those so-called diplomats who are real-
ly tools of their countries.
Would you please tell us your opinions about the greater use of
this tool that, if the countries would use perhaps some of these
problems might be averted or diminished somewhat. And it is a
general question to whoever would like to answer it.
We heard from three of the individuals. Perhaps the others could
comment. Thank you. Mr. Baer.
Mr. Baer. Let me be bold enough, I guess, to go first. We would
concur that this is something that should be used, the persona non
grata. In March when I was in the countries of Chile, Uruguay and
Argentina meeting with the highest government officials of those
countries, this concern of the overrepresentation at Iranian Embas-
sies and the questionable activities of individuals there was raised
very specifically, but primarily I must say by Chile and by Uru-
guay.
Both indicated that the activities of those at the embassy were
being monitored and that this was very clearly a concern. Over-
representation, meaning an inordinate number of individuals as-
signed to the embassy based on the limited relationship, both trade
and otherwise, with the country of Iran.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Rabbi, let me just see in case anyone else would like to comment
on usin^ this tool.
Mr. Smger.
Mr. Singer. Yes. I think that we should consider the possibility
of using that tool, particularly when some of those people act as a
cover. We attempted to deal with that question as well in an eco-
nomic manner through the support that we brought to the meeting
that we encouraged in your home city in Miami at the summit
there and we tried to encourage the President to take a position
on that and, indeed, he did at our meeting in New York when he
called for a break of relations with Iran with regard to economic
relations.
I must say that some of the host countries for the events that
we are discussing here today, still haven't even begun to deal with
35
these questions the way we deal with them. And I think that hav-
ing a meeting this afternoon on this subject might be a time to jolt
some of the representatives from Europe that are dealing with this
subject who still host some of these "diplomats" representing ex-
tremist groups, I think, in a manner that is much more kindly even
than we do.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Rabbi.
Rabbi Weiss. Yes. I think it is a tool used by Iran, but the prob-
lem that the international commvmity has is that it does not recog-
nize that it is also used, I believe, by other countries, specifically
by Syria.
I was at an open cabinet meeting that President Menem invited
me to attend.
I believe I am the only foreigner — I am sure Menem is not too
happy about the invitation: but I am the only foreigner to have
ever attended a full open cabinet meeting in Argentina and was
told then right after the AMI A bombing that the Israeli Embassy
was bombed bv an obscure terrorist group in southern Lebanon
called Ansar Allah.
Well, if that is the case, then the Menem government should cer-
tainly direct its attention to Syria which controls southern Lebanon
because if Syria wished to enter into the fray that terrorist group
(Ansar Allah) could not be operating in soutnem Lebanon and as
a consequence could not have bombed the AMIA building.
If I can, just one more statement, draw a parallel. Many of the
families of Pan Am 103, John Root, Susan Cohen — and I recognize
that the families are split — ^but many of the families believe that
it was Syria that was very much responsible that had a hand in
Pan Am 103, but that the U.S. Government, for political reasons,
for politically expedient reasons, decided to dump it all on Libya
because now the trend is to bring Syria into the peace process. And
that is what I meant when I said in my testimony that even the
United States, and I say with a heavy heart, even Israel, there was
a front-page report that Israel was blocking that there was stuff
coming out of Syria which contributed to the AMIA bombing and
in order to get to the root of terrorism, it must be understood that
politics can nave no place.
Political expediency cannot outweigh the value of Jewish lives
and let me just say this. That if after 4 years of the Israeli Em-
bassy, if you don't find the culprits, after over a year of AMIA, you
don't find the culprits, that sends a message to terrorists around
the world you can do this and get away with it and I say it
emboldened and encourages terrorists to act right here in the Unit-
ed States.
When it comes to terrorism, this world is a global "shtetl", we are
one small community. And if America doesn't step in and pressure
the Argentine Government to put an end to it, believe me, it will
hop from South America to the United States as has already oc-
curred. It is our problem.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Dr. Beraja, you wanted to add
something?
Your translator is good, but I don't know if he is that good. Let's
find out.
36
Mr. Beraja. [Through the interpreter.] We believe that inter-
national terrorism creates confusion among governments and one
of the consequences is this policy of appeasement regarding govern-
ments who sponsor terrorism and this is what we do not agree. The
ambiguity and the lack of determination to act against the so-called
diplomacy which covers up for terrorism.
Ms. Ros-Lehtdsten. And the connection about
Mr. Beraja. And the connection with drug trafficking and terror-
ism linked to drug trafficking also.
One last word. The policy of appeasement reminds us of what
happened in Europe in the 1930's with the appeasement regarding
the Nazi threat and the consequences of those mistakes are a suffi-
cient lesson of history,
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Your statement about appeasement, are you
insinuating that Argentina has been intimidated by Iran?
Mr. Beraja. We know that the Argentinean position follows the
advice of European governments who have suggested to the Argen-
tinean government to be extremely careful regarding its attitude
toward Iran because there was danger of worse reprisals.
It was publicly acknowledged by the deputy foreign minister of
Argentina when he met with a delegation of the American Jewish
committee last year in Buenos Aires.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Let me just ask one question. For the folks who are based in
Buenos Aires, is it your opinion that the local prosecuting judge
has been getting all of the help and assistance that he needs from
the government of Argentina in order to carry out this very difficult
task that could be of far-reaching international perspective?
Mr. Beraja. [Through the Interpreter.] The executive did provide
support to the Federal Judge Galeano, but the issue of those in
charge of the investigation both as security and intelligence agen-
cies, took too much time for an adequate coordination under the
authority of the judge and this was not helpful in the course of the
investigation.
I wish, for the record, to say that President Menem has estab-
lished a reward of $2 million for any information that can be pro-
vided in this investigation and, second, in the Argentine Congress
a follow-up committee has been established by both Chambers,
/ House and the Senate, to monitor the investigation process.
/ Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I would liKe to thank all of the
/ panelists for being here today. As Chairman Oilman said, we are
dedicated to seeing that iustice is done in this bombing, in the Is-
raeli Embassy attack and that, as he says, other such terrorist at-
tacks, wherever and whenever they may occur. We will keep the
records open for statements from other members of the committee
and I apologize on their behalf.
There are so many committee hearings at this time, so many
meeting at this time because of our continuing resolution and rec-
onciliation process, and that is the reason why they are not here
with us. It is certainly not indicative of their level of concern for
this very serious problem.
Rabbi.
Rabbi Weiss. Yes. I just wanted to make two points, one on
Galeano. There are questions that have been raised about how
37
independent he really is. On my last visit to Argentina, I publicly
mentioned much of my testimony and that is that there is a cover-
up, that there is no full investigation because it would reveal that
people on the highest echelon were involved.
The President of Argentina, also high profile, then proceeded to
call me "totally delirious." When I repeated that charge, Galeano
actually subpoenaed me to court. I think I am perhaps the only
American to have testified, but this is what happened.
I was there for 6 hours. I felt semi-arrested. I was literally held
in a very, very small room, read the riot act and I got the sense
right there that the real purpose that afternoon was to intimidate
me and to force me to recant my allegations and my sense is that
the judiciary there, unlike in the United States where we have pre-
cise checks and balances, they take their orders from higher up,
quite possibly from the President himself.
In my last comment, if I may, as an old Soviet Jewry war horse,
the most effective tool that sprung Soviet Jewry was the Jackson-
Vanik amendment in which the U.S. Government told the Soviet
Union you want free trade? You want Most Favored Nation status?
Then you are going to have to be true to human rights. And I say
for the record, that the issue in Argentina is not a matter that they
don't have the means. They have the means.
As I told Menem, I said there is a Hebrew statement [speaking
Hebrew], there is nothing that stands before the will. It is not Iran
that troubles Menem. He has got internal problems and the only
way Argentina is going to beef up security and get the culprits. The
only way they are going to do this, is if like Jackson-Vanik, there
is going to be real pressure.
If the U.S. Government says if you want American tourists, if
you want American carriers to land, then the Azeiza airport, the
security better be better. If you want Americans to tour there, then
those borders where you can take across sea ship loads of explo-
sives, those borders better be tight. That is the only language the
Argentina Government understands and if we don't do that, I pre-
dict, God forbid, that Buenos Aires is a community that awaits the
next terrorist attack.
Ms. Ros-Lehtesten. Thank you so much and I apologize for bring-
ing
Mr. Beraja. Only 1 minute.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. OK, thank you, Mr. Beraja.
Mr. Beraja. [Through the Interpreter.] I will not have a con-
frontation with Rabbi Weiss, but I cannot agree on such a dramatic
vision of Argentina. We, the Jewish leadership, have the total free-
dom to say what we believe we have to say. If we don't say more,
he can criticize us.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you to all the
panelists. Thank you,
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA
TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON INTERMATIOHAI. RELATIONS
SEPTQffiER 28, 1995
AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. NILCOX, JR.
COORDINATOR FOR COUHTERTERRORISM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the
subject of terrorism in Latin America and the bombing of
the AMIA Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires on July
18, 1994. These subjects are of great concern to the
United States, and we have intensified our focus on
terrorism in Latin America and the need to bring the
bombers of the AMIA center to justice.
The tragic bombing of the AMIA building, the almost
identical bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires
in 1992, the bombing of the World Trade Center, and the
related plot to blow up various public, areas and
government facilities in New York which is now before a
federal court, brought home to us the truth that our
hemisphere is also vulnerable to international terrorism.
The perpetrators of these savage crimes are or are
believed to be extremists who abuse the Islamic faith in
whose name they claim to act . Dedicated to the
destruction of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the
State of Israel, these groups are also steeped in hatred
of the West and its culture. Their pursuit of terrorism
in our hemisphere and in many other parts of the world,
demonstrates that terrorism arising from conflicts in the
Middle East is now a global phenomenon.
The IntematLJ onal Terr orist T>>T-g>afr in l-afin America
The Lebanon-based, Iran-backed Hizballah, which has
waged a campaign of terror in the Middle East for many
years, including many suicide car bombings, is now the
major international terrorist threat in Latin America.
The suicide bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 1992, which
killed 29, was Hizballah's first terrorist act in
Latin America. Hizballah denied responsibility for the
crime, but Islamic Jihad, a clandestine terrorist wing of
Hizballah, claimed to have carried out the suicide
bombing, and authenticated its claim with a videotape of
the Embassy before the bombing - a Hizballah trademark.
(39)
40
The Government of Argentina has not yet charged any
suspect for the 1994 AMIA bombing, but the evidence points
to Hizballah as the bomber. The operation was a virtual
duplicate of the 1992 suicide bombing, in which a vehicle
carrying a massive explosives charge detonated in front of
the Israeli Embassy. Ansar Allah, a clandestine subgroup
of Hizballah, issued a statement expressing support for
the bombing of the AMIA Center after it happened.
Another act of terrorism, the bombing of a commuter
aircraft in Panama in July 1994, one day after the AMIA
disaster, is still unsolved. Evidence gathered so far
suggests it may also have been a Hizballah suicide
bombing. Of the 21 passengers who were killed, twelve
were Jews, and three of the twelve were dual national
Panamanian-Americans. Ansar Allah also issued a press
release supporting the attack. The apparent suicide
bomber used a Middle Eastern name, but has not been
otherwise identified. He had travelled the commuter plane
route several times before the bombing, and no one claimed
his remains .
We believe that Hizballah activities, which include
narcotics and smuggling as well as terrorism, are
supported in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay. The organization is known to have cells in
Colombia and Venezuela as well. Hizballah cells are
concealed amidst the large Shia' Muslim population of
Lebanese origin which has settled in the tri-border area.
Like the great majority of Latin America' s large Shia' and
Sunni Muslim communities, who emigrated from the Middle
East, most of the Muslims in the tri-border area are
peaceful, patriotic citizens who want nothing to do with
terrorism. Nevertheless, Hizballah has used this area for
fund raising and recruitment and for clandestine support
for terrorism, narcotics and other illegal activities.
Central government control is weak in this area; borders
are porous and often unpatrolled; and it is a favorable
environment for such operations.
Hizballah's chief patron is Iran, and it is likely
that Iran was aware of and provided support to the two
Buenos Aires bombings. We believe that Hizballah has not
committed terrorist acts abroad without Iranian consent.
And Hizballah cells in Latin America and elsewhere in the
world depend on guidance and logistical support from
Iranian intelligence officers assigned to Iranian
embassies m the region.
Mr. Chairman, Hizballah is only one of various
international terrorist threats in Latin America affecting
U.S. interests- Through August 1995, there were 53 acts
of international terrorism in the region, of which 35 were
directed against U.S. interests. Forty-two of these were
41
- 3 -
in Colombia, where there have been repeated bombing
attac)cs against multinational owned oil property, and an
epidemic of Jcidnappings .
In 1994, there were nearly 1,400 reported kidnappings
in Colombia, a 35 percent increase over 1993, but the
actual number may be even higher, since families and
employers prefer to settle cases quietly by paying
ransom. As of today, at least four U.S. citizens are
being held for ransom by Colombia guerrillas, and two
American hostages were killed on June 19, during a shoot
out between the terrorists and government forces. We have
urged the Colombian government to redouble its efforts to
free these hostages. But since they are being held in
remote areas where the government's control is weak, and
since the terrorists are intent on extorting large
ransoms, the prospect for voluntary release of these
hostages is limited. Two groups, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) , and the National Liberation
Army (ELN) were responsible for many of these terrorist
acts. These and other guerilla groups also have ties to
Colombian narcotraff ickers .
In Peru, the notorious Sendero Luminoso, or Shining
Path group, which has killed thousands over the years in
pursuit of its revolutionary aims, has been in decline
since the arrest of its leader, Abimeal Guzman in 1992.
Yet Sendero remains a deadly organization.
It committed 215 acts of political murder in 1994, a
major decline from 650 in 1992, but still a significant
number. Its ideology is fervently and anti-foreign and
anti-American, it has directed six attacks against foreign
nationals so far this year. In July 1993, Sendero
detonated a large car bomb in front of our Embassy in Lima.
Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico have also
suffered from political violence, but they have not
experienced major incidents of international terrorism in
recent years .
Cuba, the only Latin American nation on our list of
state sponsors of terrorism, is no longer an active player
in Latin American Terrorism. Its former Soviet and
communist revolutionary allies are gone, and Havana is
increasingly shunned in Latin America as more and more
states of the region turn toward democracy and free market
economies . Yet we believe Cuba still harbors terrorist
elements, for example from the Basque ETA group and the
Colombian FARC and ELN, and for this reason it remains on
our list of state sponsors.
42
- 4 -
State of Prog rftaa ^" ^*"' T ffve3t:igat;ion of trhfi AWTft ^fmhiffq
Mr. Chairman, turning to the investigation of the
AMIA bombing, Argentine leaders have emphasized to us
their strong commitment to solve the AMIA bombing and the
bombing of the Israeli Embassy, and to prevent any
recurrence of such acts in their country. Also,
Argentina' s leadership in hemispheric councils to promote
greater counterterrorism cooperation has been impressive.
Large suicide bombings of this kind, which create
massive destruction, are extraordinarily difficult
challenges for investigators. We are concerned,
nevertheless, that neither of these major crimes has been
solved, and to our knowledge there has been no
breakthrough in the AMIA investigation. I believe there
are various reasons for this.
— Argentina's laws and its investigative and judicial
systems do not provide all the tools and resources
that are needed to deal aggressively and intensively
with such major crimes. We understand the Argentine
Congress is now examining way to strengthen its
anti-terrorism laws, in ways that will enhance the
government' s capabilities without endangering human
rights . We have encouraged this effort .
In the past, Argentina's borders have been porous,
and the government lacked an adequate system for
monitoring immigration. Recently, President Menem' s
government has adopted a new program to prevent the
use of fraudulent travel documents by terrorists or
other criminal elements seeking to enter the country,
and to tighten border controls against hostile
elements .
In the past Argentina's investigative, security and
intelligence services have suffered from inadequate
interagency coordination. Recently, steps have been
taken to provide greater cohesion. We believe this
holds promise.
Argentina also needs to improve the effectiveness of
officials working in lower levels of its law
enforcement agencies. The Government of Argentina
realizes that to deal with major acts of terrorism
like the 1992 and 1994 bombings, improved law
enforcement machinery is needed.
43
- 5 -
Regionaj. Coppe rn t iO P '*"'* Cooi-^inat^iein . anrt fhw U.S. Role
The Buenos Aires bombings have created a sense of
urgency in the hemisphere, galvanizing the states of the
region into new cooperation. After the AMIA disaster.
Secretary Christopher announced that he would send me, as
his Coordinator for Counterterrorism, to Latin America to
consult with the most concerned governments on a concrete
plan to combat terrorism. He also announced that "as host
for the 1994 Summit of the Americas, the United States
will move to make terrorism in our hemisphere a priority
item on our agenda" .
The United States has learned in other parts of the
world that close consultation and cooperation among the
law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic security
services of friendly states is critical to fighting
international terrorism. Spreading this approach of
cooperation among the states of our own hemisphere has
been one of this Administration' s foremost
counterterrorism goals during the past year. Following up
on Secretary Christopher's announcement, in early
September, 1994, I led an interagency team to Buenos
Aires, Asuncion, Brasilia, and Caracas, to discuss
operative measures.
In the ne.'Ct phase, the U.S., Argentina, and other
like-minded nations, led an initiative at the December
Summit for an OAS meeting on terrorism, which will be held
in Lima in early 1996. Argentina, which has been the most
active Latin American state in this area, convened the UN
Security Council after the AMIA bombing and sought
approval of a "Declaration on Terrorism." And a special
session of the OAS Permanent Council was held for the same
purpose. The OAS has also established a Working Group on
Terrorism, charged with preparation for the 1996
conference .
In another move to strengthen subregional
cooperation, Argentina hosted a conference in August this
year in which the other states of the southern cone,
Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, as well as the
United States and Canada, took part. That meeting, at
which I led the U.S. delegation, has proposed a series of
concrete anti-terrorism cooperative measures in such areas
as border control, intelligence sharing, extradition, and
abuse of diplomatic privileges. It also called for wider
adherence to international treaties and conventions
against terrorism. These measures constitute a
significant step toward greater regional cooperation in
countering the international terrorist threat.
44
- 6 -
U.S. Asaiat^nce to t^e AMIA Inquiry
Because of the international dimensions of the AMIA
bombing, the profound sympathy of the American people
toward its victims, and the close U. S . -Argentina
relationship, the United States has been active in various
ways in assisting the Argentine government's investigation.
Shortly after the bombing, Argentina asked us to
assist in their post blast investigation. An
International Response Team (IRT), managed by the
Department of State' s Bureau of Diplomatic Security with
three explosives experts from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, flew to Buenos Aires. Additionally
three FBI agents provided technical assistance. A similar
IRT had helped Argentine in the early phases of the
investigation of the 1992 Israeli Embassy, and the 1994
team included some who had participated in 1992 as well as
experts who were involved in investigating the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing .
The IRT spent 12 days, working side-by-side with the
Argentine Police and Israeli experts, who were also at the
bomb site. Members of the IRT were instrumental in the
recovery of parts of the engine of the Renault van, which
the suicide bomber used to bomb the building, and which
were important to the investigation.
They also helped monitor the clean up efforts, and
they provided technical advice to Argentine authorities on
evidence collection and preservation, as well as
laboratory analysis.
The United States has also provided various forms of
anti-terrorism training to the Argentine Government
through the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism
Assistance Program, administered by the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, with policy guidance from the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism . Since Argentina became
a participant in the ATA program in 1992, ATA has trained
over 280 officials in 17 courses, at a cost of
approximately $2.2 million. In the next two fiscal years,
ATA intends to hold an additional 10 courses for Argentine
to train over 225 students. This highly specialized
training in multiple skills will cost approximately $2.6
million, and will cover over 38 weeks of training.
Conclusion
The AMIA bombing was an especially heinous act of
terrorism. Aimed at the very heart of Argentina's large
45
and vibrant Jewish coimnunity, it imposed a dreadful co3t
in human life, and destroyed priceless archives as well.
But out of this tragedy has come a greater awareness of
the international terrorist threat to Argentina and the
hemisphere .
The Argentine Government and people have rallied to
denounce this evil and to express solidarity with the
victims . And Argentina and the other states of
Latin America are now working more closely together in the
kinds of cooperative activities that are indispensable to
fighting international terrorism.
This Administration is doing all it can to strengthen
this trend, and to continue to assist Argentina,
especially, to resolve the two bombings it has suffered
and to prevent any recurrence of these terrible acts .
46
OPENING STATEMENT OF
ROBERT M. BRYANT
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION
BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARING ON INTERNATIONAL RADICAL TERRORISM
IN LATIN AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
47
On behalf of the FBI, It is a pleasure to appear before you
this morning to discuss international terrorism in Latin America. Since
the tragic bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, the
FBI and the Intelligence Community have learned that we are
confronted with a new and growing form of international terrorism.
This brand of terrorism is loosely structured and comprised of many
groups and persons who use violence to promote their personal,
political, social or economic beliefs. Currently, there are terrorist
infrastructures in Latin America, the United States and Canada which
actively support terrorist operations world-wide.
In July of last year two suspected transnational terrorist
assaults occurred, namely the bombing of the Israeli-Argentine Mutual
Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, Argentina and the
downing of a Panamanian commuter airline. As the attack on the
commuter airline took the lives of three U.S. citizens, our citizens and
our country became victims of a potentially broader terrorist
campaign.
48
Today I would like to update you on the assistance the FBI
provided during the investigations of these and one other major attack
perpetrated by suspected transnational terrorists in Latin America.
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1 984 coupled with the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1 986 authorize
FBI investigative jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is taken
hostage, murdered or assaulted by terrorists. Naturally, FBI
investigations abroad require coordination with the Department of
State and the permission of the host country.
In Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) regularly target U.S.
interests. Many Latin American Marxist terrorist groups, including
Peru's Shining Path, have greatly diminished. However, a new
terrorist challenge is emerging in the region, in the form of
International Radical Terrorism. On March 17, 1992, a car bomb
destroyed the three-story Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Although no U.S. citizens were harmed, 29 people were killed and
more than 240 others sustained injuries.
49
The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this cowardly
attack. The Islamic Jihad is a covername used by the Hizballah or
Party of God. The Hizballah is a radical extremist terrorist group
based in Lebanon, that is dedicated to installing a theocracy in
Lebanon modeled on the Government of Iran. Moreover, the Hizballah
is actively pursuing the removal of all non-Islamic influences from the
Middle East. In April 1983, 16 deaths occurred in the Hizballah
bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. Likewise, 241
fatalities were caused by a Hizballah suicide truck bomb attack on the
U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983.
Support for the 1992 terrorist bombing in Buenos Aires
may have emanated from the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay, which has a large Middle East population and a Hizballah
presence. The borders in this area are porous and ideal for
conducting illegal fundraising enterprises, including smuggling, gun
running and the sale of stolen vehicles.
50
In Buenos Aires, a terrorist car bombing on July 18, 1994,
destroyed the AMIA building in which over 90 people perished and
more than 200 were injured. None were U.S. citizens. A previously
unknown group called the "Islamic Command" claimed responsibility
for this brutal attack. The United States Government responded to
this bombing less than 48 hours after the blast by offering and
thereafter deploying 13 experts in explosives investigations from the
International Response Team (IRT). The IRT represented various
government agencies, including security experts from the FBI, the
State Department Diplomatic Security, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms. FBI Supervisory Special Agent David Williams
from the Explosives Unit is here today to respond to any bomb-related
questions. For the record, no arrests have been reported regarding
the 1992 terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy. With respect to the
1994 AMIA bombing, an Argentine used car dealer and two other men
implicated in the matter have been arrested.
Outside of Colon City, Panama, an ALAS commuter plane
exploded in flight and crashed on July 19, 1994. Among the 21
51
victims were three U.S. citizens and 12 Jewish persons. In Lebanon,
a group using the name "Ansar Allah" or Partisans of God claimed
responsibility for the AM I A bombing and suggested participation in
the bombing of the ALAS commuter plane. The FBI is conducting a
parallel Investigation with the Panamanian Government due to the
homicides of three U.S. citizens. No arrests have been made in this
ongoing investigation.
Due to the high visibility of the trials of Sheik Omar
Rahman and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, both implicated in the terrorist
acts in New York City, the counterterrorism community must remain
on guard against potential sympathetic acts of reprisal by elements of
International Radical Terrorists. This transnational criminal problem
requires a concerted response from the international law enforcement
community. To prevent future international terrorists acts, the FBI is
pledged to share counterterrorism intelligence, training and
techniques with our counterparts in Latin America.
52
Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, I am prepared to
furnish the committee additional information in a classified form. I
appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you today.
53
Presentation by Dr. Luis Czyzewski , father of a victim of the
terrorist attack against the AMIA-DAIA headquarters in Buenos
Ai res .
House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations
Washington D.C.
September 28, 1995
54
I am the father of a victim who died in the attack against the AMIA
headquarters. On behalf of myself and my wife who is with me, and
representing the relatives and friends of this brutal massacre's
victims, I would like to share with you our views about the issues
included in this meeting's agenda.
As we all know Argentina suffered two attacks against Jewish
targets in less than three years.
After the second terrorist attack one should carefully analyze
whether the things that were not done or done in the wrong manner
after the attack to the Embassy could have caused the murderers'
action to be repeated.
We firmly assert that the mistakes and omissions that followed the
first attack -which was practically not investigated- acted as an
immense and attractive invitation to persuade terrorists to repeat
their action. Based on the theory that it was an attack by
international terrorism against a foreign target located in
Argentina, as is the case of an embassy, the responsibility was
moved beyond our borders without seriously investigating the local
connec tion which js not doubted by anyone today.
On the other hand we do not see that the first attack alerted the
Argentine government about the security and control measures that
should have been implemented in borders and ji^i^r^orjjs and we believe
were not applied as seriously and strongly as required.
This and the analysis of the events which followed the attack to
the AMIA building make us believe that Argentina in particular and
Latin America in general is a region in which international
terrorism can operate with extreme ease. It is a generally accepted
principle that a thief decides to steal where it is easier, and
that is applicable to this case, with the aggravating circumstance
that in the two attacks perpetrated in Argentina, terrorists
necessarily had support from internal partners who have not been
discovered to date.
In our opinion the following is therefore imperative:
a) The countries of the region should coordinate efforts and
elaborate joint strategies to prevent terror acts not only in
55
Latin America but in the whole continent,
b) To obtain U.S. support in all aspects required to contribute
to the judicial investigation of the attack against AMIA.
With regard to the present status of judicial investigations aimed
at clarifying said attack we perceive that in fourteen months a lot
was investigated with notoriously poor results.
From our standpoint, where rational and emotional aspects are
necessarily intermingled, we firmly hold that we will only be
appeased when we get to know who perpetrated the attack and who the
local accomplices were, when their full names are known and jail is
the place where the rest of their lives will be spent.
It does not suffice to hear that investigators are working hard and
doing everything possible, as that is not their merit but their
duty .
We do not perceive the coordination of objectives that should exist
between the judicial power and the agencies in charge of analyzing
each of the pieces of evidence that appear every day and then
become nothing.
This makes the feeling of impunity grow day after day as to this
very day facts do not show the opposite.
We are certain that the Argentine government positively knows that
clarifying the attack to AMIA will notoriously strengthen its
international standing, and it is therefore necessary for
investigators do so without any fear, doubt or conditioning.
However, it is something we have not perceived to date.
Mr . Chai rman :
Allow me to spend one more minute analyzing the topic that gathers
us here from a different perspective: the humane aspect.
For people and countries attacks mean the analysis of facts and
actions originating in them.
For relatives the tragedy in itself is the most important fact. I
would like to convey a testimony on this statement.
Since July 18, 1994 my wife, my other children and myself cannot
enjoy the smile, a kiss and the model of life that our daughter
Paola set for us every day, and they were beautiful.
56
Since then we cannot see her grow up, become an adult and a good
person as every parent wishes of his/her children.
For the other 85 families, some Jewish, some Catholic, Argentine,
Bolivian and of other nationalities, the situation is the same with
respect to the dead relative.
I hope that you, who are also sons and daughters, parents, brothers
and sisters understand that the pain of this uselessly shed blood
should force all persons and countries to reflect and do whatever
is passible so that very soon we can say with all our might: NEVER
AGAIN
Finally, I would like to thank the Committee of International
Relations of the House of Representatives of the United States for
the invitation I received through Mr. Benjamin A. Oilman to offer
my testimony which I hope will be useful.
Thank you very much.
57
PRESENTATION BY DR. RUBEN E. BERAJA,
PRESIDENT OEDAIA
COMMITTEE ON INTERNA TIONAL RELA TIONS
HOUSE OE REPRESENTA TIVES
WASIDNGTON DC, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
Mr. Cliainnan,
I thank you for the invitation to address this distinguished
Committee of International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
This occasion is appropriate to complement ^vhat we have
stated 14 months ago, shortly after the massacre
perpetrated in Buenos Aires, when the AMIA-DAIA
building M'as destroyed by a terrorist attack.
The time elapsed has allowed us since then to acquire a
greater knowledge about international terrorism as a
phenomenoum of the times, to better calibrate the threat
that it constitutes for civilian populations and democracies,
and understand the strengths and weaknesses that the State
apparatus shows vis a vis this dangerous challenge.
On behalf of DAIA, the representative organization of
Jewish institutions in Argentina, we have worked
relentlessly so that the wound opened by international
terrorism does not remain unpunished, and that it also
receives the adequate political sanction.
Regarding the first aspect, as plaintiffs together with
AMI A, w'e have had an active participation in the activities
carried out by Federal Judge, Dr. Juan Jose Galeano and
58
the Prosecutors, witnessing the difficulties that prevented
more concrete residts in the ongoing investigation.
We critize the fact that these dificiilties were increased by
the lack of coordination between the securiy and
intelligence agencies in charge of the investigation and
because of the delay experienced in obtaining the
cooperation of the Police of the Buenos Aires Province,
which only took place a few months ago.
In spite of the above mentioned, m'C believe that the court
has gathered elements that allow us to come to the
following conclusions:
a) To commit the terrorist actions, the perpetrators
required qualified support from diplomatic personnel or
individuals linked to the Embassy of Iran in Buenos Aires.
b) Under diplomatic immunity or in close relationship to
those who have it, as indicated previously, cells of activists
identified with islamic fundamentalism have been
established in Argentina, one of which, it can be
reasonable presumed, has played an important role in the
logistical support previous to the attack.
c) Groups involved in the illegal dealing of stolen vehicles,
where some members of the Police of the Province of
Buenos Aires are involved, have been included as
accessories, providing support to the terrorists.
59
d) The elements obtained in the investigation a/low us to
conchide that Ciiidad del Este, Paraguay, constitutes a
center of support of fundamentalist terrorism.
From the point of view of criminal law, and the
requirements of doctrine and jurisprudence, it can be
accepted that additional evidences must he gathered so that
the Court can reach a final verchct against those included
in my previous remarks.
Nevertheless, the logical analysis of the information
already gathered allow us to indicate that those mentioned
in point- a), b) and c) constitute an interconnected web,
interacting between them and reciprocally necessary to
consummate a massacre such as the one we have suffered.
This logical conclusion which has been constructed with
great effort in the Court file is enriched by the
investigations carried out within the sphere of the
Secretary of State Intelligence (SIDE), which is under the
authority of the President, and they have arrived to the
following conclusions:
a) The attack of July 18, 1994, was the responsibility of
individuals belonging to the Hizballah organization -this
was admitted coincidentally by the head of intelligence, Dr.
Hugo Anzorreguy, by the Argentinean Foreign Minister,
Ing. Guido Di Telia and among others by the Ambassador
of Argentina to the United States, Dr. Paul Granillo
Ocampo.
b) It should be indicated that the authorities of my country
believe that the attack against the Embassy of Israel in
60
Buenos Aires, in March 1992 was also perpetrated by
members ofHizbollah.
c) There are serious indications of suspicious activities of
individuals linked to the Iranian Embassy, as well as a
growing activism Mnthin elements of Shiite fundamentalism
in Buenos Aires and other parts of Argentina.
Once again, these conclusions have the characteristic of
investigations of intelligence agencies, based in clues,
indirect evidence, confidential investigation in the country
and abroad, as well as information provided by similar
agencies of friendly governments.
The accumulation of conclusions reached by the Court and
those obtained by the law enforcement and intelligence
agencies allow us to state that from a political point of
view there exists enough elements and background so that
the government of Argentina can adopt policy decisions
that imply stronger sanctions agamst Hizbollah and all
those States that through complacency, support, direct or
indirect involvement allow that organization to plan and
execute acts of aggression in other countries, killing
innocent civilians, instilling fear in the society, creating
havoc and enormous material damage, all of which affects
and endangers the basic pillars of democratic life.
We wish to indicate categorically that there are no raisons
d'etat, be them economic or political, that can justify a
policy of compromising with terrorists, because we are
convinced that it sends a dangerous message, inviting
further attacks and also damaging the credibility of the
people in the rule of law.
61
We are aware that there are many countries that faced with
terrorists aggression have chosen a policy of appeasement,
trying to unilaterally forgive crimes committed in their
territory as a necessary price to theoretically prevent new
terrorists attacks in the future. This policy of appeasement
brings back to our minds what happened in the thirties in
Europe, regarding the nazi threat: the historical
conclusions of the cost of that ambiguous policy are so
evident that no additional comment is necessary.
Our position was initially shared by President Menem,
who publicly supported a strong political reaction of
Argentina against those governments which protect or
promote Hizbollah. Unfortunately, in August of last year,
the Deputy Foieign Minister and the Foreign Minister of
Argentina, indicated to delegations of American Jewish
organizations that following the advice of friendly
European governments, it M'as wise to be extremely prudent
vis a vis Iran, so as not to be subject to worse reprisals.
This position has established a policy still current, policy
which greatly worries us, not only for the past, but also for
the future.
It is widely accepted by the experts that terrorists activities
may increase, that its links with drug trafficking ( i.e. the
Bekaa Valley/ Hizbollah ) are greater and greater, and
increasingly dangerous, and that the combination of those
factors -as the war in Bosnia demonstrated- can have
tragic consequences for humanity. In Argentina,
marihuana fields have been detected in the northeastern
22-101 0-96-3
62
Province of Misiones, bordering the region where groups
linked to Hizbollah' have settled, as it was indicated last
August by the head of the Paraguayan Police. According to
military authorities in Argentina, the most serious
hypothesis of conflict comes from narcoterrorism and
recent statements of the head of Security of Uruguay
indicates that because of the open border policies which
will be a result of the Mercosur common market, the
dangers of terrorists activity are increased.
We are conscious ihat ii-e are not only struggling regarding
the past, to solve the criminal attack against A Ml A, but
also to protect our future from the threat of narcoterrorism,
whatever its ideological affiliation. The democratic world
can not take lightly the information regarding attacks with
poisonous gas, bombs in airplanes, or tlie miraculous delay
of a clock, M'hich prevented a massacre at a school with
seven hundred children in Lyon, France.
We therefore M>ish to propose:
I) That democratic Nations and particularly the United
States intensify specific actions to neutralize terrorists
groups in their own bases.
2) That Governments denounce M'ithout fear or ambiguous
speculations those regimes that support, protect and
promote terrorism and narcoterrorism.
3) That the Resolution against terrorism passed
unanimously by the General Assembly of the United
63
Nations on December 9, 1994 be implemented with
concrete measures. Words are not enough.
Our Organization, an N.G.O. recognized for 60 years of
struggle against nazism, discrimination and for the
preservation of human rights, )re will continue our efforts
within the rule of law so that Argentina becomes a leader
among the countries willing to face terrorism and its allies
and neutralize sinister threats that endanger democracies.
The State Departments counterterrorism policy follows
three general rules, which we fully share:
. First, do not make deals with terrorists or submit to
blackmail.
. Second, treat terrorists as criminals and apply the rule of
law.
. Third, bring maximum pressure on slates that sponsor and
support terrorists by iirposing economic, diplomatic, and
political sanctions and urging other states to do likewise.
We trust that this presentation contributes to strengthen the
decision of the United States Congress to maintain as a
priority item of its agenda the terrorist threat, and that the
rule of law be reassured /protecting the basic right of a
human being, the right to live without fear.
THANK YOV VERY MUCH
64
SEP-29-'95 15:47 T-flMCHfl NU 2067212520 tt761-02
TESTIMONY OF RABBI AVI WEISS, National president. Coalition for Jewish
Concerns-Aincha, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
September 28, 1995:
I'm graieful to Congressman Ben Oilman for convening these hearings. After returning from
Buenos Aires this past July I met with Congressman Oilman and my representative, Eliot Engel. Their
concern for the victims of the ANfiA and Israeli Embassy bombings, as well as Congressman Oilman's
quick response to my request thai hearings be called— is greatly appicciaied. As I sit before you the image
of countless numbers of families of victims, of Diana Malamud, Liora Ginsburg, the Czyzewskis, of
Damian Goldenberg and so many others are etched in my heart. I dedicate this testimony to (hem and to
the memory of their loved ones in the prayer that justice be done.
Having spent almost a week in Argentina in July 1994 when the AMIA attack occured during
which time 1 met with Argentine President Carlos Menem and also attended a full cabinet session, and
having sF>cnt several days in Buenos Aires on the first anniversary of the attack this past July, I have
come to (he conclusion that (he government of Argentina is stonewalling the investigation and that a
cover up is taking place.Therc has been no full investigation because such an investigation would reveal
that people in the highest echelons of government, or people who worked for them or the government
intelligence service were involved.
This conclusion is not speculation. Evidence points in this direction:
i) It is part of the public record that President Carlos Menem has reincorporated many people
with ultra-right wing or neo-Nazi views, or criminals with murderous pasts into the state intelligence
service. One cannot expect individuals with these kinds of views to carry out a serious investigation into
either of the two bombings. Yet these were the individuals tasked to carry out the investigation.
For example, Menem appointed Col. Oscar Pascual Guerrieri as advisor to the state intelligence
agency, SIDE. Guemreri had headed two concentration camps during the previous military regime and
was part of a bombing campaign to destabilize the govemmen( of Menem's democratically elected
predecessor, Raoul Alfonsin. The destabilizing campaign included Guerriri's telephoned death threats to
elementary schools. A Jewish nursery was the first (arget of the campaign. Another example: Luis
Abelardo Patti, a former police official involved in an alleged shoot-out in 1983 with two political
dissidents, was named by Menem to head the Buenos Aires lucrative Central Market. Just a few days
after the one year anniversary of the AMIA bombing, Menem lauded Patti's performance.
Articles attached to this testimony, written by Martin Edwin Andersen and published in the
Washington Times document countless examples of similar appointments.
2) The Argentine intelligence and immigration services are compromised. For example, in
January 1990 a Syrian terrorist, Monzer Al Ka.ssar, linked to the Pan Am 103 bombing and implicated
by German intelligence sources to the Achille Lauro hijacking which resulted in the murder of New
Yorker Leon Klinghoffer, was permitted to enter Argentina by Carlos Aurelio "ZaZa" Martinet,
appointed by Menem as Director of Immigration. A few days later, Kassar was granted an Argentine
passport signed by Menem's brother. Kassar's name surfaced in connection with the 1992 bombing of
65
SEP-29-'95 15:47 T-flMCHfl NUI 2057212520 «761-03
the Israeli Embassy. Additionally. Menem's brother-in-law, Ibrahim Al Ibrahim, was appointed head of
security at the Buenos Aires airport despite the Tact that he didn't even speak Spanish.
3) Specific questions concerning the AMIA and for that matter the Israeli Embassy bombing
point to a government cover-up.
(a) The only person dcUined though not indicted in the AMIA bombings is Carlos Alberto
Telleldin. Tellcldin was the last owner of an automobile whose parts were found in the ruins of the
AMIA building. Telleldin swore before three federal judges that Hector Verger, rumored to be an ex-
member of SIDE offered him $lmillion and his freedom in exchange for falsely implicating one of the
Ifbanese citizens held in Paraguay as the person to whom Telleldin sold the van. The charge precipitated
a separate investigation by Judge Branca, it's now four months later and no results have been
forthcoming.
In an article published in La Nacion September 26, 1995 it was reported that Telleldin met
secretly with Luisa Riva Aramayo, one of the three fedend judges and told her that he bad in fact sold the
car to two Buenos Aires police officers. Aramayo's deci.sion to meet with Telleldin in secret without her
colleagues was highly unusual and was toiuidly criticized.
(b) The policemen on duty at AMIA and the Israeli Embassy were not at their posts when the
buildings were blown up. Despite this fact. Captain Gaston G. Fernandez, chief of the 7th precinct
which controls special guard duty in front of AMIA was promoted.
(c) Several Buenos Aires residents told mc that members of Painted Faces— a notorious Nazi
type group—who had been given life sentences, were seen on the streets of Buenos Aires just a few
weeks before AMIA was bombed. Who was responsible for their early release?
(d) Subsequent to the Israeli Embassy attack, the US warned Argentina about possible further
terrorism. Despite this fact, security in Argentina remained appallingly lax, the borders remained
unguarded. Jewish buildings were not protected by cement barriers. Whoever was responsible for
these security lapses surely contributed to the AMIA attack-nonetheless no one has been held
accountable.
(e) Respected Argentine reporter Dr. Adrian Ventura of I .a Nacion told mc he saw two men
wearing blue uniforms digging craters in front of the Israeli Embassy on the Saturday night after it was
bombed to give the appearance that a car bomb had exploded.
In any police investigation one examines all possible leads and then discards them one by one
based on improbability or lack of evidence. It was clear from the very beginning of the AMIA
investigation that the police had a preferred lcad--specincally Iran— and they weren't going to give
serious consideration to other leads as such information would have been cmbarassing to the Menem
govemmcnt. The reality is that this kind of attack could not have taken place without being abetted from
the inside.
For the investigation to be thorough, no lead must be left unchecked. If neo-Nazis were
invdved— perhaps intent on destroying Nazi files in the AMIA building— they must be implicated. If they
worked together with Arab extremists as the Mufti allied himself with Adolf Hitler 50 years ago, it must
be revealed.
66
SEP-29-'95 15:4S T-RMCHfi NU 2067212520 11761-04
At the open cabinet meeting I attended I was told that Argentine intelligence had concluded that
the Israeli Embassy was bombed by an obscure terrorist group called An Sar Allah operating out of
Southern Lebanon. If (he Menem govemmeat is serious about an investigation why has it not directed its
attention to Syria which controls Southern Lebanon ? Without Syrian cover this terrorist group could
not operate. Indeed, if Syria— which the United States protected from terrorist charges in the Pan Am
103 bombing in order to bring her into the peace process— was responsible, that too must be reported.
Political expediency has no place in a terrorist investigation, the chips m\ist fall where they may.
The US government's claim that the AMIA bombing was the work of Hizbollah because it so
closely resembled the Israeli Embassy attack which had (he earmarks of Hi7.boIlah, doesn't wash. It
ought be remembered that after the Oklahoma City bombing, the immediate reaction was (hat Middle
Eastern extremist terrorists were responsible because of similarities with the World Trade Center attack.
As it turned out, extremist right wing fanatics played a key part in the Oklahoma City tragedy.
4) Serious questions have also been raised concerning Federal Judge Juan Jose Galeano charged
wiih the investigation into (he AMIA bombing.
(h) Until April of 1995, Judge Galeano was handling hundreds of other cases. While he has
received no new cases since April he still presides over the hundreds of cases still pending before him.
(b) Questions have been raised about Galeano's independence. After publicly accusing the
government of a cover up this past July, I was subpoenaed by Galeano and spent six hours virtually
locked in a small room answering questions about my allegations. The Judge's assistant spent close to
half an hour reading a series of laws warning me that perjury carried with it a serious penalty. There arc
many in Argentina who believe that the judiciary does not act without approval from high government
officials including Menem. 1 sensed right there in Galeano's presence (hat the real purpo.se tha(
afternoon was to intimidate me and to force mc to recant my allegations.
There is one other matter which deserves the committee's serious attention.
Buenos Aires is a city that awaits the next terrorist attack. 1 say this not only because the
continued failure (u apprehend the terrorists who bombed the embassy and AMIA sends a message to
terrorists everywhere that Buenos Aires is an open target, but al.so because security in Argentina is
abysmal.
The Ezeiza Buenos Aires International airport is among the least secure in the worid. When I
entered Buenos Aires this past July my passport was not checked by computer. It's common knowledge
that the borders into Argentina are sieves allowing terrorists (o transport explosives unimpeded across
the frontier, especially by sea.
To test security 1 travelled together with several colleagues by boat from Buenos Aires to
Uruguay and back this past July. My worst fears were borne out. Among those traveling with me that
day by boat was Gabi, an Israeli cit)7.cn, who, despite the fact that he entered Argentina using an
Argentine passport, left thai day using his Israeli passport. Fn other words, although there was no
indica(ion on his Israeli passport that he had arrived in Argentina, he was nonetheless, permitted to
leave. De.spite (he fact (ha( (he US govcmnieut had just issued a warning that a terrorist attack in South
America could be imminent, both in Buenos Aires and Uruguay our baggage, which included a tape
67
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recorder— commonly used by terrorists to hide sophisticated bombs— was not checked. Upon our return
to Argentina J wall(cd directly from the ship to the streets of Buenos Aires not even passing through
passport control.
To prevent further terrorist attacks in Argeatina it is critical that the US government conduct a
full on-site investigation into Argentine security. If Argentine airports arc found to be unsafe the US
government should prohibit American carriers from landing there. And if the Argentine borders are
found (o be porous, US citizens should be warned not to travel to Argentina.
There is great fear in Buenos Aires. Fear that terrorism will strike again. Fear that Argentina
may once again slip back into a dictatorship. Fear on the part of many Argentine Jewish leaders to
speak out.
After I publicly accused the Menem government of a cover up this past July, Menem himself
called me "totally delirious' in stories carried on the front page of Buenos Aires newspapers. In a lead
editorial in I^ Nacion (July 30. 1995), Adrian Ventura indicated that the head uf DALA rejected my
accusations 'out of fear." Ventura continued. "The truth is that from this moment on the volume has
been raised and now the discussion is concentrated on the actions of the security forces." Ventura
confirmed what I had heard from scores of Buenos Aires Jews who came up to me and said "Thank you
for saying what we believe but were afraid to say."
There is a fire burning in Argentina. Buenos Aires is ripe for another terrorist attack unless
America pressures the Argentine government to take serious measures and demands that security be
dramatically tightened.
Just days after the horrific World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings terrorists were
apprehended. It's almost four years since the Israeli Embassy was blown up and more than one year
since the AMIA attack, but there are no serious suspects. And there will be no serious suspects without
the US government stepping in to demand a real and full investigation.
68
STATEMENT OF TOMMY P. BAER
INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT OF B'NAl B'RITH
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ON TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA
AMIA BOMBING IN ARGENTINA
SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
On behalf of B'nai B'rith members in this country, in Argentina and in 54
other countries around the world, I welcome this opportunity to testify on
a subject that has troubled and preoccupied us for more than a year,
particularly since our members in Argentina have become deeply
frustrated over the failure to find the culprits in the dastardly 1994 AMIA
bombing that was so costly in the lives of both Jews and non Jews. The
trauma connected with this event was damaging to the functioning of the
Jewish community and to Argentina at large. The fact that the bombing
was the second on a Jewish or Israeli institution in a two year period
adds to the malaise of Jews in Argentina.
I am of two minds on the subject of the bombings and the inability to
bring those responsible to justice. At one level, I commend the efforts
of President Menem to buoy the spirits of a beleaguered people, and of
those judges and investigators who are making a sincere and
determined effort to search out the truth and to assure that justice
prevails.
At another level, I have a gnawing sense that obstacles are being
thrown up by an old guard in the security forces and in the courts, an
old guard whose instincts were finely honed under a military dictatorship
and which has often been associated with, and protective of, Nazis and
neo Nazis.
The two devastating suicide bombings in Buenos Aires had staggering
death tolls: Twenty-nine people were killed and 252 injured in the March
1992 attack which destroyed the Israeli Embassy; and 86 people died in
the assault on the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA), an
agency central to the life of the country's Jewry.
Because of the suicidal nature of the bombings, suspicion pointed to
69
Iranian sponsorship off Islamic extremists whose aim worldwide is to
defeat the Middle East peace process and to create hostility between
Jews and their neighbors. However, no clear evidence sufficient for a
trial has yet appeared.
With no clear path to a trial emerging after a year of intensive
investigation, the Jewish community is understandably angry, frustrated
and despondent. In addition, there is fear which grows out of the
realization that Argentina remains a soft target. In fact, in a meeting last
year with the country's foreign minister, Guido di Telia, a B'nai B'rith
group heard him say that failing to bring the criminal killers to justice
would Invite a catastrophic, third terrorist attack in Argentina. He saw
such an eventuality as enormously destructive to the Jewish community
and to democracy.
The attacks are significant because they are directed at the largest
Jewish community in Latin America, which is estimated to be in excess
250,000 people.
Wheels of justice turn slowly in Latin America. Argentina, better
developed than most countries in the region, is still impeded by a lack
of skills to deal with the ferocity of terrorism that has struck it. From the
standpoint of courts, laws and the security forces and their apparatus,
the country is ill prepared to solve Its terrorism problem.
This background, if left in place, hardly invites an enthusiastic
investigation of Jewish (or Israeli) institutions. However, in answer to
questions from B'nai B'rith, high level Argentine officials claim they have
replaced the old guard. Although there is some skepticism among critics,
it is recognized that training security forces is a major undertaking. As
a result, Argentina has begun to receive technical aid from the United
States and other countries. What's more, judges from Argentina have
also come to the U.S. to learn how our courts deal with terrorism cases.
This is important for the future.
At the onset of the two bombings, enormous technical assistance came
from the United States, Israel, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Argentina's acceptance of the offer to help was an admission that other
70
powers were better equipped to deal with the catastroj^he. Indeed, offers
of cooperation from U.S. government agencies to Argentina are to be
commended. As never before, the importance of the existence of a State
Department office of Counter-terrorism has been underscored.
More pressing is the reality that Argentina faces a threat from its open
borders, particularly with Paraguay and Brazil. The tri-border region's
thriving and unchecked illegal and illicit business In Ciudad del Este,
Porto-lguacu and Foz de Iguacu invites strong suspicions of heavy traffic
In drug running, contraband, arms and terrorists. Aside from the fact that
customs officials can be bought off for a 'closed trunk" passage from
Paraguay to Argentina, the documents collected from travelers are
discarded after three months. There is no computerization of who
crosses borders, in other words, no record of wanted or suspicious
Individuals Is possible. This reality makes it absolutely essentia! that
countries in this hemisphere closely cooperate in an effort to insure that
borders cannot be traversed with impunity by terrorists or those who aid
and assist them.
The prospects for rapid technological change are bleak because of the
precarious economic situation in Argentina which now suffers from an
official posting of 1 8.6 percent unemployment, but observers estimate an
even higher figure. As a reaction, public protests have been growing.
On the positive side, Argentina is now playing a lead role in promoting
interest in addressing the ravages of terrorism in the region. Additionally,
the Argentine government has announced that it will issue new fraud-
proof passports. This is even catching the eyes of previously
disinterested countries like Brazil and Paraguay.
The investigation of the AMIA bombing has been the focus of one judge,
Juan Jose Galeano. Following the Gallic system of law, judges are
empowered to gather information and to prosecute. But if there is
cynicism about the security forces which are supposed to aid the judges,
the courts themselves are not highly respected institutions in Argentina.
By contrast, Judge Galeano has worked tirelessly with a small staff and
volunteers in a difficult landscape for pursuing leads. Upon learning that
71
the judge was not free from his other court duties, and worked on the
AMIA case only part-time, B'nai B'rith questioned government officials
and other judges on this point. To Its credit the government released
Judge Galeano from all duties but the AMIA case.
The judge works closely with the Jewish community, particularly with the
DAIA, whose president, Ruben Beraja, who is here today, is both an
eloquent spokesman and frequent critic of the government's failings in
the pursuit of the case.
However, at the outset there were numerous runs down blind alleys.
By early August 1995. the judge had four people under detention. The
lead suspect is Carlos (Tel-el-deen') Telleldin, the son of a sadistic
torturer close to the Junta, who had been a high ranking security official
from Cordoba. Telleldin espouses neo-Nazi views and is being held for
involvement in the falsifying of documents of the vehicle used in the
bombing.
However, knowledgeable people see Telleldin "as only a small cog in the
wheel". Other operatives, especially those who planned this terrorist act,
are still at large.
Many terrorism analysts believe that Iranian embassies are the spark for
activating dormant Hizbollah and other Muslim extremist cells. As
evidence, they point to the enormous presence of Iranian embassy
officials in countries like Argentina where there is a small Iranian
community, and limited trade with Iran.
Insofar as diplomatic representation is concerned, senior government
officials in both Chile and Uruguay told me several months ago that they
are aware of the potential problems posed by "over representation" at the
Iranian Embassies in their countries.
I should add that several years ago Argentina and Iran were cooperating
on a joint nuclear project which had boosted the trade between both
countries to a significant level. We are told that the joint nuclear project
has ceased, but trade continues, albeit at lower levels.
72
Although there is the general belief among many that the government will
not prove a case against anyone who directed the attack, some experts
expect substantial breaks in the case. It was thought that one occurred
most recently.
In early August, seven suspects from Paraguay - six Lebanese and one
Brazilian - were extradited to Buenos Aires for their connections with a
German born Nazi arms seller; they were released in less than 48 hours
for lack of evidence.
This seemed odd to us: after all, it was Argentina which pressed for the
extradition of the seven from Paraguay in the first place. Why were the
suspects released so quickly? Would not there have existed probable
cause precedent to a request for extradition?
What has been clear all along is that terrorism raises uncomfortable
questions for societies on the following issues:
1.) the nature of security forces in Argentina, Paraguay and
Brazil and their ability or interest in dealing with finding
suspected terrorists;
2.) the need to secure borders by improving surveillance and
checks on traffickers in drugs, contraband and the apparatus
of terrorism; and
3.) the scant ability to share intelligence on the murky figures of
islamic extremism who have targeted Latin America.
With whatever flaws exist in the emerging systems, the affected countries
have begun to realize that the damage from terrorism now far outweighs
the unrestricted movement of people and goods across a thriving trade
zone between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. One of the reasons is the
increased pressure from the United States and from groups like B'nai
B'rith, which continue to raise the twin issues of tightening security and
seeking justice. At the very least, some of these countries now see that
their international reputations for pursuing justice now count for
something.
Thus, some countries in the region are aiming to comply with higher
73
standards. Paraguay had no democratic rule in recent memory. The 34-
year long dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner totally controlled all
life forms. There is now a democratically elected government in Paraguay
and clearly, the old way of "doing business" Is changing. It is significant
that the extradition, which involved appeals by two of the terrorist
suspects, went through a process of adjudication. Despite insider claims
of money changing hands at one court level, the judges abided by
judicial rules.
In memory of those who died, and as tribute to those who worked in the
rescue and the search, B'nai B'rith and other Jewish organizations have
pressed for a concerted effort to find those responsible.
What can individual organizations like B'nai B'rith do to create an
awareness of the threat posed by international terrorism?
B'nai B'rith Argentina sponsored a two day conference on July 3 and 4,
1995 to analyze the wide reaching effects of terrorism. With the
participation of government officials, rabbis and priests, educators and
psychologists, the conference attracted more than 1 000 attendees. This
historic conference, the first of its kind ever held in Argentina, raised the
profile of the terrorist threat and proposed concrete steps to confront it.
B'nai B'rith has also maintained contact with a broad range of United
States and Argentine officials in order to:
1.) gather information in order to properly assess the terrorist
threat;
2.) to offer constructive insights into possible ways to improve
security;
3.) to offer Argentine officials a platform to share their
perspectives and interpret their policies and positions;
4.) to commend the positive steps that are taken to improve the
situation, including greater cooperation among appropriate
agencies and countries of the hemisphere; and
5.) to continue pressuring the Argentine government.
From the viewpoint of worldwide Jewry it is important not to forget the
innocent victims who lost their lives in the two Argentine bombings.
74
B'nai B'rfth pledges to continue its global role in working to expose the
threat posed by International terrorism not just to Jewish communities
and to Israel, but to democracies everywhere, including our own.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before the
Committee today.
75
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA.
AND THE AMIA BOMBING IN ARGENTINA
TESTIMONY OF
JACOB KOVADLOFF, CONSULT A]Vr ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 199S
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, I want to thank you for this
opportunity to testify today on a matter of grave importance to our country and to the security
and well-being of democratic societies throughout the Western Hemisphere and across the globe.
Under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, the Committee has devoted considerable attention to this
urgent issue — probing the international aiiineclions that facilitate lerrorist acts, and crafting
legislation that will deter such acts, dry up their sources of .support, and .severely punish their
perpetrators. The American Jewish Committee commends you in this critical effort and pledges
to continue our work with the Committee and others in the Congress and in the Administration
who seek to raLsc public awareness about the threat posed by international terrorism and to
develop tough and practical countermeasures.
By way of introduction, Mr. Chairman. I must tell you that my connection to the issue
before the Conmiittee today Ls profoundly personal. 1 am Argentine and Jewish. For the last
eight of its more than 30 years of existence, I was the director of the American Jewish
Cunmiittce's South American Office, headquartered in Buenos Aires. In June of 1977, I left my
country due to escalating threats to my family, my staff and, of course, myself. At that time,
my country was in political turmuil, torn by a virtual civil war between subversive groups and
the forces of repression -- and among civilian, military and paramibtary organizations. After the
threat of political violerice forced us to close our office in Buenos Aires, the American Jewish
Committee continued to work alongside democratic institutions, both Jewish and non- Jewish, in
Washington and New York, that sought an end to the repression and civil strife in my country.
In the years since the end of that dark chapter in Argentine history, the American Jewish
Committee, through frequent exchanges in both countries, has remained in close contact with the
Jewish community there, with Argentine civic institutions, and with the Government of
Argentina.
Allow me to say, Mr. Chairman, that many of us have not forgotten and .still harbor deep
gratitude to you for your help to the victims of the barbaric struggle in my home country. We
have not forgotten, cither, your firm condemnation of the anti-Semitic acts which were a
common occurrence in Argentina during that terrible lime.
Indeed, the history of extremist political movements - in and out of power - in my
native country and across Latin America for •icvcral decades has been interwoven with anti-
Semitism. In a sense, today's hearing revisits a chapter of that history that might well be called
76
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 2
"From Domestic Terrorism to International Terrorisiii. " In d 1980 AJC analysis. "Latin Atijerita
- llie Arab Connection, " we described how the political pragmatism of many I^tin American
governments gradually allowed the penetration of a discriminatory and anti-Semitic ideology into
their diplomacy. Its culmination was the infamous vote at the United Nations equaling Zionism
and racism. In an oddly parallel fashion, anti-govenunent guerrillas and subversive movements
from the 1960's onward, with support from anti-Western governments in the Muslim world,
voiced similar strains of anti- Zionism and anti-Semitism. Operatives of some of these so-called
liberation movements received weapons, money and asylum from confrontational nonaligncd
.states, with training camps in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Sudan.
While in Argentina today there are no surviving strucmres of militant movements of the
extreme left, it is easy to see that individuals and small groups of the extreme right, remnants
of the repressive former regime and its support network, are still active, anonymously, in
important areas of Argentina's political life, particularly in its armed forces, and in tJte security
and intelligence services. The link between these groups and individuals on the militant right,
and the terrorist attacks against the Israeli Embassy and tlie Jewish community in Buenos Aires
of 1992 and 1994, respectively, has never been firmly established, but there continues lo be
speculation in Argentina that such groups may have played a supportive, logistical role in the
bombings - and, through law enforcement connections, may have complicated the government's
investigative efforts.
Before turning to those terrible ii£:idcnts in 1992 and 1994, 1 must say emphatically, Mr.
Chairman, that it would be inaccuTBte and unfair to broadly characterize Argentina as an anti-
Semitic country and a Nazi haven — stigmas which are frequently applied to my native country .
Yes, there are racists in Argentina, and yes. tlic country harbored a number of infamous figures
of German Nazism - but Argentine society as a whole rejects anti-Semitism. Indeed, in 1992
the American Jewish Committee in cooperation with the DAI A, Argentina's umbrella group of
Jewish organizations, published an opinion survey in which a decisive 81 percent of respondents
expressed acceptance and tolerance of Jews ~ a significant rise from previous studies conducted
in the 1960's and 70's.
The 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires elicited broad and sincere expressions of
public sympathy with the victims and their families, and with the Jewish community generally.
But those expressions were, of course, made nearly iiKidental by the horror of the attacks
themselves - attacks that together killed more than 120 individuals, and that as yet have led to
no conclusive prosecutorial action Shortly after the March 17, 1992, bombing that destroyed
the Israeli Embassy - and again Just three days after the July 18, 1994, bombing that reduced
to rubble the AMIA Jewish community headquarters building — laigc public demonstrations were
conducted in Buenos Aire* in support of Israel artd the Argentine Jewish community, and in
tribute to the victims. President Menem and his entire cabinet, Catholic Church leaders,
lawmakers and representatives from all walks of Argentine life Joined the Argentine Jewish
community in expressions of solidarity and in condemnation of the attacks.
After the 1992 bombing, a newspaper in Buenos Aires headlined its report on the
i
77
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 3
demon^tratioiui with these words: "We arc all Jews." A member of Israel's Parliament, the
Knesset, answered back: "We are all Argentines. " Two years later, as 1 saw when I and my
colleague Ja^on Isaacson, AJC's Director of Government and International Affairs, joined tlic
public demonstration after the AMIA bombing, "We arc all Jews" was a slogan prominently
displayed on banners above the streets of Buenos Aires.
Official Government reaction to the bombing of the AMIA building was immediate and
heartfelt. Just hours after the first reports of the attack. Argentina's Consul General in New
York, Arnaldo Listre. was able to arrange a meeting for American Jewish Committee officials
with the then-Interior Minister and now Vice President Carlos Ruckauf, who was visiting New
York; in that meeting and in further discussions with AJC later that week in Buetios Aires with
Minister Ruckauf, Foreign Minister Guido DiTclIa, and other officials, and m the televised and
frankly emotional public apology to the Jewish community issued by President Menem, the
Government sought again and again to express its outrage and sorrow , and its determination to
apprehend those responsible for this unspeakable crime.
While the public reaction and the public statements by the nation's leaders were sincere
and appropriate, the action that has followed those expressions has been frustratingly inadequate -
- frustrating, I know, to Minister DiTclla. with whom I and several of my colleagues in AJC met
yesterday in New York, and frustrating lo the Argentine Jewish community and to all who are
committed to justice in the AMIA case.
Answers to the questions posed by both of the Buenus Aires bombings have eluded the
Argentine criminal justice .system, although a consensus has formed among Western intelligence
officials that the attacks were carried out primarily by operatives of or connected to HizboUah,
very likely at the direction of or with tlic knowledge of Iranian officials. After both bombings,
there was speculation in Argentina that the atLicks were intended as signals to the govemiueiit
that its wanning relations with Israel - and perceptions of a cooling in political and commercial
relations with some in the Arab world — would carry a heavy price. While such speculation
cannot be discounted, it must be said that other countries, even in Latin America, have enjoyed
a longer history of close relations with Israel without experiencing similar tragedies .
The choice of Buenos Aires as the site for these two terrorist assaults has been the subject
of considerable anxiety and speculation. In fact, we may never know why the bombers selected
Buenos Aires; with each passing month, the prospect of resolving these crimes grows more
uncertain. But there are facts we do know: That with its long and, in many areas, minimally
patrolled international bordei-s, and its sorely inefficient immigration control procedures,
Argentina likely offered the relatively easy access to aud from ihcir targets that terrorists require.
That within the ranks of right-wing extremist elements and within radicalized segnicnu> of the
immigrant Arab population in Argentina and its border regions, outside agents would be likely
to find operational support for an attack on Jewish institutions. That, at least from the
perspective of 1994. it was unclear whether Argentina's investigative services had the will, or
the experience, or the competence to resolve a difficult case of international terrorism.
78
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 4
The American Jewish Cominiltee hus explored these and other factors that may luve
contribuied to the circumstances of the AMIA bombing in two publications. Shortly after the
attack, we published a text by Professor Carlos Waisman of the University of California in San
Diego — "Why Argentina?" — that portrayed the politicnl and sociological context of the attack
ami described how local extremist groups could have given logistical support to the culprits in
the AMIA bombing, likely members of an anti-Israel radical Islatnic faction.
On the first anniversary of the attack, wc published a report prepared fur the American
Jewish Committee by an Argentine journalist. Sergio Kicrnan, titled "Atrocity in Buenos Aires -
- The AMIA Bombing, One Year Later. " It provides the most thorough and balanced analysis
1 have yet reviewed of the investigation to date, and its forecast of progress U)wanJ a successful
resolution of the case is tioihing shoit of discouraging. As the Committee knows, the only
suspect now being held in the case is Carlos Alberto Tclleldin, a secondhand-car dealer who had
connections with the police and especially with a Dr. Bcrges, who i.s well known iii Argentina
for having cooperated in the military repression of the 1970's. The investigation conducted by
Judge Juan Jo.sd Galeano has made little apparent progress in part, at least, because he and the
prosecutors simultaneously are responsible for scores of other cases before the same court.
I respectfully request that both Professor Waisman's and Mr. Kieman's studies be
considered part of my testimony and he included in the hearing record.
The 1993 edition of the prestigious publication "Antisemitism World Report," which is
published jointly by the London-based Infltitute of Jewish Affairs and the AJC, states in the final
paragraphs of its entry on Argentina a conclusion similar to those I have made here. It says, in
part:
"The bombing of the AMIA on 18 July was the most serious anack on a Jewish
community outside Israel since the Second World War. In terms of Argentine antisemitism, it
was a vivid demonstration of a certain conD-adicti.)ry trend. On the one hand, the incidence of
antisemitic prejtidice and manifestations in the country remains sporadic, even decreasing (despite
an increase in the general crime rate).... On the other hand, the attack represented the second
time in twenty-eight months that Buenos Aires was chosen as the site of international anti-Israeli
or anti-Jewish terrorism.
"President Menem and key members of his cabinet are aware that such attacks bring hack
niemories of Argentina as a place where terrorism is not yet something of the past, and
undermine official efforts to attract foreign investment. . . . Responsibility for the AMIA bombing
has been ascribed by the Argentine, Israeli and US governments, as well as by numerous analysts
(both Jewish and non- Jewish) to Islamic militants. The latter, though, may have subcontracted
part.s of. if not the whole of, the operation to local anti-Jewish elements — whether opposed or
otherwise to the Menem administration's neo-liberal economic policies and international
alignment with the USA ~ or to other operatives."
It u worthy of note that HizboUah. identified by intelligence agencies and singled out by
79
TESTIMONY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE PAGE 5
Sccrctaiy Christopher as the party must likely responsible for the AMIA attack, receives
considerable funding from tan — some $100 million annually, as U.S. experts have told us —
and operates with apparent case in Syria and Lebanon. It is disturbing that, although Argentina
appears to be seeking a lower profile in its relations with Iran, it continues to maintain such
relations in the face of the consensus view of Hizbollah involvement in terrorist acts on
Argentine soil. I know that some who arc committed to justice in the AMIA case are concerned,
as well, about Argentina's recent decision to sell oa: or more nuclear reactors to Syria, a nation
that remains on the U.S. list of state spunsurs of terrorism - although the Argentine Government
has said that such a sale is dependent on the achievement of peace between Syria and Israel. As
AJC has pledged to continue to monitor and report on the AMIA and Embassy investigations.
we Vk'ill continue lo muniiur these and other related is.<nies in the pursuit of justice for the victim.s
of those tragedies.
A prestigious Argentine writer has said that "the July 18th attack puts before us a tragedy
and a drama. The tragedy, which is irreparable, is what happened. The drama, which is
eventually reversible, is the state of powerlessness in which Argentina is today when trying to
counter the impunity with which the attack's authors wer« able to act ami the awful effects of
the pain and sorrow they have sown. "
It is to defeat that sense of powerlessness and to provide maximum assurance that the
terrible events of March 1992 and July 1994 will not he repeated in Buenos Aires that we know
key officials of the Argentine Government are committed — a commitment we share. We hope
this Cummittee will do all in its power, Mr. Chairman, lo encourage a broadening of the
international intelligence cooperation initiated among Argentina, the United States and Israel, in
particular, in the wake of the Buenos Aires attacks, and to seek intensified participation by
Argentina and other states throughout the Hemisphere in efforts to protect against international
terrorist acts, block support for those acts - whether such support derives from governments or
individuals - and punish those who engage in them.
Again, Mr. Chairman. I want to express to you my gratitude for having been called to
testify before the Committee. I note that 1 am joined here today by my colleague Richard Poltin,
AJC's Legislative Director and Counsel. On behalf of the American Jewish Committee, 1 must
again thank you for your continued devotion to the eradication of the scourge of terrorism, and
for the intense focus you have applied today to these tragic acts in my native country.
80
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TniWOMt (2 r2) 7M-5770
TILEX: 23 61 29
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Scacement by Israel Singer.
Secretary General, World Jegish Congress
on the subject of international terrorism
before the House latematlonal Relations Committee
Mr. Chaimiaii, distinguished members of the Committee ,
I wish to express my thanks to you for holding hearings on this
critical and urgent topic aid allowing me to testify on the subject.
I come here in my capacity as Secretary General of the World Jewish
Congrass. As such my concern with this matter extends beyond that which
we all share as Americans to include those of Jewish communities both
here and especially abroad. I an particularly delighted that WJC vice-
president Dr. Ruben Beraja, head of Argentina's Jewish community, has
joined us here today.
The issue before us cannot of cotirse be reduced to one-dimensional
causes and formulas. So in the short time which is allotted, I want
to focus specifically on the particular characteristic of the terrorist
virus which clearly was at work and was behind the bombing of the AIGA
center in Buenos Aires. That is the threat posed by fundamentalist
Islamic terror.
At these hearings we are looking at the issue as it relates to
Latin America, but it is abundantly clear that the threat in that region
is not isolated from the more general one and that Jews have been made
a specific though certainly not the exclusive target of these criminals.
Wlcness Che events is the past two years in Buenos Aires. Panama,
London, and Lyon, France.
./2
81
i09/27/95 U;17 ©212 755 5883 W J C NY ---. HOUSE COMM/INTL
Scatemeat by Israel Singer - 2 -
before rhe House latematioaal RelaciooB Coninu.ctee
He have asked Steven Emerson, whose extraordinary 1994 documentary "Jihad
in America" is viewed by many as the catalyst for the omnibus anti-terror legis-
lation to produce a report in cooperation with our Research Institute (the Insti-
tute of the World Jewish Congress) on the world-wide Jihad movement. A copy of
this report is being made available to the Conmiittee members, and it is based
on its findings that I wish to make the following observations:
Fundamenrlist Islamic terror represents one of the most lethal threats to
the stability of Western society. But at this point I wish to underlljae the very
Important fact c .t militant Islamic fundamentalism is not synooimous with the
Islamic religion. The vast majority of the world's more than one billion Muslims
condone neither terror nor violence- It is only a small minority which advocates
militancy.
Fundamentalist Islamic terror represents one of the most lethal threats to
the stability of Western society. The worldwide Jihad movement traces its roots
to the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan and the Muslim Brotherhood originally
established in Egypt. Dufortunately, neither Western policy makers nor their con-
stituents have fully grasped the Implications of the fact that militant Muslim
fundamentalists have organized extensive infrastructures particularly In the United
States, taking advantage of American democracy and exploiting Its freedoms. At
the heart of this brand of Islam (to which a majority of Muslims do not subscribe)
is Jihad ^ holy war to bring about the subjugation of non-believers and the crea-
tion of an Islamic empire. The movement Is permeated by hostility toward the West
— in particular the Ouited States — and above all hatred of Jews and Israel. In
the last several years, using the latest technology, the militants have managed to
build up an impressive intematiooal infrastructure, which is geared toward fund-
raising, the recruitment of volunteers, and para-military training. Some of its
members were responsible for the murderous bomb blast in the World Trade Center in
New York. Documents captured in raids on the homes of suspects revealed elaborate
plans for other such attacks in the US, Israel and elsewhere. Militant fundamen-
talism is on the rise throughout the Muslim world, as well as in Islamic communities
la the West. Sudan is already firmly in its grip and Algeria and Egypt are directly
threatened. Unless the West takes action to rein in this menace it could find it-
self the victim of extremist violence on a level hitherto unimagined.
./3
82
09/27/95 14:18 tt212 755 5883 W J C NY -»-»-» HOUSE COMM/INTL ©005/008
Statement bj l6rael Singec
before che Bouse Intemac ioiin 1 Relarloas Committee - 3 -
The West, and in particular the US, must finally confront "political Islaa"
instead of sweeping the problem under the rug. The State Department seems to be
guided by the philosophy that mllitanc Islam need not be confronted; that oaly
the "extremists" need to be challenged. Such a policy is doomed to failure be-
cause it posits the existence of artificial differentiations within militant Is-
lamic movements. The essential element guiding these movements is the necessary
aggrandizement of Islam at the expense of all other systems. As such, the much
disparaged "conflict of civilizations" between Islam and to the West is, in fact,
a conflict of irreconcilable values between political Islam and the West.
The State Department still believes in the notion that dialogue with the
Islamic Movements is something that should be pushed forward. Unfortunately, the
dialogue is in reality a means by which Islamists gloss over their differences
with the West in an effort to lull it into a false sense of security. Unless the
US recognizes first and foremost the differences with political Islam, the path
of dialogue" is an en^ty and dangerous gesture.
Most tragically, the reticence to face this threat has pulled the rug out
from the great majority of Muslims who do not believe in a mllitaat interpretation:
secularists, modernists, and even traditionalists who do not demand the establish-
ment of Islamic empires. Indeed, only through the emergence of a moderate Islam
will a competing ideological center of gravity to political Islam be created. And
in order for that to occur, the West, led by the US, must be willing to lend its
great moral weight to the delegitimation of militant Islam and to the concomitant
build-up of moderate Islam. In fact, the great power available to the US in this
debate is largely of a moral nature; ultimately the militants would not be able
to survive a worldwide effort of dlscreditation and marginalizatlon.
Fortunately, the Clinton Administration has recognized the security threat
emanating from militant Islam. Hence, the introduction of the counter-terrorist
legislation in March 1995, which calls for the initiation of unprecedented judicial
procedures allowing the use of secret evidence against resident aliens suspected of
terrorist acts. In a sense, the Clinton Administration's security policy towards
Islamic radicalism is ahead of its political policy. This emanates from hard-
headed assessments by law enforcement officials who have perceived the international
threat in much more substantive ways than have State Department officials.
./4
83
09/27/95 14:18 ©212 755 5883 W J C NY ->-•-> HOUSE COMM/INTL
Statement by Israel Singer
before the House International Relations Commiccee - 4 -
In addition to the security elements, a comprehensive policy towards mili-
tant Islam will require the following components:
* Intelligence and law enforcement coordination between Western and pro-
Western states in the Middle East.
* Support for moderate Huslim iastitutlons and development of moderate Muslim
leadership networks together with other countries.
* Exposure and delegiclmatlon of radical ideological movements.
* A sustained coordinated anti-terrorist policy that confronts all the insti-
tutions, regimes, and support networks that aid radical cadres villing to
carry out terrorism against the West.
84
STATEMENT
of
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
on
Inlernalional Terrorism in Lalin America
BEFORE THE
House Inlernalional Relalions Commillee
Seplember 28, 1995
85
House Committee Testimony - September 28. 1995
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for
allowing the Anti-Defamation League the opportunity to testify at
this most important hearing. My name is Barry Mehler.
The Anti -Defamation League, through its Gorowitz Institute
and Klinghoffer Foundation has been deeply involved in the effort
to combat domestic and international terrorism through
educational and legislative means. ADL's Jarkow Institute has
helped support our activities in Latin America.
As you know, on July 18, 1994, the world was shocked by the
horrific bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires. The
terrorists who committed this heinous crime did not just destroy
a building; they struck at the very heart of the Argentine Jewish
community. Among the eighty-seven killed and scores wounded in
the blast were Jews visiting the building to pick up their
pensions, to look for work, to seek assistance. The records of a
hundred years of Argentine Jewish history were lost. In the
bomb's wake, the community -- which had suffered the bombing of
the Israeli embassy just two years earlier -- was left fearful,
helpless and demoralized. They wonder when and where the third
bombing will occur. Yet, fourteen months after the assault
against the AMIA building, and over three years after the
destruction of the embassy, little if any progress has been made.
In April, 1995, a delegation of seventeen leaders of the
Anti -Defamation League visited Argentina. Our objective was to
demonstrate the solidarity of American Jews with the Argentine
86
Jewish community and to assess the Argentine government's
investigation into the bombings of the AMIA building and the
Israeli embassy.
Prior to the trip to Argentina, several members of the
delegation met with the terrorism divisions of the FBI and the
State Department and were briefed on the current status of the
Argentine government's investigation into both bombings and also
given observations of both divisions on various facts and
assumptions .
In the four days that the delegation was in Argentina, we
met with government officials including, among others, President
Carlos Menem, the Ministers of Justice and Interior, and the
Director of State Intelligence Service in addition. to several
members of his staff. Additionally, we met with members of the
DAIA which is the umbrella organization of Jewish organizations
in Argentina. We also met with business leaders and both
American and Israeli diplomats.
These meetings clearly showed that the Argentine government
led by President Menen has shown a greater seriousness and
responsiveness investigating the AMIA bombing than what was shown
following the embassy bombing. We also came to the following
conclusions :
1) the expertise of the various Argentine security and
police departments is much less than what would be desirable. A
general consensus of the people we spoke to felt that the
experience and training of the investigators was not up to
solving the problems presented. In this regard we would suggest
87
that the American government and the FBI in particular expand the
availability of counterterrorism schools to Argentine personnel.
We understand some of this training has already taken place by
the FBI and we feel that much more is necessary.
2) From what we were able to gather, there is very little
coordination in Argentina between the various entities that are
investigating these two bombings. We heard that they don't share
information but rather that each one wants to be the one to "hit
a home run" and this has greatly hindered the investigation.
3) In the IGUACU area in the north of Argentina where the
borders of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina meet, there is an
Islamic extremist group that I understand resides on the
Brazilian side of the river. The border between these countries
is very porous and, having spent some time in the area, I can
agree that it is almost impossible, if not impossible, to police
crossings. It would be very easy for terrorists to slip over
into Argentina from either Brazil or Paraguay, commit a terrorist
act, and then return quickly.
We suggest that a tri-lateral commission be set up between
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay to maintain control of the groups
that live in this area. There certainly should be infiltrators
as well as monitors at work. We urge the United States
government to work with the respective governments to have such a
commission formed that would be active in the prevention of
terrorism that emanates from this area.
But just as the United States must encourage Argentina to
take firm steps to combat terrorism, we must continue to be at
88
the vanguard of this international effort. Enactment of tough,
comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation has been a top
legislative priority for the Anti -Defamation League and the
broader Jewish community. We support the broad policy objectives
of the bill and are disturbed by recent reports that the momentum
behind this measure has been stalled.
The Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Act is an important
complement to existing legislation, and strengthens the rule of
law against terrorists worldwide. Most important, the bill
strives for an appropriate balance between Constitutional
safeguards and the need for a more aggressive response to this
escalating threat.
The recent bombings in Buenos Aires, as well as those in
Paris, Jerusalem, and Oklahoma City demonstrate all too clearly
that no country, no religious group, no individual, is immune
from the threat of terrorism. The only effective antidote to
this scourge is through aggressive local and multilateral
counterterrorism measures.
Mr. Chairman, member of the committee, thank you for your
time .
89
09/27/95 19:15 FAX 370 5467 AJJD C NY Z^°l_
Ralph I. Goldman
Father of David Ben Rafael,
Victim of terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, March 17, 1992
House Committee on International Relations
September 28. 1 995
Ladies and Gentlemen,
On March 1 7th, 1 992 I lost my son David Ben Rafael in the most deadly terrorist act of
that year, the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.
American born and educated, raised on the values of freedom and justice, he was there
as the minister of the Israel legation.
In the years that passed since that day, I lost my confidence in the will of the
government of Argentina to pursue the investigation into this criminal incident and its
perpetrators, with energy and determination.
90
09/27/95 19:15 FAX 370 5467 AJJP C NY *"»
For more than three years I have pressed the Argentine authorities with respect to two
simple questions;
1) what has the Argentine government done about the InvestiQation of the
March 17. 1992 bombing of the Israel Embassy,
and
2) specifically, has the Argentine government investigated whv their two policemen
who were charged with guarding the Israel Embassy were not on duty when the
attack took place.
I take the opportunity to draw to the attention of this distinguished body that to this date
no response publicly or privately to either question has been offered by the Argentine
government, and that the investigation is apparently at a halt.
We know that the poisonous weed of terrorism grows mainly where ripe conditions
exist. In retrospect, it is clear that Argentina continues to provide such fertile ground.
A second deadly attack took place in Buenos Aires on July 18th. 1994. this time striking
at the heart of the Jewish community.
91
09/27/95 19:15 FAX 370 5467 AJ JDC NY
lg]004
Following the investigations of the two terrorist attacks, one can not avoid the
frustrating conclusion that the authorities of Argentina failed twice in their duty as a
sovereign government:
Once --
They failed to create the right climate of deterrence that would have prevented
terrorism from operating on its territory. It saddens me to suggest that perhaps the
opposite climate existed there: one that attracts terror by an astonishing leniency of its
law enforcement apparatus.
And the second failure -
Is the inability of the authorities to capture and bring to trial those citizens of Argentina
who, with their deeds or omission, were auxiliary to the two attacks.
> 92
09/27/95 19:18 FAX 370 5467 A JJDC N Y °"1 l"
■'/
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The political tradition of Argentina in the last quarter of a century is characterized by
short memory. The natural tendency there, as demonstrated through various regimes,
is the tendency to forget.
I am cognizant of the fact that America has used its utmost resolve and concerted
resources to fight this terrorist scourge. However, not enough has been done.
Americans must not let these events in Argentina be forgotten until justice is served. I
urge that the Congress of the United States use its prestige and economic power to
assure meaningful investigations of the 1992 and 1994 terrorist attacks and to l<eep the
international community and the families of the victims informed.
Moreover, I hope that these hearings will continue and will contribute to a thorough
resolution of the investigations at hand.
93
09 27 95 19;16 FAX 370 5487 AJJDC NT
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I opened my statement by sharing with you the fact that I, personally, have suffered
from terrorism in Argentina. No action you take will return my son, and others, to life.
However, your voice can be heard and your statement can resonate in the free
democratic world, encouraging the government of Argentina to exhaust all measures to
pursue justice In these cases.
By doing that, you may be adding a significant weapon to the global war against
terrorism.
Thank you.
22-101 0-96-4
94
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
Statement of James L. Brown
Deputy Associate Director (Criminal Enforcement)
Before the House International Relations Committee
September 28, 1995
95
THANK YOU POR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT THIS TESTIMONY
ON BEHALF OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND
FIREARMS (ATF) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. ATF
APPRECIATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS
DISCUSSION CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON
TERRORISM.
AS THE FORMER CHIEF OF ATF'S EXPLOSIVES DIVISION, THE
CURRENT CHAIRMAN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE (lACP) AND AN APPOINTED ADVISOR TO THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOMB TECHNICIANS AND
INVESTIGATORS (lABTI) , I HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN
EXPLOSIVES MATTERS, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND
INTERNATIONALLY, AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FOR THE
PAST 31 YEARS. IN MY CURRENT CAPACITY, I CONTINUE TO
OVERSEE ATF'S EFFORTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL
EXPLOSIVES LAWS, ALONG WITH ADDRESSING EXPLOSIVES-
RELATED ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE lACP AND THE
lABTI.
TODAY, I AM PLEASED TO DISCUSS SOKE OP ATP'S
INITIATIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE CONTINUING
SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. INCLUDED IN THIS
TESTIMONY ARE THE CAPABILITIES ATF HAS IN ADDRESSING
THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.
96
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ATF HAS STATUTORY JURISDICTION OVER THE PROVISIONS OP
TITLE XI OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, AS
CODIFIED IN PUBLIC LAW 91-452. THE ACT ASSIGNED THE
AUTHORITY FOR ADMINISTERING THIS LAW TO THE SECRETARY
OF THE TREASURY. ATF STRIVES TO BRING THE FULL FORCE
OF THIS ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY TO BEAR AGAINST THOSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES. THIS IS
BEING ACCOMPLISHED BOTH NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY,
THROUGH INVESTIGATIONS OF CRIMINAL BOMBINGS AND
EXPLOSIVES THEFTS; INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE AND
TRAINING TO FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND FOREIGN AGENCIES;
AND PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM POTENTIAL INJURY,
DEATH, OR PROPERTY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE IMPROPER
STORAGE OR ILLICIT USE OF EXPLOSIVES.
SINCE BECOMING A BUREAU IN 1972, ATF HAS MADE
CONSIDERABLE STRIDES IN EXPLOSIVES CRIME SCENE
INVESTIGATION. ATF'S GREATEST ASSET IN THIS REGARD IS
ITS SPECIAL AGENTS, WHO THROUGH YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AND
ADVANCED TRAINING, HAVE DEVELOPED AN UNMATCHED
EXPERTISE IN POSTBLAST ANALYSIS. THIS EXPERTISE HAS,
IN TURN, BEEN SHARED WITH ATF'S LAW ENFORCEMENT
COUNTERPARTS AT THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL
LEVELS THROUGH SUPPORT INITIATIVES DEVELOPED TO ASSIST
THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE EXPLOSIVES CRIME
97
-3-
8CENE6 AND REDUCE TH£ INCIDENCE OF THIS VIOLENCE IN
SOCIETY.
ONE SUCH INITIATIVE IS ATF'S NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM
(NRT) . THE NRT CONSISTS OF FOUR TEAMS ORGANIZED
GEOGRAPHICALLY TO COVER THE UNITED STATES. EACH TEAM,
COMPRISED OF 20-25 EXPERTS INCLUDING POSTBLAST AND FIRS
RECONSTRUCTION INVESTIGATORS, CHEMISTS, AND BOMB
TECHNICIANS, CAN RESPOND WITHIN 24 HOURS TO ASSIST IN
ONSITE POSTBLAST INVESTIGATIONS WHEN REQUESTED BY STATE
OR LOCAL OFFICIALS. THIS SPECIALIZED RESPONSE
CAPABILITY IS THE ONLY ONE OF ITS KIND OFFERED BY A
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY. TO DATS, THE NRT HAS
RESPONDED 309 TIMES TO INCIDENTS THAT HAVE CAUSED 432
DEATHS, 2,324, INJURIES AND $2.4 BILLION IN PROPERTY
DAMAGE. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY
AND THE TEAM MEMBERS WERE MOST PUBLICLY EVIDENT IN
ATF'S RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND OKLAHOMA
CITY FEDERAL BUILDING BOMBINGS.
IT WAS ATF'S RECOVERY OF THE PARTIAL VEHICLE
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF THE VAN IN WHICH THE BOMB WAS
CARRIED THAT ULTIMATELY LED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE
PERPETRATORS OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING.
98
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AND IN OKIAHOMA CITY, 200 ATF AGENTS, BOMB TECHNICIANS,
AND CHEMISTS, AS PART OF TWO NRT'S WORKING SIDE BY SIDE
WITH FBI INVESTIGATORS, QUICKLY RECONSTRUCTED THE
DEVASTATING BOMB AND THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THIS
HORRIFIC CRIME.
EVEN BEFORE THE TRAGEDIES OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND
OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBINGS, ATF HAD TAKEN STEPS TO
STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
INVESTIGATING INCIDENTS OF THIS MAGNITUDE. AS A MEMBER
OF THE TERRORISM SUB-WORKING GROUP, WHICH IS
ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNDER THE
AUSPICES OP THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ATP HAS BEEN
CONDUCTING RESEARCH INVOLVING LARGE-SCALE VEHICLE
BOMBS.
THROUGH THIS RESEARCH PROJECT, LAW ENFORCEMENT WORLD-
WIDE WILL DERIVE MUCH-NEEDED INFORMATION RELATIVE TO
THE EXPLOSIVES SIGNATURE, BLAST EFFECT, DEBRIS
DISTANCE, AMD RESIDUE RETRIEVAL.
SINCE JULY 1994, THERE HAVE BEEN 10 TESTS (RANGING FROM
50 TO 1,000 POUNDS) AT THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY (DNA)
HIGft EXPLOSIVES TEST SITE IN WHITE SANDS, NEW MEXICO.
TWO ADDITIONAL TESTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE
99
-5-
DATA COLLECTION. THESE TWO TESTS WILL BE SCHEDULED
SOMETIME IN 1996.
ATF EXPLOSIVES TECHNICIANS, NRT MEMBERS, EXPLOSIVES
SPECIALISTS, AND LABORATORY PERSONNEL ARE UTILIZED TO
OBSERVE AND COLLECT ALL TEST DATA. ASSISTING IN THIS
EFFORT ARE THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE
DNA. THE ADVANCED TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE RECEIVED BY
THE ABOVE PERSONNEL IN MAJOR CAR BOMBINGS IS UNEQUALED.
THERE IS MO OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY TRAINING
INVESTIGATORS IN CAR BOMBINGS OF THIS MAGNITUDE.
ALSO SUPPORTING ATF'S EXPLOSIVES ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
ARE ITS LABORATORIES IN MARYLAND, GEORGIA, AND
CALIFORNIA. BESIDES PROVIDING THE FULL RANGE OF
TRADITIONAL FORENSIC ANALYSIS, THESE LABORATORIES
ROUTINELY EXAMINE THE COMPONENTS OF BOTH INTACT AND
FUNCTIONED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND EXPLOSIVES DEBRIS IN
ORDER TO IDENTIFY DEVICE COMPONENTS AND THE EXPLOSIVES
USED. THE LABORATORIES ALSO PROVIDE TRACE EVIDENCE
COMPARISONS. MOREOVER, THE LABORATORIES MAINTAIN
LIAISON WITH EXPLOSIVES MANUFACTURERS WHO PROVIDE THEM
WITH EXEMPLARS OF NEW EXPLOSIVES PRODUCTS ON THE
MARKET.
100
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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS IS ANOTHER TOOL USED BY
ATF TO SUPPORT ITS EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS-
ATE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE ARSON AND BOMBING
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES SUBUNIT (ABIS) OF THE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CRIME ARE TRAINED IN
THE TECHNIQUES OF PREPARING ANALYSES ON SERIAL
ARSONISTS AND BOMBERS TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE SUSPECTS BASED ON CHARACTERISTICS
PARTICULAR TO INCIDENTS. RELATED CONCEPTS OF THESE
ANALYSES CAN ALSO BE APPLIED TO OTHER AR£AS SUCH AS
ONSITE CRIME SCENE ASSESSMENTS, SUSPECT INTERVIEWING
TECHNIQUES, AND INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES.
ATF ALSO HAS A CADRE OF EXPLOSIVES ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
WHO HAVE UNEQUALED TECHNICAL EXPERTISE IN THE
EXPLOSIVES AND BOMB DISPOSAL FIELDS. THEY CONSTRUCT
FACSIMILES OF EXPLOSIVE AND INCENDIARY DEVICES, RENDER
DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE DETERMINATIONS, PROVIDE EXPERT
ANALYSES OF INTACT AND FUNCTIONED EXPLOSIVE/ INCENDIARY
DEVICES, AND PROVIDE ONSITE INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE AT
BOMBINGS. THEY KEEP ATF ABREAST OF THE LATEST
TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO EXPLOSIVES AND ISSUE
CLASSIFICATIONS FOR NEW EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY
DEVICES AND MATERIALS.
101
-7-
IN ADDITION, THEY PROVIDE TECHNICAL ADVICE ON FEDERAL
EXPLOSIVES STORAGE REGULATIONS, AND PROVIDE TRAINING IN
ALL ASPECTS OF EXPLOSIVES HANDLING, DESTRUCTION, AND
INSTRUCTION FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND FOREIGN LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. RECENTLY, IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S ANTI -TERRORISM
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ATF EXPLOSIVES EXPERTS PROVIDED
POST BLAST TRAINING TO POLICE OFFICIALS FROM RUSSIA.
IN AN AGREB1ENT WITH THE DEPARTMENT OP STATE, UNDER THE
AUSPICES OF THE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI -TERRORIST ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, ATF PROVIDES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS WITH REGARD TO EXPLOSIVES EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES FOR EXAMINATION.
THROUGH THIS SAME PROGRAM, ATF PROVIDES TRAINING IN
BOMB SCENE MANAGEMENT TO FOREIGN SECURITY OFFICIALS AND
ASSESSES THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN BOMB
SQUADS AND LABORATORIES. RECIPIENTS OF THIS LATER
ASSISTANCE INCLUDE ARGENTINA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, PANAMA,
SWEDEN, ALGIERS, ETHIOPIA, BELGIUM, TURKEY, TUNIS,
ESTONIA, LATVIA, EGYPT, AND RUSSIA.
\ ^/ 102
-8-
AN ADDED DIMENSION TO ATF'S EXPLOSIVES ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS IS ITS CANINE EXPLOSIVES DETECTION PROGRAM.
THIS PROGRAM WAS IMPLEMENTED IN 1992 AT THE REQUEST OF
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHO NEEDED EXPLOSIVES
DETECTION DOGS TO DEPLOY TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE KNEW OF ATF'S SUCCESS IN TRAINING
ACCELERANT-DETECTING CANINES FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. USING THE PROVEN TRAINING
METHODS AND PROTOCOLS FOR THE ACCELERANT- DETECTING
CANINES, ATF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS NATIONAL
LABORATORY, AND THE CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE, HAVE
DEVELOPED THE EXPLOSIVES-DETECTING CANINE METHODOLOGY
AND PROTOCOLS.
THIS UNIQUE METHODOLOGY HONES THE EXPLOSIVES
IDENTIFICATION/ DISCRIMINATION CAPABILITIES OF THE
CANINES. THIS TRAINING EXPOSES THEM TO THE FIVE BASIC
EXPLOSIVES GROUPS, WHICH INCLUDE CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS
THAT ARE INCORPORATED IN OVER 19,000 EXPLOSIVES
FORMULAS. THESE CANINES CAN DETECT MINUTE
QUANTITIES AND A GREATER VARIETY OF EXPLOSIVES THAN
CANINES TRAINED IN ANY OTHER PROGRAM AVAILABLE.
BECAUSE OF THEIR CONDITIONING, THE EXPLOSIVES CANINES
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETECT FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION HIDDEN
IN LUGGAGE AND BURIED UNDERGROUND. SINCE 1992, OVER
103
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100 CANINES HAVE BEEN TKAINED FOR USE BY GOVERNMENTS IN
THE COUNTRIES OF CHILE, GREECE, CYPRUS, ISRAEL AND
EGYPT.
AS A MEANS TO COMBAT THE PROBLEM OF EXPLOSIVES THEFTS
AND LOSSES, ATF INSTITUTED THE STOLEN EXPLOSIVES AND
RECOVERIES (SEAR) INITIATIVE. SEAR WAS ESTABLISHED TO
AID IN THE RECOVERY OF SUCH MATERIALS, TO DETERMINE
TRENDS AND ESTABLISH PATTERNS OF THEFTS, TO ASSIST IN
THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL BOMBINGS OR
ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS, AND TO ASSIST STATE, LOCAL,
FOREIGN, OR OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THEIR
INVESTIGATION OF SUCH MATTERS.
ATF'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD IS FACILITATED BY ITS
EXPLOSIVES TRACING CAPABILITY. THIS CAPABILITY ENABLES
OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO INITIATE TRACES OF RECOVERED,
STOLEN, OR ABANDONED EXPLOSIVES, EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS,
AND CRIMINALLY OR ILLEGALLY USED EXPLOSIVES. THIS
TRACING CAPABILITY IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN,
COMMERCIAL, AND MILITARY EXPLOSIVES, ORDNANCE, AND
MUNITIONS .
104
-10-
ATF'S REPOSITORY FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THEFTS,
LOSSES, RECOVERIES, AND SEIZURES OF EXPLOSIVE KATERIALS
NATIONWIDE IS THE EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS SYSTEM (EXIS) .
INCIDENTS CAPTURED IN THIS DATA BASE ARE DIVIDED INTO
SPECIFIC CATEGORIES SUCH AS DATE SHIFT CODE.
MANUFACTURER, AND QUANTITY. EXIS CAN ALSO BE USED TO
MATCH TARGETS AND MOTIVES OF BOMBINGS AS WELL AS
SIMILAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AND CAN SHOW TRENDS OR
PATTERNS IN A GIVEN AREA, STATE, OR THROUGHOUT THE
NATION. INFORMATION THIS DETAILED IS UNAVAILABLE
ELSEWHERE IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR. THIS COMPILATION OF
DATA IS SUMMARIZED YEARLY IN A COMPREHENSIVE
PUBLICATION KNOWN AS THE EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS REPORT .
THIS PUBLICATION IS USED BY OTHER FEDERAL, STATE AND
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AS THE SINGLE MOST
DEFINITIVE OVERVIEW OF EXPLOSIVES RELATED INCIDENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES EACH YEAR. THE PUBLICATION IS ALSO
DISTRIBUTED INTERNATIONALLY. ATF IS IN THE PROCESS OF
FORMULATING A SIMILAR DATA BASE ON INTERNATIONAL
EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS. THE TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO BE
CAPTURED WILL BE USED FOR COMPARISON TO DOMESTIC
INCIDENTS.
ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1991, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE NRT
CONCEPT, BUT ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE, ATP INITIATED
105
-11-
TH£ INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (IRT) . THE IRT IS THE
RESULT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ATF AND THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE. THIS
AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR ATF'S INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE
IN AN EFFORT TO COMBAT WORLD-WIDE ARSON AND EXPLOSIVES
VIOLENCE.
THE IRT PROVIDES INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE AT SELECT
FIRE AND POSTBLAST SCENES ON U.S. PROPERTY IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES WHERE THE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE HAS
INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY. ATF ALSO PROVIDES
TECHNICAL/ FORENSIC ASSISTANCE AND OVERSIGHT TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AT FIRE AND POSTBLAST SCENES ON FOREIGN
TERRITORY. SUCH REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE ARE RELAYED
THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AFTER RECEIVING A REQUEST
FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN THE AFFECTED COUNTRY.
THE IRT IS COMPRISED OF FOUR SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENTS
AND A CADRE OF FIRE CAUSE AND ORIGIN SPECIALISTS AND
EXPLOSIVES SPECIALISTS HAVING POSTBLAST EXPERTISE.
THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY A NXniBER OF
EXPLOSIVES TECHNOLOGY EXPERTS AND FORENSIC CHEMISTS.
THE IRT WORKS CLOSELY WITH STATE DEPARTMENT
PERSONNEL, CONDUCTING THE CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION/
106
-12-
EVJLLUATION, AND EXAMINING AND PROCESSING THE EVIDENCE.
TO DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN NINE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES,
FIVE OF WHICH WERE EXPLOSIVES -RELATED.
IN MARCH 1992, THE STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTED THE IRT
TO AID THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IN A POSTBLAST
INVESTIGATION OF A BOMBING ATTACK THAT HAD
DESTROYED THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES. THE
BOMBING CAUSED 32 DEATHS AND APPROXIMATELY 200
INJURIES. ATF'S INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS RESULTED IN THE
RECOVERY OF A SECTION OF THE VEHICLE WHICH CONTAINED
THE BOMB, THAT WHEN EXAMINED BY THE ATF LABORATORY.
REVEALED THE TYPE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE USED. TESTIMONY
ABOUT THIS FACT WAS MADE BY ATF BEFORE THE ARGENTINE
SUPREME COURT.
IN JULY 1994, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AGAIN REQUESTED THE
IRT TO AID THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IN A POSTBLAST
INVESTIGATION OF A BOMBING ATTACK THAT HAD DESTROYED A
JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER IN BUENOS AIRES WHICH CAUSED 95
DEATHS AND APPROXIMATELY 200
INJURIES .
107
-13-
IM APRIL 1995, THE IRT HAS REQUESTED BY THE STATE
OEPARTKEHT TO AID THE GOVERNMENT OP EL SALVADOR TO
ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION AND DISASSEMBLY OF AN
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. THE DEVICE, WHICH
CONSISTED OP A CLAYMORE MINE. SIX M-79 GRENADES, A
BLASTING CAP AND 120 ROUNDS OP SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION,
WAS BELIEVED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO BE USED IN AN
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI, THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OP THE UNITED NATIONS.
THIS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE HAS CREATED THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR OTHER AGENCIES TO REQUEST ATP
ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. SUCH WAS THE
CASE ON APRIL 19, 1995, WHEN ATP RECEIVED A REQUEST
FROM THE U.S. ARMY TO ASSIST IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A
FIRE THAT OCCURRED AT CAMP HEADQUARTERS IN TAEGU,
KOREA. AFTER 6 DAYS OF PROCESSING THE SCENE, ATF'S
FIRE CAUSE AND ORIGIN EXPERT DETERMINED THE FIRE TO BE
INCENDIARY IN ORIGIN. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE UNCOVERED
DURING THE INVESTIGATION HAS LED TO THE IDENTIFICATION
OP A SUSPECT.
CLEARLY, THE EFFECTS OP EXPLOSIVES AND EXPLOSIVE
MATERIAL CAN BE VERY DEVASTATING, AS WAS WITNESSED IN
ARGENTINA IN 1992 AND 1994.
108
-14-
UNDER THE AUTHORITY VESTED THROUGH ITS PRIHARY
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL EXPLOSIVES LAWS, ATF HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO HELP PREVENT THE CRIMINAL MISUSE OF
EXPLOSIVES, AND IT IS LOOKING AT SEVERAL FUTURE
INITIATIVES THAT WILL ALLOW IT TO MORE
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM.
ATF RECENTLY SPONSORED A 5-DAY EXPLOSIVES SYMPOSIUM
WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER WORLD-CLASS EXPLOSIVES EXPERTS
FROM THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, THE
UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND CANADA; REPRESENTATIVES
FROM AGENCIES SUCH AS THE FEDERAL BUREAU OP
INVESTIGATION, THE BUREAU OF MINES, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE; AS WELL
AS MEMBERS OF THE EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY AND THE
FERTILIZER INSTITUTE.
THIS CONFERENCE WAS HELD IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WAYS
COMMON CHEMICALS USED TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVE
MATERIALS CAN BE RENDERED INERT, AND WHETHER SUCH A
REQUIREMENT WOULD BE PRACTICAL. PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED
METHODS TO ALLOW FOR THE DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.
109
-15-
THE CONFERENCE ALSO ADDRESSED WHETHER CONTROLS CAN BE
IMPOSED ON CERTAIN PRECURSOR CHEMICALS (AMMONIUM
NITRATE) USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF EXPLOSIVE
MATERIALS, SO THAT THE MANUFACTURE OF LARGE-SCALE BOMBS
IS IMPRACTICAL.
DUE TO ITS PAST INTERACTION WITH MEMBERS OF THE
EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY THROUGH ITS REGULATORY FUNCTION,
ATF CAN CALL ON THOSE INDUSTRY MEMBERS, AS WELL AS
INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS, TO BRING FORTH AN EXTENSIVE
ARRAY OF KNOWLEDGE TO SIFT THROUGH THE VARIOUS OPTIONS
AND ARRIVE AT THE BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTION.
AS A COMPLEMENT TO THESE EFFORTS, ATF HAS BEEN
PARTICIPATING IN A WORLDWIDE INITIATIVE IN COOPERATION
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, TO
SEEK RATIFICATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY THAT WOULD
REQUIRE THE PLACEMENT OP A CHEMICAL COMPOUND IN PLASTIC
EXPLOSIVES TO FACILITATE DETECTION.
THESE RESOURCES ARE HIGHLIGHTED TO SHOW WHAT THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HAS IN PLACE TO AID IN THE
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST BOMBINGS.
no
-16-
IMOIVIDUAL ACTS OP VIOLENCE OR ATTEKPTED VIOLENCE
INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES AND IMPROVISED
EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS CONTINUE TO OCCUR. BUT THIS
COMMITTEE CAN REST ASSURED THAT ATF WILL USE ALL
AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO PREVENT SUCH ACTS FROM OCCURRING
AND WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE ARREST AND
PROSECUTION OF INDIVIDUALS FOUND VIOLATING FEDERAL
EXPLOSIVES LAWS.
Ill
Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995
Question
1. Were composite sketches prepared of the suicide bomber, or
any of his accomplices associated with the vehicle used in the
attack on the AMIA building in Buenos Aires in July 1994? -If
so, how many sketches were prepared, and who was depicted in
each sketch?
Answer
Four identikit sketches were developed. One sketch was
drawn of the suicide bomber in the AMIA bombing from testimony
by a witness who saw the van approach the AMIA building before
the explosion. A second sketch, also of the driver of the van
used in the attack, was a composite of the first sketch and
other information developed in the course of a door-to-door
survey of residents of the neighborhood shortly after the
bombing. A third sketch was of the person who parked the van
at a garage on Azcuenage and Paraguay Streets three days before
the attack. A fourth sketch was of the person who bought the
van used in the attack.
112
Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Coimnittee on International Relations
September 28, 1995
Question
2. Who prepared the composite sketches (i.e., police in Buenos
Aires, Argentine intelligence, prosecuting judge)?
Answer
The sketches were prepared by Federal Police experts.
113
Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Conunittee on International Relations
September 28, 1995
Question
3. Were any of the sketches publicized in Argentina to help
identify the suicide bomber or his accomplices? If so, please
provide samples of any publicity the drawing may have received.
Answer
Three of the four sketches developed by police experts were
publicized. The composite sketch of the suicide bomber in the
AMIA attack was printed in Clarin , a major Buenos Aires
newspaper, on August 1, 1994. Argentine TV broadcast the
sketch on the same date. On August 6, Clarin published two
other sketches, one of the person who parked the van used in
the attack in a garage on Azcuenage and Paraguay Streets three
days before the attack, and the other of the person who
purchased the van. The Argentine media republished one of the
sketches shortly before the September 28, 1995 HIRC hearing.
Attachment :
Samples
114
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115
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PMEMBQSSY PS pc,
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P. 03
Identikit del hombre que condujo la Trafic hasto el estaciona-
mienlo donde permanecio el fin de semana anterior al aten-
tado. Lo Poiiao intento dor con $u parodero.
AvOON LA DA LA CAMARA FEDERAL
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116
117
Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995
Que stion
4. If sketches were prepared, but not publicized, please
explain why.
Answer
One sketch of the suicide bomber was developed from the
testimony of one witness. This was used as the basis for
creating a composite sketch incorporating information provided
by various other witnesses. Of these two sketches of the
bomber, only the composite was publicized.
118
Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilcox
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995
Question
5. What is the routine practice of the ATF, FBI and other law
enforcement agencies in using and publicizing composite
sketches to attempt to identify bombers or their accomplices?
Answer
The law enforcement agencies use composite drawings as
appropriate, although they do not necessarily always publicize
them widely. They say the reasons may include uncertainty about
the accuracy of the composite drawings or, concern that
publication might drive the suspects deeper underground or
otherwise prompt them to become more careful in their
movements. Instead, the composite drawings might be used
primarily with other potential witnesses or local law
enforcement authorities.
119
Question for the Record Submitted to Philip Wilco:
Committee on International Relations
September 28, 1995
Qy_e_st_ion
6. Please provide details of the Argentine government's rewards
program intended to help solve the AMIA case.
Answer
The Argentine government has offered a reward equivalent to
two million U.S. dollars for information leading to the arrest
and conviction of those involved in the AMIA bombing.
120
Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995
Question
7. You have identified the Middle East group, Hizballah, as
responsible for the AMIA attack. Has the State Department'
offered the use of its world wide terrorist rewards and
publicity program to help the Argentine government identify the
suicide bomber or any of his accomplices?
Answer
We have not. The State Department's terrorist information
rewards program is available for use only with respect to acts
of international terrorism "against a United States person or
United States property" (Section 36(a) (1) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended) . The AMIA
attack did not involve U.S. persons or property. We have,
however, given wide publicity to our concern about the AMIA
bombing and the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and our
belief that Hizballah was responsible for both attacks.
121
Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995
Question
8. Is there any prohibition on our terrorist rewards program
that would prevent its use in this case, if the Argentine
government's own rewards monies were used to pay for any reward
that might eventually be granted?
Answer
The State Department's reward program is available for
information concerning those acts of international terrorism
that are against United States persons or property .
The statute that governs the State Department terrorist
information rewards program. Section 36(a) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 as amended, provides,
in part, that the Secretary of State may pay a reward to an
individual who furnishes information leading to the arrest or
conviction of an individual for the commission of an act of
international terrorism, or leading to the prevention,
frustration, or favorable resolution of an act of international
terrorism, " if the act of international terrorism is against a
United States person or United States property ." (Emphasis
added. P.L. 98-533 § 36, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2708.)
120
Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995
Question
7. You have identified the Middle East group, Hizballah, as
responsible for the AMIA attack. Has the State Department -
offered the use of its world wide terrorist rewards and
publicity program to help the Argentine government identify the
suicide bomber or any of his accomplices?
Answer
We have not. The State Department's terrorist information
rewards program is available for use only with respect to acts
of international terrorism "against a United States person or
United States property" (Section 36(a) (1) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended) . The AMIA
attack did not involve U.S. persons or property. We have,
however, given wide publicity to our concern about the AMIA
bombing and the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and our
belief that Hizballah was responsible for both attacks.
121
Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995
8. Is there any prohibition on our terrorist rewards program
that would prevent its use in this case, if the Argentine
government's own rewards monies were used to pay for any reward
that might eventually be granted?
Answer
The State Department's reward program is available for
information concerning those acts of international terrorism
that are against United States persons or property .
The statute that governs the State Department terrorist
information rewards program. Section 36(a) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 as amended, provides,
in part, that the Secretary of State may pay a reward to an
individual who furnishes information leading to the arrest or
conviction of an individual for the commission of an act of
international terrorism, or leading to the prevention,
frustration, or favorable resolution of an act of international
terrorism. " if the act of international terrorism is against a
United States person or United States property ." (Emphasis
added. P.L. 98-533 § 36, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2708.)
122
- 2 -
Similarly, publicity under the rewards program is limited
to information concerning acts of international terrorism that
affect U.S. persons or property. We have encouraged Argentina
to give widespread publicity to its reward and they are aware of
the means available for this, such as announcements by
government spokesmen, the printing and distribution of posters
and other printed matter, and advertisements in the media.
123
Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995
Question
9. What follow up steps are to be taken by the United States
resulting from the recent regional meeting on terrorism in
Argentina?
Answer
First of all, I would like to note that at the Buenos Aires
"Consultative Meeting on Cooperation to Prevent and Eliminate
International Terrorism, " the United States and the other
participating nations agreed to:
• Exchange information on terrorism;
• Strengthen and continue to develop domestic laws on
terrorism;
• Encourage the accession to multilateral conventions adopted
on terrorism and the conclusion of agreements, particularly
to establish judicial, police, and intelligence cooperation
to combat, prosecute, and suppress international terrorist
activities;
126
Question for the Record
Submitted to Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
House International Relations Committee hearing
September 28, 1995
Question
10. How will the Qrganization of American States address the
regional terrorism problem? ■'
Answer
The US Mission to the OAS and the Office of
Counterterrorism represent the USG at the bi-weekly meeting of
the OAS's Working Group on Terrorism, the entity responsible for
planning the OAS Terrorism Conference, scheduled for April.
This group has begun to discuss the agenda and goals of the
conference. Although it is early in the planning stages, the
agenda will be focussed on practical measures to counter
terrorism, including anti-terrorism cooperative measures in such
areas as border control, information sharing, extradition, and
abuse of diplomatic privileges. It will also call for wider
adherence to international treaties and conventions against
terrorism .
127
128
Domingo 16 de julio de 1995 •,CLApjN.»^PQyj|pA^^7 I
ta.^ro(m§ se prc0fo el atenta^ $egui
jebas^munidas por eljuez G^an
. . < ■'♦'^WSE:
129
9-27-35 ; 3:50AM ; JCRC^ 202 225 2035;# 2/ 4
IkMMKA A. MWULSn ^<«n ">*
SENT BY:
Bnfcd 3cattB Menace
|«nMr ammmt om iiwct W*SMiNCt«N. OC JOi 1 0-2003
ib«i •MB vuMM Miat«eit April 7. 199S
The Honorable C«rle» Saul Menem
PvoldeDr of Atssxdu
BALCARCE SO (1064)
Capdnl Fedcnl, Arfcndxu
Dear Presldcnr Menem:
We are wndag to express our concern* over the lack of progress >. /.ijaidna's
investigation of the /ewisb Cosunuaicy Center bombing in Buenos Ainu over nine
jaonOu ago That bonbiiig was an intematfonal tragedy both because jf I'-c
trsnenilous lois of laeoceac lives and the dangcn xueb atracki -- and the groups which
perpetrate them - peae for aU dviliz*d sociellet. "ntere c-a. ba lictte d'^ .^r of ihe links
between the iniiigators of this attach tnd those groups which ha«« tar^csc .<>jBericans
both hare and abroad.
Tbocfore. we are greatly dinppoinred chat toon has not beer. l.>r.c ro
^pprahead these crimnaJt and bring them to justice. Establishment of z ze^-axi hind
was an in^ortHn step, but unless ihesc tenoiists •• and their inteauCozai sponsors -
are pursued with all aveUablR resources, liiey wlQ be encouraged ro ccrixrut fiiure acts
of taiTor in AigcrdBa and throughout the world.
We appitciate your attencioa to our eoncems and hope that yo<_ v.~^ bttnjt to
this effort the same vigor and determination you broij^t to reiamung y'^^' economy.
We, of course, stand ready to do ^vhat w« can to help you in pursuing itc f cipctrators
of this tenible crime agaoist society.
Sincerely,
jiimj,^aynJ4ti-'
Connie Mack Barbara A. NQlulski
United Stales Senator United States Senator
»«^ fiM« cBftiR vum i»5 ic «r." t? vr Ai" I »;
130
SENT BY:
Senators signing the letter to President Menem of Argentina:
nikulski
Mack
Baucus
Biden
Bond
Boxer
Bryan
Buzns
Campbell
Chaffee
Coats
Cohen
Conrad
Daschle
OeWine
Dodd
D'Amato
Dole
Bjton
Peingold
Peinfitein
Glenn
Gorton
Craham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Harkin
Halms
Inouye
Kennedy
Xerry
Kohl
Xyl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Lervin
.Liebannan
McConnell
Moa ley-Bra un
Koynihan
Murray
Nickles
Packwood
Reid
Robb
RocJcofeller
Sarbanee
Shelby
Simon
SnowQ
Specter
Walls tone
131
SENT BY:
9-27-95 ; 9:51AM :
JOtC-
suxii wmitma e* mo
Bnitd 3tatri Senate
tMASHINItTON. DC aOS 10-2001
202 225 2035 ;# 4/ 4
3vri tn
ad" (fM*fI amei •u^lXM
TTY, ma Mt4H*
June 21, 199S
Ttie Honor aJsla Carlos Saul Manam
preaidsnt. of Argentina
BAIiCAXCS SO (loe«)
Capital P«4eral, Ars«ntina
Dear President Manem;
In April of thia year, many of n.y collui«g-ua« aciJ ". wrote to
you regarding th« invest igat ions of the 1993 bombir!:; cf the
Jewish Corom«nicy Canter In Buenoa Alra^ and ttie bonJ;ir.ii' oE the
lerasll Smbassy bombing in 1993.
I am enclosing a copy of that latter. Ve wealri ^^presiace
receiving a response to our latter and look forvar<5 c./ ^orkinj
with you to combat international terrorism.
Seec wishaa.
Sincerely,
Barbara A- nikulakl
United States Senator
B»M/j£
MnMfbrandlaxlransmlltalmemoTGTI |'et»n|M > |
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et>.
Dqn.
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rut
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a«TT «sr ;o;J
;:d?r.
132
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92255107-'
202 225 2035;tt 2
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ktUUkntiaCK*«
kisn tntiM
(iMDiiltlUiiti
UOIOMAl. OFTICU
UatttUnt
ScpcenAifr 27, 199S
Hooonbl e Btqlimln A. Ollmui
Chiinaiii
CoCBDiOft
2170
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VfUUnffoa,
Dnr ChitimiB OUnnn:
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booblag,
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ttiitcaie
proMCUIDI
with 111
AigeaxiB>
boitibls£,
outngei.
Aian
expmilti
on intKBHtJoml RaUiIoiu
HouN OeHeo BalUloi
DC20S1S
Wleicathil Center wnti to ipplnd yoiir geinm in brioglqg before your
, teUtlvM of the ianooent vlctlmt w]io loit tbolr llvei In tbe tcmrJtt
tbet deitroyed tbe AML^ buUdlni on J^ 18, 1994.
Like men f aba ooaeemed partial, the Simon Wlaaeoltal Oe&tK la deeply
(Uaq^oln ad that ArfeBtlae autboritlai bavc sot made more prognaa in identUyUig Urn
petpetratqn of tbla letrariai act.
diat the govanment of Prealdeat Menem can and ihoold do more to brtog
a auoeeaafiil eonclufioa. Thii would Inehide, iitlUzln| ibe madia to
govemtaent'i 2 million doUu reward and tbe appointiog of a apedal
with a fUly funded itaffthat would be able to deal iwiftly and leiioualy
tie
la Ida.
I fUltue to est In a lerioua and eflbcttve manner is cftnniKtiffn with tUa
t4 ftaiUd kavei her tanltoiy and her eitlaeaa vulaettble to flitun terroriat
filter demoeney in tbe Anerleu, we urge tbe CoDgreii of tbe US to
de^Kit concenu u) the goveraneat of Argentina os tUi matter.
iB^jttam
With all good wiahea in the new year.
Siacaraly,
Imiintngitl Kodquuttri
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133
La Nacion - ts. AV^r, vVv.-.v-. ;i .. . ■ •. ' Sunday July 30, 1995
AMIA: A sign of adjustment
The investigation of the bombing of the AMIA building
has entered such a delicate stage, that it is believed that
the possibilities of solving the case - which will not take
place anytime soon- depends upon which steps are taken next.
As a result of this, the Federal Parliament, upon
ordering the District Attorney to indict Alberto Telleldin,
the main suspect in the case, sent a clear sign of change.
The new message is that the investigation must be thorough,
no matter who is implicated: they cannot admit that the
security forces -who should be the most interested party in
solving the case- has obstructed its development.
Telleldin swore before representatives (camaristas)
Luisa Riva Aramayo, Horacio Vigliani and Juan Pedro
Cortelezzi, that a few days before the election the
ex-captain Hector Vergez, who has been rumored to be
associated with the intelligence service, offered him one
million dollars and freedom, if Telleldin would implicate a
Lebanese citizen who was recently investigated by the
federal judge Roberto Marquevich.
Both men met on four occasions. One of these meetings
took place in Judge Juan Jose Galeano's chambers. However,
the Judge was not present at the meeting.
Judge Marquevich determined that the implicated
Lebanese citizens who were sent to Argentina - possibly by
the secret service?- had no relation with the amassing of an
arsenal in the Delta, much less with the terrorist attacks
committed against the lasraeli Embassy and the AMIA
building.
The leaders of the AMIA and the DAIA, would have no
doubt that Vergez consorted with intelligence agents.
If Vergez had not had the backing of an intelligence
agent, how would he have had the courage last Friday at a
meeting to discredit Telleldin to call the president of
DAIA, Ruben Beraja, a drug launderer. Furthermore, how could
Vergez swear that the government had never obstructed the
investigation, if as he affirms, he has no ties to any
official agency and has no knowledge of their intentions.
This whole episode leaves behind a strange feeling that
some scheming individuals who have infiltrated an official
organization attempted to divert attention from the
investigation .
RAISING THE VOLUME
134
What happened these days has to be analyzed in light of
the occurrences of last week.
Rabbi Avi Weiss, a Rabbi from New York City, arrived in
our country when we commemorated the first anniversary of
the massacre.
The Rabbi on his second visit to our country was not
pleased and upheld the theory, not based on fact, but on
reliable information that in Argentina there has not been a
serious investigation because to do so, would implicate a
government official or his collaborators.
As you will recall, criticism was widespread.
President, Carlos Menem, who had invited Rabbi Weiss to a
cabinet meeting last year, has now described the Rabbi as
delirious. Ruben Beraja, head of the DAIA, rejected Rabbi
Weiss 's accusations as reckless.
Never-the-less, what is certain is that the volume of
the discussion has been raised and in now centered on the
actions of the security forces.
Even yesterday. United States Democratic Congressman
Elliot Engel, who met at the beginning of June with our
president to convey his uneasiness over the lack of results
from the investigation, stated to "La Nacion" that the
Committee of International Relations of the United States
Congress, had invited Rabbi Weiss to a meeting that took
place last Thursday with the head of the committee, Ben
Oilman, to try to understand why Menem insulted the Rabbi
when to them he deserves the utmost confidence.
The Rabbi took this opportunity to reiterate that Menem
has not taken this matter seriously and that our borders
lack security. This is the way we are perceived.
In the meantime, Beraja warned that he would raise the
level of his complaints if no progress is shown soon. As a
result, Menem manifested his profound disgust. Corach is
angry at Beraja as well.
Maybe because Rabbi Weiss' speech helped to redirect
the fire toward antisemitic clusters, and surely because of
the convictions of the Jewish leadership, Alberto
Crupnikoff, head of the AMIA, Luis Dobniewsky, the AMIA's
legal advisor and Beraja, had a long and honest meeting with
the Federal Representatives (Camaristas) . At this meeting,
Beraja stated the problem clearly and the other two men
backed him up.
135
It is suspected that the Buenos Aires police force has
radical members in its ranks. Although less dramatic, due to
the good will that these entities have toward Hugo
Anzorregui, they also are distrusting of members of the
second and third ranks of the SIDE. It is very probable that
some of these members will be arrested in the near future.
SOMETHING IS MISSING
The pressure applied by the AMIA and the DAIA to clear
up this matter is crucial. On the other hand, Judge Galeano
and the District Attorneys Eamon Mullen and Jose Barbaquia,
who had never been involved in a terrorist case, have in the
last twelve months gained valuable experience and are
conducting a solid and professional investigation.
The danger and the breakdown appear to be in the
security forces who perhaps are protecting themselves or are
covering up internal mafias. Additionally, Telleldin, a
compactors of cars, related how in order to "keep his job",
he must periodically hand over auto engines to an important
urban police brigade ( "conurbano") . They could be
obstructing the investigation.
136
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138
TO THE HONORABLE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
We have spent the last 1* months waiting to learn who were the criminals who
murdered our relatives in (he bombing that destroyed the AMIA build'ng on
July 18, 1994. Expert, from various countries assijred us that the action of
local groups was a!>:olijtely necessary in carrying out this bloody acv
regardless of the mtelhctjal and/or financial resporsabiitv of international
terrorism. P'ssently. ne only person detained in the case (although still not
ir\dicted) IS Carlos Alberto Telleldin, the last owner of an auto seme of whose
parts were found amidst the rubble of the AMIA building
After so many months of attempting unsuccesfully to find some explanation
about those who were responsible for the massacre, we believe it is esentia!
at this time to rnaKe knowr, some details aoout persons involved in, and
action^, taken during the investigation For example'
* The total chaos in the zone from tf i moment of the explosion (which
suggestively neither the judic a! auth 'ities nor police officials ever attempted
to curb) impeded the prooer collection ar? processing of the basic evidence
which would have given clues to the manner in which the blast was produced
Given that there was no control in, and no cordoning off of the area, one can
surmise that since persons robbed be'ongings from the cadavers and looted
items from the blown out shops and apartments in the neighbourhocci
persons could just as easily have placed false evidence ;n the ?one.
* Aft©f 14 months the technical investigation is filled with conflicting
hypotheses regarding the type and quantit/ of explosive charge, and the exact
point of the epicenter of tne explosion
* The judge in the case. Dr. Juan Jose Galeano although he has received no
new cases since April. 1995. still is presiding over 400 pending cases In other
parts of the worid, in cases of much less importance, there would be an
independent prosecutor or a judge placed exclusively in a position to
investigate only the one Cfime
* The piessure exerted on the judge is obvious. He has suffered three attacks
on his apartment, which supposedly has a 24-hour guard by the Argentine
Federal Police
' There has been no publicir/ regarding ti^e tf/o million dollar reward offered
by the government for those giving information on the AMIA bombing. That
reward, part of the Decree # 2023 signed into 'aw by President Menem on
November 16. 1954, has had piacticaliy no publicity m the local media in the
last ten months.
139
"The policemen Diegc Barreaa ana f/.ario Bare'.ro whc aomit their
participat'on in a cnrnmal gana speC'^i'ZJng i^ - among o'.^^a' cnmes - auto
theft have not been detained Amor.^ the members ot th.ei- gang was Carlos
Telleldin. Even more susp>cicus is the fact thsc Otficsr Ba^'eiro rece.ved a
departmental promotion during the same time that he v»/as under suspicion in
the, AMIA case
'Another poiJce officer who was promoted is Captain Gaston G. Femancei:
who even with a icng history of anti-semitic behavior, was chief o* the 7th
Precinct (the same stetionhousc that controlled tho special guard duty in front
of the AMIA) Fernandez is new a commisioper in charge of eight different
precincts
'Hector Verge? 's an ex-memoer of SIQc, tne A'ac:ntine intelligence service
who was chie* o- the Ls Rioera concentration c^mp and brags openiy that he
helped set-up La Peria, one of the bicodiest "detention centers" aunng the last
military dictatorship verga;; admiUed ottering Teileidm one million dcllars and
his freedom ;n exchange for fingenr-,; one '.'' the Lebanese citizens (detained
in another case 'n neighbonng PlVtcuo; jS the person tD whom ne (Telleldir'
sold the van w^- - : parts later ape -irec dispersed in the area of :h8 AMIA
bombing The ■jv.ir ^n^iion douars v. - .. to be csid by "frienos ' 0^ the SiDE
according to Vergsz The Verges admission provoKad the opening of a
separate judic'S' investigation by Judge Branca After four months nothing has
been publicly communicstcd about the results of this secondary investigation
We have onU usied the tio of the iceberg a few samples of some of the
fnghtening facts surrounding this poorly managed confusing, and obstacle-
filled investigation. We ask the Honorable; Co-gress of the United States of
Amenca to exert the necessary pressure to clear up this hemous crime so that
we, our children and the entire Argcntir^e society can live n peace and witn
justice. Then and only tne" can the dead fnady r- st in pe^jce.
V ^^ - AJ^-^ ''.'^-- K"'-' / ■ ^ •/;-■
140
1
^7
Report about the Investigation of the AMI A Attack ^'' ^^ jZ l^'iS MdJ n\ \^
Introduction
This work was undertaken with the purpose of discovering the reasons why the
investigation into the attack against the AMIA-DAIA headquarters hasn't advanced
Capturing the guilty depends on the development of a consistent hypothesis, free from
political ideas or preconceptions Until now, such notions have served only to deviate
from the case. Without a consistent hypothesis, it will be difficult to conclude the
investigation. And if the time already gone by and the poor management of this case make
it difficult to catch the guilty, we have to think about preventing future attacks which, with
each passing moment, seem to draw pitifijlly closer.
Historical Background
This attack, along with the one committed two years earlier against the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires, can be viewed as the second most important case in Argentine judicial
criminal history.
The first culminated at the end of 1985, when the leaders of Argentina's military
dictatorship from 1976 to 1983, Generals Videla and Viola and others such as Admirals
Massera and Lambruschini, were judged and condemned. Kidnappings, rapes,
assassinations, tortures and other crimes were proved. More than 10,000 disappearances
were accounted for, although that figure may actually approximate 30,000.
Analyzing the list of the victims of those crimes (and we refer to the 10,000 proven cases)
one finds that 15% were of Jewish background. This is a remarkable figure, if we
consider that the percentage of Jews in Argentina is only 1%. Also, according to the
testimony of the survivors of the concentration camps and extermination camps that
existed at that time, simply being a Jew or being considered a Jew meant death almost
without exception.
In the case of the journalist Jacobo Timerman, the mobilization of the Jewish community
of the United States, backed by its state organizations, finally helped save his life, although
they could not stop his torture.
The indictment of the military junta was possible due to the political conditions and the
correlation of forces during Argentina's return to democracy. At that time, after the
Malvinas Islands defeat, the totality of the Armed Forces were at a point of disintegration
and deterioration. Nevertheless, before leaving power, they decreed a law of self-
amnesty.
In 1982, months before the elections which reestablished democracy, the Presidential
candidate for the majority Justicialist party was asked about the possibility of repealing the
141
seif-amnesty law should he be elected President. Dr. Italo Argentino Luder answered that
to do so would be manifestly anti-Constitutional.
In the end, Raul AJfonsin of the Union Civica Radical (UCR) won the elections and
pushed for the trial of the commanders, which ended in their condemnation at the end of
1985. This entire process, even if it cannot be considered satisfactory, would not have
been possible had Luder won.
A short time later, due to pressure from a variety of sectors, the laws of Due Obedience
and Final Point were decreed, and with them dissolved the possibility of pursuing fijrther
judicial actions and sentencings of the Armed Forces and Security Forces involved.
The current Argentine government is Justicialist. Without this implying any accusation
against the President, many of the current high officials could have been in a government
led by Luder, and in some cases, some of them served in military governments, especially
in areas tied to security organizations, the police, intelligence, etc.
Nazism in Argentina
From the first coup orchestrated by General Jose Felix Uriburu, Argentina has been a
country with a Nazi tradition, inside and out the apparatus of the State. That coup was
carried out against the Radical government of Hipolito Yrigoyen on September 6, 1930.
The people of Argentina used to call Uriburu "Von Pepe" due to his admiration for
Germany. The German influence during his reign was notable.
During the entire decade of the '30s, with strong resources supplied by the German
ambassador Von Therman, the extreme right — groups such as the Civic Legion and the
Nationalist Freedom Alliance — proliferated. The latter was led by a policeman named
Juan Queralto. These groups marched down a principal thoroughfare in Buenos Aires
known as Avenida de Mayo dressed in Nazi uniforms and under police protection.
The coup of June 4, 1943 was eminently fascist. The majority of its protagonists, civil and
military, did not hide their admiration for the "Hitler cross." Even Peron, the obvious
brain of the coup, and later president, spent many years in Italy and Argentina, and also
explicitly manifested his admiration for the totalitarian regimes of the right.
When the war exploded and practically until 1945, different Argentine governments
maintained an uncomfortable "neutrality" which the Allied powers interpreted as a political
cover in favor of the Third Reich.
As such, numerous war criminals found a refuge in Argentina and later collaborated with
different State structures like the Police and the Armed Forces. A typical case is that of
the AS of the Luftwafe, Hans Rudel, who was practically the father of the Argentine
142
military Air Force. Rudel, like Eichmann and other Nazis, arrived in Argentina after 1945,
fleeing Allied justice.
This influence of Nazi ideology continues today. The Interior Minister, Carlos Corach (of
Jewish heritage) has currently among his advisors two known Nazis. One is Carlos
Tortora, who belonged to the Nationalist University Concentration (CNU). At the
beginning of the '70s, the CNU assassinated a Jewish student named Silvia Ester Filler in
Mar del Plata. Tortora, before being designated as an aide to Corach, was one of the main
officers of the SIDE (State Information Service).'
During the Second World War, a priest names Julio Meinvielle, became very popular. He
revindicated Nazism and did not hide his aversion to Jews. In the '60s, he was the mentor
and ideologue of the Nationalist Restoration Guard (GRN) that committed crimes and
attacks of all kinds. Among his disciples was a youth named Norberto Belladrich, who
currently is the press aide to Interior Minister Corach.
In the '70s, Horacio Calderon edited a book entitled "Jewish Argentina," a book of Nazi
ideology in which it was affirmed that Jews were the true owners of the country. On the
cover was a map of Argentina, nailed with little Stars of David to a cross. "Jewish
Argentina" is considered as an archetype model of the majority of the studies about Neo-
Nazism. Today, Calderon is an advisor to President Menem. In his latest public
comments he has reneged on his anti-Semitic past, but he has not been convincing.
The Arab Influence
Justicialism, the political movement founded by General Juan Peron in 1945, which
President Menem belongs to, has ties to the Arab world. Peron looked upon the birth of
Nasserism with great affection and the ideology of Nasser coincides with many Justicialist
principles.
When Peron returned to power in 1973 ~ after a 17 year exile in Franco's Spain - he was
sympathetic towards the Arab cause and he sent a commercial mission to Libya, Egypt and
other Arab countries.
In 1960, the Arab League sent Hussein Trikki, the founder of the organization Crislam, to
Argentina. Crislam's purpose was to try to achieve a union between the Moslems and
Christians against a common enemy: the Jews. Many ultra-right figures were part of
Crislam, among them Mohamed Ali Seineldin, a fanatic Christian fundamentalist, and the
Neo Nazi leader of National Alert, Alejandro Biondine, who declared himself the "Fuhrer
of Argentina."
' The SIDE, after the attack against the AMIA, circulated a presumed "secret report," that attributed the
bombing to an "internal Jewish" matter. The report was written by Norberto Ceresole, who taught courses
in military institutes in Brazil. The report was published in a magazine financed by the SIDE called
"Critical Point."
143
In ]988, when he was a candidate for the Presidency, Menem visited Syria at the
invitation of President Haffez el Assad. In that visit he met Monzer Al Kassar, a Syrian
arms dealer, and Ibrahim A! Ibrahim, who would later marry Menem's sister-in-law, Amira
Yoma.
When Menem was elected President, Ibrahim and Al Kassar traveled to Argentina and
obtained passports in record time. Although he hardly spoke Spanish, Ibrahim was named
Special Delegate to the President in the Customs Division of Ezeiza, where he obtained
sufficient power to block inspection of entering merchandise
In the middle of March 1992, some days before the attack against the Israeli Embassy in
Argentina, the US State Department placed Argentina's airport Ezeiza in the "unsafe"
category, and warned visitors that the airport was open to terrorist attack.
A short time after, Monzer AJ Kassar was arrested in Spain for arms trafficking. Ibrahim
Al Ibrahim divorced the President's sister-in-law and left the country. He is wanted by
Interpol and by Argentine authorities for drug trafficking charges and forgery.
The election of President Menem worried various sectors of Argentina's population,
especially the Jewish community, overall due to his Syrian environment and his contacts
with the Peronist ultra-right. But Menem tried to show himself as friendly to the Jewish
community. In his speeches, he spoke of tolerance and respect and he was the first
Argentine president to visit Israel.
The Sivak Case
During both the Proceso (Argentina's military government from 1976 - 1983) and again
when the country returned to democracy, the engineer Osvaldo Sivak (of Jewish origin)
was kidnapped twice. His kidnappings demonstrate the relationship that exists among
neofascist and delinquent groups that are maintained intact and in a situation of power
until today.
When the case regarding Osvaldo Sivak's second kidnapping began in the court of Dr.
Luis Enrique Velasco, in the Secretariat of Dr. Bruno and with the collaboration of Dr.
Galeano, ^ in the complaint. Dr. Marta Oyhanarte de Sivak and her brother-in-law Dr.
Jorge Sivak requested from the Federal Police a list of the kidnappings that had occurred
in the last years. The request, made in 1985, was made to find similarities with the
kidnapping of Osvaldo Sivak. The Federal Police denied the request. After some
insistence, the list was given in April 1986.
Approximately 25% of the persons on the list were of Jewish origin. The list reached the
president of the Delegation of the Argentine Israeli Associations (the DAI A), Dr.
■ Dr. Galeano is currently in charge of the investigation of the AMI A bombing.
144
Goldberg, who was grateful for the information and said that he had suspected that
something like this had been occurring, but that it hadn't been possible to prove. In any
event, the matter was not denounced publicly, and it has never been known whether this
information has been considered in the appropriate manner.
In April 1986 it was determined that Mario Agustin Aguilar,^ and Barrionuevo, Army
Intelligence Agents, with the collaboration of others, extorted Marta Oyhanarte de Sivak
and Jorge Sivak. Judge Velasco considered that they were not mere extortionists, and he
attributed the Sivak's kidnapping to them. This was one of many errors of the
investigation.
Also, it was known that in his private practice as a lawyer. Judge Velasco previously had
defended Mario Agustin Aguilar, in an extortion case in a court in San Isidro (in the
province of Buenos Aires)
When the kidnappings took place, the Chief of the Federal Police was commissary Di
Vietri The anomalies in the investigation generated an interpellation in the House of
Representatives. Interior Minister Antonio Troccoli defended the action of his
subordinate Di Vietri But this defense was a failure Various days later the heads of the
Federal Police resigned, including the Chief and the Assistant Chief of the Fraud Division
Judge Velasco tried to defend his competence in the case, from Dr. Smolianski's
complaint. '' Af^er appeals and different judicial and parliamentary proceedings, the case
was transferred to the Federal Criminal and Correctional District Court No. 5, headed by
Dr. Martin Irurzun.
A very few months later, in the first days of November of 1987, Judge Irurzun brought the
investigation to a close He determined who the perpetrators were, found Sivak's remains
and clarified that two other two extortionary kidnappings ended in death: those of
Benjamin Neuman and Eduardo Oxenford.
Neuman had had an important role in the Argentine Jewish community and had ties to the
Israelita Hospital and the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. A policeman named Villarreal
'From prison, Aguilar sent a note to the Supreme Court of Justice on June 28, 1994, anticipating the
attack against the DAI A. [This note, a copy of which can be found now in Judge Galeano's court records,
has the June 28 entry date with the Court's stamp and signature. During the Sivak case, Aguilar
demonstrated a mythomaniac personality and in innumerable opportunities tried to change dates and add
notes to the record to his own benefit. Nevertheless, the stamp and signature of the Court's entry table are
real and should be taken seriously.) The Court did not investigate the matter. In the same way. Judge
Galeano failed to note that if the date were certain, various felonies were committed by public officials
who did not act in accordance with their duties once they received the accusation. Or by declaring the
date stamp false, Galeano failed to recognize the complicity of some Court official or that he should
investigate the reason for it. Aguilar's accusation can be found in Section 14 of Galeano's court
proceedings.
" Dr. Smolianski was recently brought in (March 1995) to help the lawyers of the AMIA-DAIA in their
task.
145
who was a custodian in the Embassy determined that Neuman was a good candidate for
kidnapping It was also discovered that all those involved in these cases were in the
Argentine Federal Police, among them Officials Buletti, Galeano' and the Assistant
Commissary' Lorenzatti, who to date is a fugitive
Success in the investigation of the Sivak, Oxenford and Neuman cases was directly related
to the drastic changes in the cupola of power of the Argentine Federal Police
Commissary General Pirker who took over as Chief from June 1985 to until his death in
May 1987 was one of the key pieces of this success
Pressure from U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy and various Jewish institutions in North
America was also important. One of the coordinators of this effort was the deceased rabbi
Marshall Meyer.
National Alert
When Commissary Pirker commanded the Federal Police, a Nazi-fascist group called
National Alert was arrested National AJert had placed bombs in a Sephardic temple on
Lavalle street (four blocks from the AMIA building) and in a movie theatre in the Capital
(where a Jewish movie was playing). This group was responsible for Anti-Semitic
propaganda in downtown Buenos Aires.
In attempting to deactivate the bomb in the movie theatre, a policeman of the Explosives
Brigade died and another was seriously injured. This led some sectors of the police to
collaborate with Commissary Pirker to detain the perpetrators. Pirker had to use officials
from the Railroad Security Superintendency of the Federal Police, a dependency with little
organic ties to the rest. According to what Pirker confessed to the author of this report,
"I didn't know who I could confide in in the force "
The incidents regarding National AJert and Osvaldo Sivak are the only two, the first of net
anti-Semitic content and the kidnapping with anti-Jewish connotations, that the Federal
Police has resolved from 1983 to the present. During this time at least thirty threats and
anti-Semitic attacks have occurred.
The Embassy
In 1992, the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires occurred. The investigation
of the attack , for Constitutional reasons, is in the hands of the Minister of the Supreme
Court of Justice of the Nation, Dr. Ricardo Levene, an elderly man, physically and
mentally deteriorated.
' No relation to Judge Galeano.
146
Dr. Bisordi, who was assigned to investigate the case and who worked with Levene, has
been accused by the Lawyers Association of Buenos Aires of sympathizing with Nazism
and with the military regime that governed Argentina until 1983. He was relieved some
time later by Dra Silvina Catucci, who has not been found to be very effective.
Levene's investigation was not successful because he committed many mistakes in the
investigation, even though they were technical Faults were manifested. Finally, the case
entered death row. Today nobody bothers with the subject.
A few hours after the attack against the Embassy occurred, when survivors were still
being rescued, a journalist with close ties to the Menem government, Silvia Fernandez
Barrios, asked the wounded, without any basis, if it was true that the arsenal of the
Embassy had exploded This question was broadcast on official television, Argentine
Color Television. These comments were also made by, among others, the governor of
Buenos Aires Province, Eduardo Duhalde
Security in the AMIA Building
The building was located in Once, a commercial neighborhood where there is a constant
loading and unloading of merchandise.
The roof was easily accessible from two buildings in the rear. One was an apartment
building, from which kids would go to look for their ball each time it would fall from a
balcony to the patio. The other easy point of access was from an old house taken over by
squatters, Uriburu 626 (linked to AMIA funds).
After the attack on the Embassy, parking on the block of the AMIA headquarters was
prohibited, and a patrolman and two agents were assigned to guard the building around
the clock. Still, it was easy to convince them to allow parking on the block, especially if a
bribe were offered Neighbors saw vehicles parked there with total freedom, drivers
spoke with the police officers and then they would load or unload their merchandise.
Ten days before and up until the moment of the attack, the lights of the street Pasteur
were not working.
The Explosion
At 9:53 AM on July 18, 1994, a powerful bomb exploded and destroyed the headquarters
of the AMIA. According to local authorities, the bomb was carried by a Renault Trafic
pickup truck which came down Pasteur Street and detonated right in front of the building.
This is the official hypothesis, but there is conflicting evidence that points to a bomb in the
inside of the building.
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No terrorist group took responsibility for the attack. In spite of this, as soon as the
explosion occurred, and before the investigation began, ail community leaders, the media
and government officials maintained that the attack was carried out by Arabs.
The front of the building crumbled instantaneously The majority of the victims died as
they were crushed by the collapse of the walls and floors. The largest number of survivors
were found in the back of the building.
In the street, victims were wounded by the explosive charge, many others were hit by
flying rubble.
As soon as a column of black smoke emerged from the ruins, and the survivors were
overcome by a strong ammonia smell, chaos enveloped the area Buenos Aires, a city of
three million inhabitants (eight million in Greater Buenos Aires) lacks a centralized
organism that handles public catastrophes. The immediate consequences of the explosion
clearly showed the lack of an authority to take charge of the matter.
The site was invaded by hundreds of curious onlookers, journalists, firefighters,
paramedics, volunteers and afflicted individuals searching for relatives or friends. It was
only at 12:15, more than two hours after the explosion, that the area was cordoned off.
Gas and light were cut off a half an hour later Fortunately, one of the main hospitals of
the city is located a few blocks away (the Hospital de Clinicas). Many wounded were able
to walk there, with the aid of friends or workers. The seriously wounded were taken by
ambulance.
A survivor, Natalio Slutsky, described the confijsion after the crumbling of the building.
At the time of the explosion, Mr. Slutsky was in his office in the rear of the AMIA
building, and he was able to rescue other survivors through the roof of the building. Upon
scaling an adjacent balcony, Slutsky looked back: "I saw hundreds of people standing in
the ruins, giving orders. At that moment, I thought that if anyone were still alive, all this
noise and lack of organization would kill them. I think that they should have remained
silent, trying to listen for sounds to find someone alive. People died asphyxiated."
Friday, July 22, a group of forensic Israeli police arrived in Buenos Aires, led by Dr. Jay
Levenson, head of the Disaster Victims Identification Group. According to all the
witnesses, the group essentially took charge of the Argentine morgue, and added a little
bit of order to the confijsed scene. The autopsies, delayed due to a lack of personnel,
accelerated so that relatives could receive corpses in time to have a proper burial.
Witnesses present who helped in the search for victims told that each time a body was
detected or found, the firefighters would make the others leave, giving no logical
explanation for this measure.
There were many robbery cases. Diana Malum recovered her dead husband's watch, his
wedding ring and his wallet, but the latter only had 6 pesos. "My husband always carried
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al6t of money," she says. "Someone took hife money and left only his credit cards and
personkl papers." According to survivors, Andres Malamud, Diana's husband, who was
the architect responsible for the building's repair - was carrying $6,000 dollars in his shirt
pocket, because that morning he had withdrawn that money from the bank.
The surrounding businesses were also ransacked. In the photography store of Mario
Damp, cameras, film and an enlarger were stolen. His safe was forced open and $3,800
dollars were stolen. A nearby shoestore was also ransacked the night of July 21 . That
same day the owner of a toy store asked the police for permission to enter the perimeter of
the security area, and he spent the afternoon putting merchandise that had not been
damaged in garbage bags. The next day when he returned to find them, the bags were
gone.
The owner of a print shop was luckier. When he arrived at his store he found it destroyed
by tiie explosion. Someone had taken a key from his desk, had opened the safe, and had
taken all the checks and cash. The owner argued so violently with police and his case
attracted such attention that finally a police official told him that his belongings had been
transferred to the 5th Commissary "for security reasons." They returned everything to
him.
Anti-Semites did not dare to speak openly, but nevertheless they were present. The
Jewish institutions were inundated with anonymous telephone attacks, indicating that more
bombs had been placed in other buildings.
One of these calls stood out for its cruelty. Because some survivors had been found
wandering the area in a state of shock, many people requested help via radio and
television, in the hope that a disappeared family member would be found One man
received a call on his cellular telephone, telling him that his mother was in a hospital thirty
minutes from the AMIA. The man rushed to the hospital, but he was told that they hadn't
admitted any victim of the explosion. At that moment, his cellular telephone rang again; it
was the same person that had called before, this time laughing and asking "How did you
like the joke, you disgusting Jew?"
Members of the bomb squad of the Federal Police only examined three building searching
for rubble from the explosion, the two contiguous to the AMIA building and the one
across from it. A group of journalist who were doing an investigation for a book,
searched in more than a dozen buildings, in which they found remains of the explosion and
found more human remains. The journalists took all this evidence to the Judge in charge
of the case. The doormen of the buildings they visited told them that the Police had never
come by. In one of the few buildings where the police did gather evidence, the technicians
came with brooms and picked up all the material with used and dirty shovels. The
material was not labeled nor were photos taken
The remains of the explosion were abandoned in a deserted lot in the University City, by
the side of the river. Among the remains were hundreds of books of the AMIA and IWO
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Library, some damaged, others intact. There were also, according to witnesses, pieces of
remains from the police laboratory, and remains of a dumpster which sat in front of the
AMIA. Abraham Lichtenbaum, the AMIA's librarian, went to the lot to try to rescue
some books, accompanied by some volunteers. They were arrested The librarian called a
lawyer and petitioned the authorities to be able to enter the land and save the books, once
the petition was accepted, they went back to the lot and they were arrested once again.
Lictenbaum appealed to Judge Galeano. Three weeks passed without an answer from the
court Then the librarian received a call from the owner of the restaurant across form the
lot telling him that vagabonds were coming to the lot daily taking away things to sell.
Professor Lichtenbaum called the police and went running over there: There he found a
dozen persons complaining to the police agents and asking them "Why can't we go in
today?"
A North American specialist that works for a federal agency saw the personnel of the
Police and the Civil Defense gathering parts of cadavers in the explosion site, and placing
them in garbage bags. Bothered — the standard procedure is to put away each part
separately and label it-, he tried to intervene, but they told him not to interfere. At the
same time, remains of the building, which are critical for analyzing the type of explosives
used and the exact position of the bomb, were removed from the site, except for small
samples that the local agencies took.
The Judicial Morgue still has 16 bags of human remains that have not been identified. No
analysis has been done to determine which cadavers these remains belong to.
The Federal Police
The attack of the Embassy occurred when Commissary General Pasero was the Chief of
the Argentine Federal Police. He resigned a few days after the attack on the AMIA-DAIA
headquarters. It was not clear if his resignation can be attributed to the lack of
professional efficiency or if there were other reasons.
Another question is in what measure the current Chief of the Federal police, the
Commissary General Adrian Pelacchi (previously in charge of the Superintendency of
Dangerous Drug Investigations) will want to or be able to do what his predecessor Pasero
could not.
It is important to mention some things about the Argentine Federal Police It is a very
powerfijl institution (it has more than 35,000 in its ranks) and it possesses an enormous
degree of autarky - even if it does depend hierarchically on the Ministry of the Interior
and ultimately on the President of the Nation. Only in the period during the last military
government did the Executive Branch exert real power over the Police The Argentine
Federal Police in its organic role has a formal similarity to the FBI of the US. Republican
and federal institutions were incorporated into the Constitution of 1853, as were the
reforms that followed.
22-101 0-96-6
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In Argentina, mafias do not exist in the same way they do in the US and the few
organizations that would be able to organize themselves as mafiosos are more in the
business of meat or in the distribution of newspapers and magazines. But prostitution
drugs, gambling, etc are administered or regulated by some groups belonging to the
Federal Police. These are independent groups, but at the same time they are tied to the
institutional organization chart, and their respective spheres of influence are clearly
divided.
These considerations help to understand, or at least not to discount that even if a minority
of the Force, undertakes or has anti-Semitic activities,* the rest are not in conditions to
investigate these activities, given that they (by being involved in other types of illicit
activity) prefer to avoid eventual conflict, in order not to be discovered themselves. Their
intervention is only possible if the political pressure amasses at the national or international
level
The Argentine Federal Police has been acting superficially, but these matters demand more
forceflilness
The Seventh Commissary
The AMI A building is in the jurisdiction of the Seventh Commissary, which is the
responsibility of Inspector Commissary Gaston Fernandez.
As soon as he took charge as Commissary, Fernandez was visited by , as a welcome, five
members of the Jewish community, merchants in the zone. The Commissary made them
wait two hours and then finally told them that he would not receive them.
In the beginning of the military regime (1976) an organization was created called CAPE or
the Special Police Correction Center, in which courses of net anti-Semitic content were
given, in which it was said that the Jews were to blame of what used to be called the
"international and apatriate subversion" or "international synarchy," Gaston Fernandez
attended these courses.
Fernandez was also related to the famous task forces working with great freedom and
absolute power over the lives of the detained. Fernandez' group applied specifically what
they had learned in the courses at the CAPE. Commissary Fernandez was promoted to
Inspector Commissary and currently is in charge of Zone Three of the Federal Capital.
(Zone Three has seven commissaries under its charge in the capital).
Three months after the attack, the DAIA honored to Commissary Fernandez for his role in
the investigation.
'^' Until recently, the Constitutional Order of Police indicated in its official report that there was no attack
against the AMIA, but that its was an accident produced by the explosion of a heater.
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It's also appropriate to underline that no Police guard assigned to the custody of the
AMIA (Fernandez' subordinates ) was at his post at the time of the explosion. The
Federal Police never clearly explained the reason for this, something that had already
occurred in the attack against the Israeli Embassy.
This process (removing guards suddenly in order to perform a kidnapping or attack) was
called "free zone" in the time of the military rule In many cases, the free zones were
determined according to where the jurisdiction of where case would be handled, assuring
either the complicity of the judges or their ideological sympathy and the consequential
impunity from justice.
Many of these judges continue working in the different areas of the Judicial branch.
The police guarding the AMIA were hardly equipped for security. They only had guns.
Their only means of communication was through walkie-talkies and the police car didn't
run Since no one had seen the car move during an entire year, the neighbors had asked if
it had an engine. When the police car was destroyed by the explosion, the mystery was
revealed: it had an motor, but it didn't work.
The police reports and the firefighters' report that appear in court records tell of their
actions after the explosion.
Even with the contradictions and the ambiguities of the accounts, one can deduce that one
of the policemen assigned to guard Pasteur street was in the bathroom of the bar across
the way when the bomb exploded. Three minutes later, he went to save his partner and
help him out of the patrol car. Also it's said that his partner was fixing the vehicle, and the
hood of the car was up, protecting him from the blast. In other paragraphs, the Officer
that wrote the report (in third person) notes that the sergeant was struck by the arrival of a
truck at the door of the AMIA with two dumpsters. The driver unloaded them both and
left the scene. It's interesting that the assistant officer said that in that moment the
sergeant got out of the patrol car and went to the bathroom. The sergeant maintains, each
time that he refers to the subject, that "God's hand saved him" Seeing the dumpsters
being delivered, failing to investigate their contents and arrival as one would expect from a
guard, and then abandoning the scene may indicate that he was not just lucky but may
have been an accomplice.
A young man who operated a quiosk in the area and was a witness arrived at the scene 40
seconds after the explosion (more than two minutes before the sergeant) He looked
inside the destroyed vehicle and upon assuring that it was empty proceeded to save victims
among the building's ruins. Only some minutes later did he see police at the site. The
sergeant, in an interview with a weekly magazine, offered yet another account when he
declared that he found his partner various meters from the place, standing and holding his
head.
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Hours after the explosion, the Volunteer Firemen Corps of Florencio Varela offered to
collaborate in the rescue of victims. This body is the only one at that time that had
equipment for rescuing victims similar to that brought by the Israelis some days later. The
equipment was purchased in France and some of their members were trained in its usage.
Aside from these Firemen, members of the Federal Police did not posses the equipment
nor the experience and did not authorize their colleagues to collaborate
Judge Galeano
The AMIA-DAIA investigation is formally the responsibility of the Criminal and
Correctional Federal Judge, Dr. Juan Galeano. In Argentina, the judges act as
investigators and prosecutors. Ideally, the police and security organizations should help
the judges. But the system rarely works.
A series of scandals has stained the image of the Judicial Branch in Argentina. In 1992, a
judge named Sarmiento was accused of blackmail against a private hospital, Sanatorio
Guemes In that case the present Judge Galeano was a secretary for Judge Velasco, and
with the help of the chief of the State Information Service (SIDE) Hugo Anzorregui, they
were able to detain Judge Sanniento What was interesting was that the hospital was the
subject of extortion in connection with a felony, which the hospital's medical director Dr.
Sorin admitted in a televised report. The felony consisted of reusing disposable materials
(syringes, filters, etc.). The lawyer that represented the hospital, Anzorregui's brother,
was able tc get them to detain Judge Sarmiento and to forget the felony committed by
Sanatorio Guemes itself A little time later, thanks to the efficiency he demonstrated in
this case. Dr. Galeano was named a Federal Judge by recommendation of the SIDE
Director, Hugo Anzorregui.
In 1994, some months before the attack on the AMI A, a prosecutor from Judge Galeano's
court was forced to resign, because he had accidentally discovered that Galeano was not
even a lawyer. When Galeano was named, it didn't occur to anyone to ask for his
diploma.
Judge Galeano's work has been criticized a great deal. In his proceedings, many defects
have been found. Many witnesses were not called to testify. Some went voluntarily to the
police but were rejected. In one case, a witness was told there were no diskettes, so his
declaration couldn't be taken. Another witness was told that his declaration "didn't
interest them" because "they already had too many."
One of the wounded in the AMI A attack was transferred to the Hospital de Clinicas, and
by the individual's name and description he was of Arab origin. The Jewish, Korean and
Arab communities all live together in the Once neighborhood, so it's quite likely that a
passerby hit by the blast could be of Arab origin.
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The victim, the same day he arrived at the hospital, was visited by various peoph, who
immediately took care of transferring him to the Syrian-Lebanese Hospital Judge
Galeano freed up an official and asked the Syrian Lebanese Hospital to give him
information about this patient. It's important to note that the Hospital de Clinicas is also a
Teaching Hospital and even though it may lack means, it is considered professionally one
of the best in the country. The Syrian-Lebanese Hospital did not respond to Galeano' s
request and some months later Galeano tried again It goes beyond saying that the proper
procedure in a case like this - being careful of course not to fall into a racism — would
have been to send a official of the Court, accompanied by the police, to appear in the
Hospital and register the patient themselves to avoid any alterations to the record. In
these cases, to send one official only serves to alert the suspicious The matter has still not
been investigated Research should be done - in a subtle but efficient manner - of the
wounded, given that one can't discount that some terrorist could have been wounded in
the explosion.
At one point Galeano received information about an Iranian in Venezuela that could
provide important information about the attack He traveled to Caracas in the President's
plane with this secretary, Dra. Spina, and with two prosecutors, where they interrogated
an Iranian who presented himself as remorsefijl, manifesting that the perpetrators of the
attacks in Buenos Aires were members of the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires
Judge Galeano did not clarify why, or by whose authority, he authorized Berges* to visit
Telleldin in prison.
Herges, with photos in hand and the promise of an important sum of money, tried to
convince him to recognize the detained Lebanese in Paraguay as purchasers of the Trafic.
Dr. Galeano also authorized the "reconstruction" of the explosion, done by Armed Forces
experts in military dependencies. The reconstruction was broadcast on national television
and seen by millions of viewers. The similarities to the actual explosion were minimal. It
was done in an open field where the lack of surrounding buildings made it so that the only
impact produced which could be verified was the rating of the program itself
In spite of this, the experiment was added to the court record.
Some obstacles to the investigation can be explained by the lack of organization in certain
areas of the Government For example, when Judge Galeano asked for information about
the entry of Iranians into the country and other suspicious foreigners. Immigration
The National Constitution clearly and precisely establishes the independence of the three Powers of the
Slate: Judicial, Legislative and Executive. Judge Galeano, confirming the politicization of the case,
instead of requesting authorization for his trip from the Court, asked directly for it from the President of
the Nation.
' Berges is also an intelligence agent. During the Proceso he was in charge of the concentration camp La
Perla and he is friends with Tellcldin's father, a member of the Triple A and a known anti-Semite and
oppressor.
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Services answered him by sending him a note in which it said that computer registers
weren't saved since 1989, "due to budgetary problems." In order for the Immigration
Services to find the real registry of the entry and exit of suspicious persons from the
country, the Judge had to submit the exact date of entry, the flight number and place of
entry into the country. In reality, the computer system of Immigration Service only
consist of inputting in alphabetical order the forms that the border officials send to the
centra! office. There was no computer network nor a digital information system
From the beginning, the Court or more specifically the court record, received all kinds of
visitors. Confidential information became public, with amazing exactness.
Feeding the pages of the newspapers, from the Court, the Prosecutor, and from the DAI A
itself, the task of the journalists was made easy. They have limited their extensive
investigation to talks over coffee with the government officials while Xerox machines do
the heavy work.
One could suppose that Judge Galeano and the complainants know where the information
flows from and, of course, that this will not get into the hands of the guilty, so that they
can avoid having to build their defense or alibis. In any event they don't have to do much
more than read the newspapers to inform themselves, even before the officials leave the
Judge's chambers.
The court record consists of more than 80 sections, of four hundred pages each, in
addition to other sections which are not in the principal court proceeding, where one can
find the declarations of eleven protected witnesses. These latter reports are reserved for
the Intelligence Service, etc. Several hundred telephones were involved and 10,000 hours
of recordings of those telephone conversations have been gathered.
All this information, which until now has not served to reach any positive result, is
virtually unmanageable for one person, and one has to fijrther consider that the Court's
record is growing at the rate of one and one half sections each week.
The Iranian Connection
The declarations of an Iranian refugee, Moatmer Manucher, who is said to be a former
diplomat, currently under protection of the United States, warned beforehand that Iran
was planning an attack in London.
There is not a great deal of transparency here. Two high-ranking officials of the UN High
Commission on Refiigees personally responsible at the time for protecting the Iranian,
were dismissed. In the declarations taken by member of the Court there is reference made
to the fact that the Iranian anticipated the future attack.
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Galeano visited the President at his residence in Olivos to show him this lead The British,
nevertheless, were not interested in the Iranian and thanks to that, they were able to
uncover the attack committed in the center of London, organized by a Palestinian woman
in an act of vengeance According to her, the Israelis had killed her husband There was
no Iranian connection
At that time, Galeano had already accused four Iranian diplomats as accomplices and had
asked for their extradition to Iran Iran harshly criticized Judge Galeano and demanded
apologies
According to British terrorism experts, one can't discount this as just a maneuver to
distract the bloodhounds. Until now, the elements that Judge Galeano sustains are meager
and doubtful in order to insure an Iranian connection.
In spite of this, his investigation was directed to an area known in Argentina as the
"Triangle," on the border of Paraguay and Brazil, where there is a large Arab community.
Recent arrests made by the Argentine and Paraguayan police indicate the existence of a
Nazi network that reaches Buenos Aires
In accordance with Ruben Beraja, president of the DAI A, the hypothesis has a meaning
due to the activist posture of the Iranian Embassy since the fundamentalist revolution of
1979 that toppled the Shah. The Iranian Embassy has financed visits to Iran , and together
with a Lyndon Larrouche delegation in Buenos Aires, has sponsored many meetings and
book presentations. According to Beraja, the Iranians spent the last decade organizing
militant cells among the Muslim Arabs of Argentina, and tying to earn the sympathy of the
majority of the local Christian Arab community. In the Triangle region, according to
Beraja, there is a large group of Arab immigrants, sympathetic to Yasser Arafat. Because
contraband flourishes in the area, the Triangle can provide the clandestine cells with
asylum and connections with the entire world.
Three men currently under custody alleged that they were trained in an island of the Tigre
River which belonged to the extremist neo-Nazi Alejandro Suckdorf.' The other trails
Galeano took didn't lead to anything either. There were also trails that indicated that a
group of Pakastani immigrants that lived in a farm to the west of Buenos Aires were said
to be "involved in something," But no evidence about them was ever uncovered.
Judge Galeano refused to consider the possibility of a Syrian connection. According to
con Ruben Beraja, the DAIA president, Syrians in the Argentine government say there
may be corruption in the government but no ties to an attack.
The court only has one witness that is said to have seen the white Trafic pickup truck,
which according to the official explanation, contained the bomb. This witness, a woman,
is said to have seen the driver: a man with Arab features, and she even describes the color
Currently detained in the Civil Court of San Isidro of Dr. Markevich.
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of his eyes (which contradicts what was said in later declarations). The question is how
could she have seen the driver so clearly.
No other witness saw the pickup with these characteristics before the explosion. Some
time after, a street sweeper who miraculously survived given he was only a few meters
from the explosion, went to the Court and was obliged under threats to confirm that he
had seen a vehicle with the same characteristics as the Trafic heading for the AMIA,
instants before the attack occurred. The street cleaner who lives in a poor neighborhood
in the Port area and is the father of eleven children, refused to give false testimony. This
fact is known to some of the families of the victims.
Based on the presence of few remains of a pickup truck of that description among the
ruins of the building, the hypothesis of the car bomb has been attacked by various experts.
The main argument is the degree of destruction on the right wing of the building, which
much greater than that of the left. This indicates that the center of the explosion is
different from where the truck supposedly detonated.
The government is said to have found evidence that the pickup had been kept in a parking
lot in the area. According to the Intelligence reports, the terrorists left the white Trafic in
the parking lot of the street Paraguay, three blocks from the AMIA. A man took the
pickup there five days before the explosion, paid for a week of parking and left a generous
tip. The person in charge of the parking lot testified that at the time he thought that the
pickup was weighed down because it had difficulty going up the access ramp of the
parking lot.
If this is so, how could it have gone over the curb of the AMIA at high velocity on
Monday, July 18? Another curious detail is that the parking ticket included the complete
name and the document ID # of the driver. Parking tickets never include such data - only
the date and the hour of arrival and exit of the vehicles. If it is true that some remains of a
vehicle were found inside and among the ruins of the AMIA, it is also certain that the
quantity of people entered the site of the attack a few seconds after it occurred and with
complete freedom, ruining the possibility of finding ~ unless false proof was introduced
from the beginning.
The fact that 1 5 months have passed since the attack without any resolution to the
investigation, shows that terrorists planned their actions with great prudence and
precision. This is contradictory with the manner in which the Trafic was kept in the
parking lot, where each one of their acts calls attention or is suspicious. The generous tip,
the risk of leaving a vehicle filled with explosives for 5 days, the traditional possibility of
robbery in parking lots, or putting information never required on a parking ticket.
Everything seems more like a mechanism prepared to derail the investigation than a part of
a well thought-out plan prior to an attack of great magnitude.
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The SIDE
In Argentina there are various intelligence services In the time of the military
government, their numbers were even greater, but today each Armed Force has its own.
The Police has its own, and the National Gendarme and the Naval Prefecture has its own.
Each provincial government has an autonomous intelligence service. Finally there is
SIDE, the Information Service of the State, which answers directly to the President's
Office. The existing and traditional rivalry between these intelligence services makes
collaboration or the exchange of information impossible. This is also characteristic of the
diverse foreign services solicited by the Government, which served to strengthen the
investigation of the attack against the AMI A.
After the attack on the Embassy, the following episode occurred: In one of the islands of
the Tigre ( an area situated about 30 to 40 kilometers from the city of Buenos Aires, a
group of islands where the Rivers Parana and Uruguay join and the Rio de la Plata begins)
lived an agent of one of the intelligence services of the Argentine Army, by the last name
of Suckdorf He had had a strong argument with his wife and it ended with him striking
her.
The wife denounced him with the Buenos Aires Provincial police and also told the police
that he had a firing range, a large amount of explosives, arms of different calibres, and a
landing area for helicopters. After the AMIA attack, her husband had returned home
happy, saying that "at last the Jews were given what they deserved," and hinted to her that
he had collaborated in the attack.
The Police broke into the house and proved the woman right. Suckdorf told the police
that he kept ail this material under the orders from the Chief of the Army, General Balza.'°
A few months after this event, the attack against the headquarters of the AMIA-DAIA
occurred..
The Trafic used supposedly in this attack had been sold by a auto merchant named
Telleldin, son of the Commissary Telleldin" and member of the Intelligence Service.
Together with various police officials in the province they sold "used cars."
'"General Balza has maintained in recent times his democratic ideas. On December 3, 1990, he defeated
the mihtary command of the painted faces; led by Col. Seineldin. Seineldin had a nationalistic ideology,
but there were reasons to consider that in reality he was a neofascist and anti-Semitic. Seinildin
manifested on one opportunity, jokingly, that "in the same way you can't talk about green horses, you
can't speak of an honest Jew."
" Telleldin's first lawyer, the only one who has been detained until now for the AMIA attack, was paid by
SIDE, according to vox populi in the Courts. His name: P^rez Ferrio. Telleldin's current lawyer is Victor
Stinfale, the same lawyer as (hat of the Nazi Suckdorf, who was detained when explosives were found
that would have been used in attacks.
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Telleldin and his wife had had legal problems before. She has four cases pending, for
prostitution, acting as a pimp, operating "massage parlors," check falsification and other
criminal activities.
Telleldin is the only suspicious one still under custody, after another sixteen were freed.
According to the Judge who listened to the declaration, Telleldin had bought a burned
truck, and he had repaired it and painted it in a mechanic shop belonging to Ariel
Nitzcaner and Fabian Jource and then he sold it. The buyer, according to Nitzcaner — was
a man with Central American features who used a hat and sunglasses.
The owner of the mechanic shop is Jewish and he complained that the police tortured him
to oblige him to confess that he was Telleldin' s accomplice.
The Hunter Report
After the attack, the Argentine government invited various countries to participate in the
investigation and promised total support to the investigators. The results of this
collaboration were not revealed. Nevertheless, it appears that foreign investigators found
difficulty in their task.
The United States sent Charles Hunter, an expert in explosives of the U.S. State
Department. He arrived in Argentina as part of a team comprised of U.S. State
Department agents, the IRT and the FBI.
Charles Hunter arrived in Buenos Aires on July 22, 1994, four days after the explosion. In
the report to his superiors he asked himself why nearby buildings were damaged so little.
These doubts incremented when they could personally observe that in a building nearby
the AMI A, at Pasteur 611, part of the merchandise had been blown out to the exterior of
the store, as if the expansive wave had originated inside the;AMIA building. If the blast
occurred in the door or lobby, the merchandise would have blown toward the back of the
local.
Among other things, the team requested samples of the remains to analyze in U.S.
laboratories. Immediately the Federal Police turned over the samples According to a
source tied to the Investigation Team, they were contaminated. In their analyses, the
Americans found traces of Pet -N, RDX, silicone, ammonia, various nitrates, TNT and
other signs of plastic explosives — a combination that the source categorized as
"ridiculous" because the bomb would be so unstable that it would be unmanageable.
The Americans had diverse opinions with respect to the reason for contamination Some
believed that it was the result of incompetence and poor management on the part of the
Argentines. Others believed that it was a joke against foreigners to those that the
Argentines didn't see as collaborators but as intruders. They also pointed out that the
159
20
traditional rivalry between the Security and Intelligence Forces in Argentine made the
investigation more difficult.
Despite the report Hunter gave to his superiors, the final report maintains the existence of
the Trafic pickup and the car bomb.
The Laborda report
In an expert report that Judge Galeano also collected and which was written by an ex-
official of the Gendarme (Laborda), it indicates that the Security and Armed Forces are
not taught in training courses about amonal, an explosive used in the attack. In the report,
Laborda gives a list of ingredients that comprise an explosive and a list of companies that
can provide them (industries, pharmaceutical companies, etc.) It assures that amonal does
not produce an ammonia smell.
It also enumerates various groups and organization that know its use and are in conditions
to use it. In this list the Brigada del Cafe is listed, a group of youths that travelled some
years ago to Nicaragua to help with the coffee harvest.
It goes without saying that in that list the Triple A, the National Alert or other rightist
organizations are not listed Nor are specialists of the Armed Forces or Military Factories.
In fact, the reconstruction of the attack was realized with the help of the military.
In confirming the quality of the report, we observed that many of the mathematic
calculations were wrong.
Jewish Institutions
Some months before the attack, the President of the AMI A, Dr. Alberto Crupnicoff was
alerted, through Dr. Bronstein of the DAI A, about the certain possibility of an attack.
Despite this, invoking economic reasons, nothing was done to avoid it. Measures were
not taken such as those to avoid the accumulation of people in the areas close to the
Ground Floor of the building, to reduce possible consequences. That laziness in decision-
making seems to still be the way both institutions operate None of the lawyers that form
part of the complaint have had previous experience in this type of matter and the
criminologists who from the start have worked in the AMIA-DAIA lawyers group don't
work full-time on the matter. None of them has event read the entire court record.
For political reasons, apart from the act in and of itself, different measures are
needed which correspond to "querellantes"'^ The case before Judge Galeano is moving
'^"La querella" in the Argentine judicial system, is equivalent to a type of private prosecutor. They can
demand measures and question all or part of a Court, in case the court is not acting in accordance with the
law.
160
21
slowly., Nor has the Court known how to carry the investigation forward. Nor has it
demanded minimally that the police or services assist it in undertaking measures of the
most basic common sense; such as investigating contradictions in the police report, the
fact that the guards were absent from their posts in the moment of the attack, the
irresponsibility in the care and search for proof, the quantity of testimony that was rejected
without being heard with the pretext that they had already had abundant information. This
abundance that did not serve to resolve absolutely anything. As with so many other
measures, or the lack of them, some of which form part of this report.
At no moment did the DAIA or the AMIA specifically denounce anyone, even
though they know'"^ all and each of the officials of greater or lesser hierarchy, of net anti-
Semitic past and present involved directly in the investigation of the case. Starting with
Dr. Bisordi, secretary to the Minister of the Court where the case of the attack against the
Embassy is investigated, to the current manifest Nazi advisors in the Interior Ministry.
Neither was the numerous quantity of robberies produced after the attack by firefighters
under the noses of the Federal Police which they belonged to, in nearby businesses and the
cadavers they needed to rescue. Nor was the irresponsibility with which they managed the
remains of the victims denounced, mixing everything together in a bag, without the
certainty that they belonged to the same person.
The remains, objects and other elements that were taken from the destroyed
building, possible necessary evidence for the investigation, were sent under police custody
to the University City ~ by order of the Court and to be evaluated later.
They were hardly deposited in the fenced terrain and with guards at the door and
nearby, when vagabonds were extraofficially notified the take material for its sale. They
walked on top of the remains and the evidence with total liberty.
Repeatedly and without any plan, despite the advice and orders from their lawyer's
group, the officials of the DAIA passed on information, and they continue doing so, to the
press. With this, the possibility increases that those measures requiring secrecy to be
effective, could be leaked out by investigators.
A few days ago. Judge Galeano announced to the heads of DAIA that he would
soon call for 30 searches. One cannot discount that these searches may serve to alleviate
pressure on the Court, for fear that the case changes hands. This fear is shared by some of
the attorneys of the DAIA, who prefer to maintain a friendly relationship with the Judge.
Even though searches require the most absolute reserve, Beraja announced on
television that very important measures would occur, alerting once again the possible
individuals that might be investigated.
much of the informalion in this report was checked and supplied by government officials and or lawyers
of both institutions.
161
22
In the case against Berges for trying to bribe Telleldin to recognize the Lebanese
extradited from Paraguay with respect to Suckdorf s case, the AMIA-DAJA lawyers'
group agreed to present itself as private prosecutors The possibility of doing this is based
in that the private prosecutors could be damaged with this false testimony. As such they
have the right to form part with the advantages that this implies for the basic cause.
The strategy in which this presentation is based has a double purpose: the first is to remind
Galeano what occurred in the Sivak case when the investigation was practically stopped,
and through a strategy similar was able to take the case from the court to Dr. Irurzin, who
in four months resolved what Velasco and Galeano could not resolve in two years.
If the pressure wasn't sufficient, they could move the case into another Court and continue
forward in a more efficient manner
Despite the agreement between the lawyers, those charged with making it happen did not
do so. After a month and a half they returned to the subject. They returned to talk about
it but until today nothing has been done.
The majority of the most spectacular and publicized measures were taken in coincidence
with different political circumstances such as Berges' detention, before the one year
anniversary of the attack. Now, it seems that the July 28 hearing of the International
Relations Committee in the House of Representatives in Washington, which will consider
the attack, should push the measures announced by Beraja.
In a television report, part of a special program paid by the AMIA, and made by the son of
the AMIA's President, Dr. Crupnicoff, ex President Raul Alfonsin said "I would have
liked to have seen them arrive at some solution, but I have not seen any important
complaint on the part of the Jewish community or on behalf of the Embassy of Israel in the
sense that things have been handled poorly by the government. Then neither can the UCR
go beyond what the community itself clamors for. We will always be aware to accompany
the community in all that can be done on a road that culminates with the clarification of
responsibilities."
When the leaders of the DAI A were alerted to the growing discontent among the families
of the victims, they incorporated one of them into the lawyers' group for fear that their
frustration would lead them to start separate complaints with a consequential loss of
control.
Luis Czyzewski, parent of one of the victims, was included and recently was invited to
participate in the September 28 hearing in Washington, but on the condition that the rest
of the relatives were not informed. Until now, the families gathered in a group called
Active Memory made its decisions as a group.
Also, about a month ago, about thirteen months after the attack, the first informative
meeting for relatives of the victims was held.
162
23
Conclusion
To be able to carry an investigation of the attack forward, difficulties exist that are not
related to the case in and of itself, but instead with political interference, inexperience and
lack of interest in the organisms in charge of the investigation.
The court proceedings are the testimony of a tiring game of chess, with different sectors as
protagonists, with two big absent groups: the relatives of the victims and the authors of
the massacre.
It is full of all kinds of psychological actions, pressures, false leads and testimony. The
abundant, insubstantial evidence ends up hiding the little data that could serve as a start
for an effective investigation.
Three groups comprised of journalist investigators achieved greater success in their
investigation than the Courts, the Federal Police, the Information Services and the
National Government all together This alone is a remarkable fact.
From an international point of view, the United States maintains, as does Israel, that the
attack was done by Iranian terrorists.
Even if the attack coincides with other attacks that happened contemporaneously in
different places of the world, its magnitude reveals a great collaboration of local forces.
The inefficiency (in the best of cases) of the officials involved in the investigation of the
attack, like those that should have foreseen it, plus the suspicious, evasive and
irresponsible attitude of the Federal Police, protected by a strategy designed by local
Information Services, in the manner that historically was done in the time of the
Dictatorship, only reinforces the hypothesis of LOCAL PARTICIPATION, be it of partial
or total responsibility . That is to say, if one cannot absolutely discard the connection with
international terrorism, the leads that have been followed until now probably form part of
a defense strategy and hide those truly responsible.
Repeatedly, different independent journalistic sources come denouncing the principal
repressive organisms, like the Police the Armed Forces and different Intelligence services
are infiltrated by anti-Semitic elements. The subject has generated also harsh internal
discussion in the Jewish community.
In the official institutions of the community, even if there is ample understanding of these
circumstances, their leaders have systematically refijsed to formulate the corresponding
announcements. This nevertheless is not absolutely lineal, because some of them in giving
declarations have unleashed the truth The president of the DAI A, who ultimately
adopted a very cautious attitude in order not to generate too many irritations with the
163
24
government, is used to denouncing certain anti-Semitic elements in repressive organisms.
Their accusations, at first sight, in some cases can appear to be a great force, but by not
being specific and naming names, efficiency is lacking.
The internal fights in the breast of the Jewish leadership prevail above the work that the
lawyers of the "querella" must undertake. They have not demanded that the government
or the Court investigate the local connection
164
25
This report was done by a team directed by Gabriel Levinas He is a journalist, he was the
Director of El Porteno magazine between 1981 and 1986. He was also a member of the
Jewish Movement for Human Rights.
Sources;
• Court Records
• CELS (Center for Legal and Social Studies)
• Luis Domievsky - Lawyer of the AMIA's querellante.
• Omar Lavieri - journalist for the newspaper Clarin.
• Herman Shiller. journalist and writer. Founder of the Jewish Movement for Human
Rights and ex-director of the magazine Nueva Presencia.
• Report supplied by the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Argentina, produced by
Northamerican journalists.
• SG - Former official of the Israeli Army, dedicated to the search for Nazi war
criminals.
• Archives of El Porteno and Nueva Presencia.
• Fernando Almiron, La Prensa newspaper.
• Colonel R. Horacio P Ballester Argentine Army (infantry).
• President of CEMIDA (Center of Military Officials for Democracy).
All the information in this report can be explained in greater detail upon request.
165
Guillermo Patricio Kelly
Posadas 1355, Capital Federal
Buenos Aires, Argentina
September 27, 1995
Committee on International Relations
2170 Rayburn Building
Washington D.C. 20515-6128
Mr. Benjamin A. Oilman
Chairman
Dear Mr. Oilman:
I am respectfully submitting to your committee a document to
be included in the congressional record for the hearing that will
take place on September 28, 1995 on Terrorism in Latin America /
AMIA Bombing in Argentina.
It consist of a document submitted by me and officially
entered on the record to the Argentine Supreme Court on August 3,
1994 requesting from the Argentine authorities to investigate
individuals that due to their background could very possible had
participated on those terrorist acts and a planned attempt to the
life of President Carlos Saul Menem. Since I have follow these
terrorist events very closely, I make myself available to your
committee for further consultations.
Respectfully yours,
Guillermo Patricio Kelly
/
166
Guillemo Patricio Kelly
Attachment to Argentine Supreme Court
1-Request from Mr. Kelly to the Argentine Supreme Court to depose
Cesar Alejandro Enciso (AKA "Pino", "el Polaco") picture attached,
whom due to his terrorist background might have knowledge on the
execution of the actual bombing of the Embassy of Israel and the
AMIA Building.
2.- Same request to depose Hector J. Villalon whom on his
background show that he was detain 1976 in France for the
kidnapping of the President of FIAT. His defense lawyers were also
the lawyers of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He presently
maintain extensive contact with Libya and Iran.
3. -Letter to Mr. Kelly from the Charge de Affair Embassy of Iran in
Argentina June 9, 1987, protesting his articles against them
and fundamentalist.
167
U r 9 • n t »
S(!iir/i KELLY GUILLERIIO PATRICIO
Ctllt RODRIGUEZ PEhA 208/ PISU 3* (ESI. ORft. tllCtlRDlLO )
El U)l.l d. li Co. I. Supr... d. Ju.tlcl. d» U H.clU hic. i.b.r
U* «uto. SlIHARlh illSTRinDO Ell LA COMISARIA 15' POR
AVFRIOIIACIOH OE LOS OELIIOB OE EXPLOSION,
IIOHJCIOIOS Y LESIONES CALIFICAOAS Y OAnOS
(ARTS. 184, 80 IMC 1' Y 5', 92 Y 183 OEL
CODIOO PEHAL ) CONJ10JIVO DEL ATENIAOO A LA
EHnAJAOA OE ISRAEL.
ORI) , el Irlhuml c«n ftclii 2fl d»
dlcttd» Provldfncli
Holji ESTA DlCEi . . .
OESIOHASE LA AUDIfNCIA DEL OIA 3 DE AGOSIO A IAS
... 10,30 MORAS A LOS EFECIOS OE RECIOIR OECLARA
ClOtl lEBTIFICAL A OIIIIIERHO PATRICIO KELLY,
FOO.i RICAROO LEVEIIE (II) , ■
icnot Aire., C'/dt )ull» de 1971
SUSAIIA Al ICIA OROZCO
Pr csecrel ar lo .l»f »
2
SOY
Nolltlcacio elv?:''/ cle luX" ' '-In/ I''/
slondo las J J' ns. consllh.
168
HANI Fl ESTA . ACOHPARA DO C UMENTAC I ON .
Exce I en t fs i ifta Corte Suprenia dc Justicia
de la Nac i 6h :
GUILLERMO PATRICIO KFLLY, periodista, arqen-
tino, por derecho propio, constituyendo domicilio en la
calle Rodriguez Pen a N" 2087, piso 3°, Dto."B" de esta Ca
pital Federal, en la causa que tiene por objeto procesal
el atentado terrorista contra la Embajada del Estado de
Israel, a V.E. respe t uosamen t e dice:
I. Que como resultado de la Intensiva Inves-
i tiqacion periodfstica en el canipo national e internacio -
I nal, de una enormc asociaclon ilfcita, considera pueda /
■ ser pertinente, la coniparencia ante V.E. de Cesar Alejan-
dro ENCISO (alias "Pino", "el Polaco"), para que maniries_
te si tiene conociniicnlo respecto .nl braz o ejecutor que
I llev6 a cabo la voladura de la Embajada del Estado de Is-
I rael y de la sede de la A. H.I. A.
I
: II. Que esta Suprema Corte de Justicia esta -
blezca si hay conexiones entrc Cesar Alejandro ENCISO y
I
Hector J.VILLALON, cuya actividad terrorista const a en la
docume n t ac I on que se acompana . Que los abogados defenso-
■ res de HSctor J.VILLALON en ParTs (Francia) cuando fu^ de^
tenido, luego del sccucstro del Presidcnte de la Flat, //
• eran los mismos abogados de Kome i n , quien en vida declar6
I la guerra terrorista a la civilizacion judeo cristiana. i
I III. Que no es necesario ir mas lejos de Resisj
169
tencia (Provincia del Chaco), en conexion con ParagOay y„
BrasM para obtener armas y explosives que hacen a la in-
vestigaci6n de esta causa, para lo cual tambifn se acompa
na documen tac i 6n entregada por el Jefe de Policia de la
Provincia del Chaco.
IV. Que por lo tanto soliclta la comparencla
de los ex-Ministros del INterior Julio Hera Figueroa y Jo
' si Luis Manzano, como asf tambiSn la del Dr.Jqrge Antonio
Gait.
Proveer de conformidad,
GUILLERMO PATMCIO KELLY
170
'«■ /-
7
;^^/; » li
C' ;h
'^ Y) ' :/
11:11 B<ienos Aires, a los tre.'j dias del ines de encjosto de l-)9-1,
comparecp fiiite el. senor Presidente de la Corte Siipremfi do
Jiisticia, dosctor Ricardo Leveiie ()») y el Secretaiio di- In
Corlie quo autoriza, el Sr. Procvirador General de la Mncion,
l.ir. Oscar Liijan Fappiano y el Sr. Procuradoi' Fisc.il Dr.
F.'Jiinrdo Cns.il, una persona prev.i amen te c.itada en esta c ;ui.">a
.S.l'VH a qiijen ne Je lilzo Paber que se le recibjra lestimo-
i\ial. I'restado que fiie ol jviramento de ley en lecial forma e
impiiesl.o dy las penalldades en que inciirrr ■. qiijonrji; so pirjclu-
ceii con falsedad, manifesto ser y llamarse: CUlLLPinMO I''ATI? I -
no KELLY, acreditando r;u identidad con C.I. l.figr? ;:nn . rlr>
ii-iciona lid;id argent Ino, do e.stado civil vindo, do pi 01"'- r. i on
P'?rio<l is:i;a , doniici 1 iado en Ilodriciuez Penn 20P7, 3o/ . nino
Caivital Federal . A precjuntas relacionadas con los liechori quo
nn i nvo.^ticjan y su;; parte.-^. y sin cow respecto a f;llo«; Ic
t.ompronden ] as d i. sposlciones generale.'i de la ley que en "nln
ni.to s»> lo explican, lespondio que (sntiendo qi.t'» no I r? .oni
pr<?ndcn ln;j c|eneral>'s de la ley. En relacjon con lor. mol ivor
<lo 5511 pi'osentacion eJ comp-nreclente desea )iacer- entreqa de
do'-.nmentos relacionados con Hector J. Villalon y Alejandro
r.ncisio. ride que el l"ni certifique sii aiitenU cidad, sobrc
flirecciones que da de Brssil y Mexico. Alii esta cor la
ririna del jefc de policin del Cbaco, que hnblo ayer f"^'
telefono con el, ini.a seiie de docnmentos re 1 acionadon con y'tw
atentado al Presidente Menem y mas docnmentacion sobre Jorcie
Antonio (Jail:. Se ordena la incorporacion de esta docnmeiita-
171
cioM conr.i n l;eii Le eii im escrito que comienza "Matii f i es tn .
Acompnnn tier nii\<^n l.m:' i on" ; nun caipnl.n nnil 1 ncia que rozn "Cnr-
peLa con Pains e i ii foi macioii tolacionada al ciiidadano Jorqe
Antonio Gail"; otia.s Cotocopias que einpiezaii con la leyeiida
"A Jos roiuiios OipiiLados de la Piovincia del Cliaco: JiisLo
Jose Pr-iiiii . . ."; y otia documoiitacioii sol^re Mr. H.ictior Villa-
Jon. Quo I iivo \uia Lei.u\j6n, con el que era el eiiihajador de
Inrae] en la Aryentina, Dr. Isaacc SheJci, donde coinenUnron
el ntenlatlo a la eml)ajada. Que se comento cr-^io se Iiahia
perdido l.iemiio sin encontrar a nlngun culpable. Que el ."je
l^abia liij 1 1- r:i;ado inuclio con las dec laracioncs del enLonfrofi
niinistio di^l .inLerioi- [)r. Manzano, refiriendose a que liahin
liabido una I -.^f)! ctsion jjor acumulacion dc explosives en ol
zoLano clf> la ombajada. Que l;ai cosa no eia ciorta dado que
inclu.'^.o haliia botellas de coca cola y un aparato de eniTqen-
cir. |--.i?. rlnv \.::z ci: cnso c!c cortr:s que r\'^^^i■: 7i]V.r:.':r.z:\z\c
pose a la f;:plosi on . Que el coinpareciente concui rio a ios
r: . li . II . 1/ . , rt .San Diecjo, i;;a 1 i f orni a , para ubicar al Dr. Jose
Luis Manzano, on La Joya, donde e.sta la Unlversidad, no
eiir.on 1.1 audi) I t> y entonces maiido un c:am.nr6gra lo a Mexico
(City) nl liol.'il Maria Isabel SlieraUon y este ultimo 1 >> pudo
ubicar en ol comedor y lo filmo con seis o siete peisonas
acompn.nandol o y luecjo el dicente i ncorporo esa filmacion al
proyrama M" 3 de su produccion, que pone a disposicion del
Tribunal. VA .Sr. presidente suqjere que seria interesante
los nporlf^ a lo que se compromete el dicente. Que el dicen-
172
N''-.>
M
V
te se Urasltido a Miami y l.e fiie dejniido siicesivos inonsajes
al Dr. Maiiznno y solamente se lo coiitesto en el ultimo viaje
en que el pasaba por Miami viniendo de Quito, Guayaquil, y
le dice que eslaba recabando de su cjrabadora los monsn jps .
Que estaba en e] hotel intercontinental de Miami. Que re!?pon-
<]ia a su llamado pero que no accedia a ningun tipo de entio-
vista periodistica . Le liizo notar que lial-ia accedidn con in
revista Gente con amplitud. Que le contosto que tal cosii no
era cierta, pero no quiso dlscutir con el. Le pidio que
aunque no fuera una entrevista para TV, que por favor tuvie-
ran una conversacion personal "of de record", contestar.dole
que "Ud. y yo podemos hnblar por T.E. todo el tiempo quo Ud .
quiera, pero no me gustaria encontraime personalmente" . l.o
dijo: "no ]o entiendo, en cualquier momento voy a vinjar
nuevamente a California y ya va a ver como vnmos a cor.vor-
sar" . En esta .-semana un diario, Cronica, comeiita que Marzano
v.i\ retiro de su domiciJio alejandose de la zona, San D.i<?c|o,
y que a partir de ese momento estaria en Wanliinyton. ^''^f'- el
dicenue recordo que habia estado con ei Sr. embajndor \jv .
Granillo Ocampo, testigo de por med • o el .Sr. .Jorgo
.•jilvarlno, camarografo e interprete, y f rente a un comenta-
rio sobre lo sucedido en la embajada de Israel, le respondio
"como era posible que le piegimtara lo sucedido en ese aten-
tado si todo el mundo sabia quienes eran" . Que al dicente le
llanio la atencion y no siguio preguntando nada . Que si el
tribunal lo requiere, acompanara articulo que realizo cot-
173
motivo de p.r^r, coiiverRnci on con Ci-anillo Ocnnipo. El presiden-
te solicil-.n que tambien lo acompane . Que )iace notar en este
momento del acto judjcial que desde liace T.uclios ancs siguien-
do la concepcion del mundo fiindamsntali sta donde si bi en es
cierto, l.odos los pueblos afabes tienen una religion, no
todon son ex t;remj st;as, pero el pcder lo tienen ellos. Cuando
hahln rlr- riuirlnitipii t a ) i nino . no )o )iace solo Hp t,-;^,-, ^ino
tambien de Iialc, la linea de Ghadafi y otros estados. Vor lo
tanLo .■3ig\ir: r.o.steniendo que la concepcion de los atentados
en el ii'indo peitenece a la teoria reliyiosa del
fundamenlia 1 i r;mo, en ente caso, islamico. Que independi.ente-
msnte nfn' :.nmo cuando se atenta contra el Papa, npaisce la
"plst;i Biil'-r'Hs" que lo hace una periodista norteamei icana
Rose, quo nnrin la rer.ponsable y los d iplomaticcs de Bulcja-
rin qu'.>d;u> fir- l.enidos . Que con el tiempo tienea que poiKjrlos
en libori -:rl y nl uniro prer.o es Aleli, ciue no tieno idea de
lo que li i zo . Que con epto quiere decii de acueido a todos
los t.rab.i jo;; de estos nnos y entrevistas a lo largo del
mundo, paia visualiznr bien este probleina, dado que ellos
sor.l:iencn 'lor^de Khomeini en adelante que ]a civil) zacion
Judeo-ci i si i ana estn liquidada y llego el moir.enUo de ir al
Coran. For otro lado Gliadafi, lanza el "libro verde" impreso
en todos lor-; jflioinas. Alii sostiene que las fuerzas armadas
pueden r.o/ liquidadas y trasladada« sus armais en tres dias y
pasadas a n5?ainbleas del pueblo. Que un reprosentr.nt-e de Irari
publica '^on f-.u Cirma en "La Macion" que a su juic.io 1-t argen-
174
wo%ie e/u/itetna ae Juaiicia </e ^ q/mc*6.
tlna esta "libanizada" . Dicen que van a llevar la guerra al
territorio occidental. Kn aquel tnomento parecia algo alViso-
nante, pero ahora las bombas estan apareciendo. El dlceiite
contempla esto y lo ha hecho publicamente, que su conduccion
es la que podia teiier a mano en todos los paises. Que est.^
se puede dar en todoo los paises. Que el dicente sostiene
(i|ue se esta trabajando sobre los hechos y no sobre las cau-
sas. Que aqui no se ha Investigado sobre uno solo de los
individvios qvie tienen antecedentes para atentados de esta
iia tiirale/^a . Fox t;bi> noinbrn ct Ceuai Alejando EncJsi), cillcis
Pino, Pinito o el Polaco, y pide la intervencion de este
Tribunal si ha tenido contact© con Hecto^ J. Villalon. Que
la direccion de Hector J. Villalon es Av. Pte. Wilson 40, 6°
y 7° piso, Paseo Trocadero, Paris, Francia. Que Enciso creo
que esta profugo y que agrega que no se lo encuentra porque
"nazi no encuentra nazi, o tropa no encuentra tropa". Que
como periodista ha recogido informacion y tambien en entre-
vistas mantenidas con diverse personal de inteligencia qvi<»
los ejecutores como posibles coparticipes para esta asocia-
cion ilicita -no solo esta el que pone la bomba, sino tam-
bien la accion psicologica posteerior, ecliandole la culpa a
las propias victimas-, que el alcance del dicente es realmen-
te limitado frente a la gravedad de los liechos ocurridos
ultimamente en los que se necesita frente a una razon de
estado, el aparato necesario que surge de.^ gobierno, servi-
cios de informaciones y un periodismo que indague y sign la
175
investigacion sin intereses politicos de nucleo o de monopo-
lio. Pregnntado como vincula a Encisci y Villalon con el
atentado a la embajada y que roles les adjudica, contesta
que en el escrito que acompanara se hace referenda a ello,
se cine a diclio escrito. Que el dicente no tiene el poder
del MinistRtio del Interior u otro organismo, y tiene que
liinitar.se en piimera instancia a esto, que es lo que corres-
ponde coitio ciudadano y periodista. Que este tribunal tiene
actuaciones que provinenen del juzgado de la Dra . Servini de
Cubria en el oaso de la bomba que le enviaron al dicente
niediante lui video-bomba . Que la empresa Oca sigue distribu-
yendo encomird-.das so pretexto que no puede fiscali7.ar el
contenido. Oue en el juzgado federal de Ushuaia CHta probado
que la diogn ne hace llegar por Oca. Los despaclios con las
bombas pava gendarmeria Nacional y el dicente, vienen por
Oca. Mo hay que buscar las fronteras, sino adentro . Las
bombas vionf?n del Cliaco, con un remitente que se llama Jorge
Antonio Gait, pero ambas investigaciones son separadas y los
jueces no .se linn juntado para investigar. Que aca hay gente
dispuesta a seyuir colocaiido gente como inercenarios y que
tanto el jieonazismo y el neocoinuni smo lo hacen bajo la con-
duccion del. f imdamentalismo iranista e islamista. Que no lo
tiene probacio pero hay una obligncion para investigarlo a
f!ondo . Sino nos va a pasar como en la pista Bulgara. Que el
dicente no esta para desarrollar la investigacion. Qu-- ayer
el dicente habla con el jefe de policia del Chaco, quien le
176
^
mr^P,'
\:\
■;i<:v.
lotit^ e/(//itema ae Jluiiicia c/e <^ oA'acidn
couTicSd que iio lia^ necesiddu at clejai conaLancia uc \n^
psnlidas del pais de la gente. t.e precjiinta por los explosives
y alii liay declaraclones que dicen que son personal del
ejercito y de servicios. Que hay que investigar las causas y
sus ejecutores. Interrogado el compareciente para que triani-
fieste si desea agregar algo mas a la preseiite declaracion,
declara: Que no. Con lo que no siendo para mas, V.E. dio por
finalizado el acto, previa lectura y ratiflcacion que hi/.o
el compareciente por si, firmando despues de V.E. y por luil'.e
mi, de lo que doy f e .
177
wmvaiada de ta
Q/iefuivuca oyMd/mica cut q7 ton
Nota -1^2,
Sefiores
Quorum
At. Sr. Editor Responsable
D. Guillermo Patricio Kelly
Buenos Aires, 9 de junio 1987
De nuestra consideracion,
Nos dirigimos a Uds. per medio de la presente
para hacer llegar nuestra protesta por lo que aparenta ser una carapafta
de desprestigio contra la Republica Islamica del Iran y su Lider el
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini a quienes insisten en presentar como men-
tores del Terrorismo Mundial, con multiples conecciones en el ambien-
te de la subversion. -No solo rechasamos las terrainos de estas publica-
ciones ( copia ad junta) por inexactos e injuriosos, sino porque ademas
atentan contra las buenas relaciones existentes entre ambos paises.-
En caso de que estas infundadas agresiones
persistieran nos veremos obllgados a hacer uso de las instancias lega-
les correspondientes.-
petuosamente.
Sin otro particular, saludaraos a Uds.res-
SeipcjJ Mohamma4^Mjrzamani
Ehc. de Neg^a.x*
o
22-101 O - 96 (184)
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